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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This project uncovers the rhetoric of gesture in British elocutionist handbooks on delivery 
(about 1650 to 1800). In the work of Bulwer, Sheridan, Walker, Priestley, Austin and 
others, the gesture exceeds its caricature in histories of rhetoric: an ancillary, if 
“detached” mechanism for the coercion of audience. Instead, the gesture produces 
meaning as it promotes appeal. It recommends presence as an inventional resource, and 
moving-with as a means to coming to terms, drawing toward what Crowley, writing in 
the context of contemporary political action, calls “civil discourse.” By tracking and 
analyzing the rhetorical gesture through interrelated thematic locations—medicine, 
theatre, pulpit, and philosophical chemistry—this project not only argues for re-
embodying invention, but also (like the Elocutionists themselves did) suggests that 
theorists of material and body rhetoric would benefit by extending their cross-disciplinary 
reach. Rhetorical gesture points out an alternative to “invention” (as well as rhetoric) that 
is by nature personal, oral and alphabetic. I offer this study/ gesture in support of current 
efforts to theorize the body’s role in the production of argument (Hawhee, Davis), as well 
as feminst rhetorics that assert the importance of looking beyond the speaker (Glenn, 
Ratcliffe) and even text, for rhetorical subjects and “stance.” 	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INTRODUCTION: 
 
GESTURE LURE 
 
 
1  THE BEST LAID CAST 
 
In Book 6 of Institutio Oratoria, by way of touting the influence of appeals to emotion 
upon judges, Quintilian cautions that even the best-laid appeal can fall flat owing to body 
language. To illustrate, he describes courtroom scenes featuring the consequences of 
advocates’ lack of attunement with (or disregard of) other bodies. For example, he 
explains, an advocate who defends a woman thought it strategic for his peroration to 
produce an image of her husband in order to elicit sympathy from the court. However, the 
room only laughs: “the persons whose business it was to produce it,” unfamiliar with the 
genre, “displayed it to view whenever the advocate looked towards them and, when it 
was brought still more into sight at the conclusion,” when it was meant to be shown, “it 
destroyed the effect of all his previous eloquence by its ugliness, being a mere cast from 
an old man’s dead body.”1 Having emphasized that the best way to rouse feeling in 
judges is by rousing feeling in oneself—and that the surest way to “generate these 
emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power”2 is through deeply cast 
impression, and thus feeling—Quintilian emphasizes that this orator had the right idea. 
The flaw was with his execution. For meeting the laughter, he forgets the living element 
of his delivery, and carries on as planned. The death cast is what becomes of his speech, 
and its reception. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Lee Honeycutt, tr. John Selby Watson (Ames: Iowa State, 
2006), VI.i.40.  
2 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, tr. H. E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 
VI.i.29. 
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2  RHETORICAL GESTURE 
 
I begin with the cast to introduce rhetorical gesture: motions of the body that are 
more than ornament, more than rational, and more than one’s own. Rhetorical gesture, I 
argue, is means not only to what Adam Kendon terms “manifest, deliberate 
expressiveness,” but it is also means to thinking through and reclaiming movement, 
formation and deformation, excess, occurrence—the event—as rhetorical opportunity.3 
Although this gesture is not containable to the hand—indeed, it will course a foot, 
a shoulder, a torso, a posture, or even a handful of postures, side by side by side—the 
hand is a fitting place to begin a historiographic narrative about the relationship between 
gesture and rhetoric. In “The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and the Rhetoric of the Closed 
Fist,” Edward P.J. Corbett describes the rhetoric of the open hand as characteristic of “the 
kind of persuasive discourse that seeks to carry its point by reasoned, sustained, 
conciliatory discussion of the issues.”4 The closed fist “seeks to carry its point by non-
rational, non-sequential, often non-verbal, frequently provocative means.”5 The open 
hand depends on the “seat of the intellect,” while the closed fist depends on the “seat of 
the pants.”6 My project takes a part in contemporary efforts to restore the rhetoric of the 
closed fist—not by way of abandoning the open hand, but by arguing that reasoned 
engagement is also wholly bodily. Thinking through bodily gesture offers a model of 
invention that acknowledges both what Sharon Crowley describes as appeal to the gut 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Adam Kendon, Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 15. 
4 Edward P. J. Corbett, “The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and the Rhetoric of the Closed Fist,” 
College Composition and Communication 20 (1969): 288. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 293. Paraphrasing Leland M. Griffin in “The Rhetorical Structure of the ‘New Left’ 
Movement.”  
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and what Edwin Hutchins calls “cognitive systems that transcend the boundaries of 
individual bodies.”7 As Crowley says, “Beliefs can be learned by means of discourse, but 
they can also be learned through adopting bodily positions, making gestures, and 
performing movements.”8 Scholars of rhetoric should not merely treat bodies as 
receptacles for rhetorical effect. We should instead consider our own bodies, proximities, 
and gut sense as ways of thinking, and of coming to terms.  
Although this rhetoricity of gestures might seem intuitive (gestures are, after all, 
like textual arguments, always moving) rhetoricians have been quick to cordon off 
gestures as  
• unrhetorical, by ignoring them; 
• slightly rhetorical, in that gestures “ornament” speech; or 
• rhetorical, but only for sophists. 
This last caricature—of gesture as lure—is the one that interests me the most. The 
spellbinding rhetor is caught in an unwieldy gesture. A sort of “zap” radiates from the 
posture, which dazzles the unsuspecting audience into concurrence. These gestures, this 
caricature suggests, have a way of running away with you. You had better keep an eye out 
for their enchantments. 
This caricature reinforces the pervasive notion that invention and delivery are 
separate processes that occur in separate locations, at separate times, and had best be 
taken up separately. It also reinforces the notion that gesture is ancillary both to speech 
and to forming an argument.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sharon Crowley, Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 2006), 4.  
8 Ibid., 4. 
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This caricature it is also the reason that I turn to the 18th-century British 
Elocutionists to search for a new use for rhetorical gestures. Rhetorical critics and 
historians (in the 18th century and now) sketch the Elocutionist as a poser—a little too 
caught up with facial expression, tone of voice, and foot position in delivery. I was 
intrigued by this embarrassing patch in British rhetorical history, which stands accused of 
mistaking delivery for rhetoric, and bodily persuasion for argument. But what I found in 
the work of these elocutionists was not merely a rigid code for comporting bodies. Not 
just gesture cookbooks. Instead, I found theorists who speak of gestures in terms of 
currents of energy, of the influence of heat on persuasion, and to the generative powers of 
the motions that move us. For these Elocutionists, the problem of rhetorical efficacy in 
Britain is precisely material: the British rhetor loses auditors to the cold. Symptoms of the 
chill manifest on both rhetor and auditor during rhetorical exchange and look like this: 
stolid bodies, folded hands, inscrutable faces, try to keep out of reason’s way. While the 
still-bodied argument proves rational indeed, it suffers from something of a transmission 
problem. “Other bodies” are not targets in this equation so much as resources for 
movement. 
My work undertakes a genealogy of gesture as the craft whose forgetting gives 
rise to the conventional relegation delivery to the bottom of the canon-totem. Gesture, I 
argue, is meaning-in-formation. Its appeal is both fully inbodied and fully relational. 
Considering gesture in this way puts rhetorical invention in material terms. Such 
invention enjoins what Jenny Rice calls “the sensation of involvement, and thought-
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impingement,” and inventional practice—or moves—that acknowledge the bodies with 
which we act and mean.9  
I argue that the relationship between gesture and the bodily production, reception, 
and transmission of argument is a marginalized but vital component of current body 
rhetoric as well as the historical canon of rhetorical theory and practice. In what follows, 
I will first describe Quintilian’s discussion of improvisation, which the Elocutionists in 
my case studies extend. Although these Elocutionists uses Cicero and Quintilian as 
sources for what actio is and does, each has distinctive ideas about how gestures operate 
in relation to speech and what role they play in deliberation. Quintilian fluently 
demonstrates the importance of gestural rhetorical production to eloquent speech, but 
fails to offer a clear basis for how the capacity for such production might be cultivated. 
This tension in Quintilian serves as a useful introduction both to the Elocutionists—who 
embody, take up, and respond to it—and to my own historiographic argument, which 
seeks to clarify the second point. Following that, I offer a summary of (rhetorical 
gestures, what I am doing in this dissertation, or my argument and its implications). To 
close, I briefly describe each of the chapters and the argument’s arc. 
 
3  SLEIGHT OF HAND 
 
Other advocates, less efficacious than Quintilian, attribute postures to their client, 
which the client in no way manifests (“‘He is raising his supplicating hands towards your 
knees’” while the client merely sits), or with dramatic flare, reference the unfolding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jenny Rice, “Executive Overspill: Affective Bodies, Intensity, and Bush-in-Relation,” 
Postmodern Culture 15, no. 1 (2004): 9. 
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activities of a client who has long since left the room.10 Needless to say, these appeals 
frequently collapse as those “who cannot vary from what they have composed [about the 
supposed posture of the client] are either struck dumb at such occurrences or, as is 
frequently the case, say what is not true.”11 For how can you move sympathy to the 
bodies of others, when you will not react yourself? Quintilian points out the simple fact 
that rhetorical appeal is excruciatingly momentary—and happening (or precisely not 
happening) irregardless of speech. Through these examples of advocates refusing to react 
bodily as a component of their own persuasion, Quintilian demonstrates that appeal is 
fully embodied; it is contingent on connections between people for its very formation—
not merely some sort of “expulsion” that hits or misses its mark. The audience 
contributes to developing content, in terms of energy, feedback, and even disruption. 
Audience “gives strength to our voice, fluency to our tongue, and vigor to our gesture.”12 
For this reason, rhetors “cannot develop the same intelligence and energy before a single 
listener as they can when inspired by the presence of a numerous audience…No, there 
would be no such thing as eloquence, if we spoke with only one person at a time.”13 The 
eloquence that Quintilian calls for is not pressed and starched style. Rather, this 
“eloquence”—“in sympathy with the emotions of which it is the mouthpiece”—is that 
which inhabits the term as it becomes used in (and since characterizes) 18th century 
rhetoric.14 Eighteenth-century eloquence is likewise premised on the notion that “we 
should be moved ourselves before we attempt to move others.”15 It is “feeling,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Honeycutt, Institutes of Oratory, VI.i.42, VI.iii.41. 
11 Ibid., VI.i.42. 
12 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, X.vii.26. 
13 Ibid., VI.ii.29. 
14 Ibid., I.x.24. 
15 Ibid., VI.ii.26. 
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Quintilian says, that makes us be moved; and in this “the life and soul of oratory is to be 
found.”16  
Quintilian critiques the bad logistical habit (especially among young orators) of 
sticking so closely to the script as to ignore the dynamic space before one while 
delivering,  “because our search for premeditated ideas makes us miss others, and we 
draw our matter from memory rather than from the subject on which we are speaking.”17 
This tendency  owes to rhetorical training, Quintilian suggests, because in school settings 
it is easy to separate what seems like the basic activity of composition from delivery. 
When practicing oratory in school, “we give play to our imaginations freely and with 
impunity, because whatever we wish is supposed to be done.”18 But as the story makes 
plain, “what the instant demands” is reception of and instantaneous response to the pulse 
of the field. One has “to build up what is to follow and to secure that there will always be 
some thought formed and conceived in advance ready to serve,” even as one “pays out 
what he has in hand” in terms of voice, comportment, and gesture.19 Quintilian articulates 
the clearance between uptake and output, wherein  
Whatever portion of our matter is consumed in speaking, an equal amount 
must be brought forward from that which is to follow, so that, until we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., X.vii.15, VI.ii.7. 
17 Ibid., X.vi.6. He illustrates both what is lost in the former and gained by the latter practice with 
the story of Cicero’s, in which an inexperienced advocate, delivering his rehearsed peroration, 
asks, “Why do you look so fiercely at me, Severus?” To which snaps Cassius, “I was doing 
nothing of the kind, but if it is in your manuscript, here you are!” and delivers a scowl 
(Honeycutt, Institutes of Oratory, VI.i.43). 
18 Honeycutt, Institutes of Oratory, VI.i.43. 
19 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, X.vii.9. 
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arrive at the end, our prospect may advance no less than our step, unless, 
indeed, we are content to stop and stumble at every phase…20 
The rhetor should look ahead to what he knows to say based on goals for the case (or 
premeditation). But he should plug in to the other bodies in the space, in order to 
continually reformulate as he unfolds that scheme. One is likelier to feel “some glowing 
thought, suggested on the instant.”21 So attuned, one has a higher capacity for generating 
effective arguments: “there are more things that may be discovered than ever yet have 
been.”22  
Otherwise it is the “unhappy coherence” of the death cast.23 But how best to tap in 
to that field of action? How to maintain the flow once drawn? Quintilian has little in the 
way of practical answers to such questions. He suggests that it is a mechanical, vaguely 
physiological “knack” like that which allows one’s eyes to read several lines ahead of 
that which the hand pens: “It is a similar knack which makes possible those miraculous 
tricks which we see jugglers and masters of sleight of hand perform upon the stage, in 
such a manner that the spectator can scarcely help believing that the objects which they 
throw into the air come to hand of their own accord, and run when they are bidden.”24 
There is a certain medium (and “between”) to such phenomena. In the penning example, 
the information seems to be someplace while it is neither on the eye nor yet in the hand—
it seems to keep, intentionlessly. The juggler’s motion triggers the viewer’s release from 
rational thought. Describing writing inspiration, Quintilian cautions that “if retarded by 
the slowness of the pen,” thoughts and images “are liable to grow cold and, if put off for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Honeycutt, Institutes of Oratory, X.vii.10. 
21 Ibid., X.vi.5. 
22 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, X.vi.6. (“Quae inveniri possunt quam quae inventa sunt.”) 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., X.vii.11. 
	   9	  
the moment, may never return.”25 Quintilian admits of the “irrational” aspect of this 
knack, which transfers readily to rhetorical improvisation; he merely stipulates that use of 
any such ineffable, physical component of invention “nevertheless be founded on 
reason.”26 
4  FIELD OF ACTION 
 
Ultimately, the “certain medium” is left at that, although Quintilian does suggest 
that eloquence rests on what you carry with you. The rhetor “should have [the case] at his 
fingers’ ends,” because “there is no time to think.”27 Quintilian offers little in terms of 
specific practice, pedagogy, or theoretical basis for how a rhetor can cultivate the 
capacity for maintaining a case “at his fingers’ ends,” a lack that persists even in 
contemporary turns to material and bodily theories of rhetorical generation and 
persuasion. 
Material rhetoric has an articulated history, but it is not a history of material 
rhetoric. The histories described by contemporary body rhetoricians often overlook past 
theories of rhetoric centered on bodies and materiality in favor of their refutation of 
rational rhetorics bound up with the Cartesian premise. In other words, there is not much 
of a canon (or working vocabulary) for material rhetoric, despite Blair’s observation that 
materiality imbues and undergirds all that rhetorical critics do.28 This project locates 
support and precedent for attention to rhetoric’s materiality off the histories’ better-worn 
paths. Quintilian’s above admonition sets the stage for my account of those British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., X.vii.13. 
26 Ibid., X.vii. 11. 
27 Ibid., VI.iv.8. 
28 Carol Blair, “Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places,” Western 
Journal of Communication 65, no. 3 (2001): 271-294. 
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Elocutionists who are obscured and under-theorized—under-historicized—because of the 
nature of their theory, and the extent to which their work does not fit the caricature that 
has been written for eighteenth century rhetoric.  
I picked four case studies, each centered on a different Elocutionist, and a 
different “disciplinary” approach to gesture. Works by John Bulwer, Thomas Sheridan, 
Joseph Priestley, and Gilbert Austin highlight the range of substantive approaches to 
“harnessing” gesture during this period, and the “story” of how gestures serve rhetoric 
(and vice versa). With Quintilian, the subjects of these case studies feel that invention and 
delivery are bound together, very much embodied, and that the best rhetoric is born of 
kinesis. Each of these theorists argue that the motions that course through our bodies 
during rhetorical engagement are not only means to persuade, but themselves key to 
making and sustaining such connections, and ultimately, for the process of lively 
invention. Probing the anatomy of gesture, from its inceptive motion outside the body to 
its manifest (skin, heart, hands), these theorists—running with Quintilian’s admonition—
track the gesture as it circulates and forms.  
This gesture exceeds its caricature in histories of rhetoric: an ancillary, if 
“detached” mechanism for the coercion of audience. Instead, the gesture produces 
meaning as it promotes appeal. It recommends presence as an inventional resource, and 
moving-with as a means to coming to terms, drawing toward what Crowley, writing in 
the context of contemporary political action, calls “civil discourse.” By tracking and 
analyzing the rhetorical gesture through interrelated thematic locations—medicine, 
theatre, pulpit, and philosophical chemistry—this project not only argues for re-
embodying invention, but also (like the Elocutionists themselves did) suggests that 
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theorists of material and body rhetoric would benefit by extending their cross-disciplinary 
reach. This work points out an alternative to an “invention” (as well as rhetoric) that is by 
nature personal, oral and alphabetic. I offer this study in support of current efforts to 
theorize the body’s role in argument, as well as feminist rhetorics that assert the 
importance of looking beyond the speaker, and even text, for rhetorical subjects and 
“stance.”29 
Although the names of these Elocutionists are somewhat familiar, my argument 
hinges on aspects to their rhetorical theory that are lesser known, and that lay ground for 
my larger historiographic project of broadening the stage for what counts as “rhetorical 
gesture.” Together, these theorists challenge the assumption (implied by Quintilian) that 
delivery is somehow invention’s lagging strand. More importantly, they challenge 
Corbett’s assumption that “rhetorical activity [does] become coercive rather than 
persuasive when it resorts to the non-rational.”30 Presenting a bold case for “knack,” I 
argue that suasion is inextricable from its gesture, living and pounding through us at 
times before we realize. Argument is quick and kinetic, that gesture foundational to its 
craft. 
 
5  GESTURAL ECOLOGIES  
 
In the thick of his praise for the immaterial realm of ratiocination, “purely 
spiritual, and not less distinct from every part of the body than blood from bone, or hand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See, e.g. Glenn, Cheryl and Krista Ratcliffe, eds., Silence and Listening as Rhetorical Arts 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2011).  
30 Corbett, “The Rhetoric of the Open Hand,” 293. 
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from eye,”31 Descartes suggests at least two things which are useful to the project of 
Elocutionist rhetoric, and which set the stage for Chapter One, which takes up John 
Bulwer (1606-1656) and the influence of philosophical anatomy on seventeenth-century 
theories of rhetorical delivery.  
First, Descartes makes a strong claim as to the prevalence of motion that happens 
without volition from the will, “as often happens when we breathe, walk, eat, and indeed, 
when we perform any action that is common to us and the beasts,” and for the 
transference of this motion between bodies.32 He allows, in other words, that “flinching” 
happens when one’s friend moves a fist to one’s face; he simply does not think that the 
category of action has anything to do with judgment. Second, he underscores the power 
of a passion unleashed. It is as if the water that runs through his famous fountain-
automata takes on a life of its own. The fountaineer cannot keep Neptune from 
brandishing his trident if the stranger follows Diana to the rose bush: 
There is one special reason why the soul cannot readily change or suspend 
its passions…the passions are not only caused but also maintained and 
strengthened by some particular movement of the spirits.33  
External objects “may be compared to strangers, who entering into one of the grottoes 
containing many fountains, themselves cause, without knowing it, the movements which 
they witness.”34 In such situations, the fountaineer’s only recourse is to wait until the 
spirits have died down.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, 1649, tr. Robert Stoothoff, in The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 341. 
32 Ibid., 335. 
33 Ibid., 345. 
34 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 1641, tr. J. Cottingham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 260. 
	   13	  
[These spirits] have no property other than that of being extremely small 
bodies which move very quickly, like the jets of flame that come from a 
torch. They never stop in any place…pores conduct them into the nerves, 
and then to the muscles. In this way the animal spirits move the body in all 
the various ways it can be moved.35  
Some movements issue so immediately from their commotion that “no amount of human 
wisdom is capable of counteracting” them.36 Furthermore, Descartes says, “the utility of 
all the passions consists simply in the fact that they strengthen and prolong thoughts in 
the soul which it is good for the soul to preserve and which otherwise might easily be 
erased from it.”37 The description itself suggests that even “thoughts in the soul” have 
gestural cogs—a consistency, a lifespan.38  
Chapter One provides the ground for the dissertation’s subsequent case studies 
through an analysis of Bulwer’s gesture manual, Chirologia: Or the Natural Language of 
the Hand and Chironomia: Or the Art of Manual Rhetoric (1644) in conjunction with his 
Pathomyotomia, or a Dissection of the Significative Muscles of the Affections of the Mind 
(1649). Chirologia …Chironomia is crucial to a history of body rhetoric. Bulwer’s 
treatise represents one of the last roads not taken en route to the Cartesian revolution in 
rhetorical theory. Bulwer claims movement as a resource for the construction of rational 
discourse—to find “civil conversation,” rhetors must lead as well as follow with the 
hands.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Descartes, Passions, 331-32. 
36 Ibid., 403. 
37 Ibid., 354. 
38 But even wonder, he says, an “object of passion” that has been absorbed, and lent the body as 
well as the thought shape, must be checked, lest it “prevent or pervert the use of reason” (ibid., 
355). 
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Bulwer’s significance is more than canonical: rhetoric’s contemporary material 
turn focuses on the body’s role in the receptivity of appeal, but less so the body’s 
relationship to the appeal’s production. Bulwer argues that gestures are, quite literally, 
embodied topoi, commonplaces of the body, positions one puts oneself in to give rise, 
shape, and meaning to speech. Bulwer’s gestures are what contemporary gesture theorist 
David McNeill might call “co-expressive but potentially non-redundant” with speech, 
and enact feedback loops between one’s utterance and one’s utterance formulation.39 
Bulwer’s location of the construction of rational argument at the confluence of mind and 
hand provides an alternative to both Cartesian and contemporary body rhetoric. His 
treatises are an unrecognized but vital resource for exploring the moving body as 
inventional resource, and for understanding the quality of action-in-relation that moves 
between animated rhetorical subjects. 
Although Bulwer suggests that these gestures draw impetus from nearby bodies, 
he does not offer means by which to think about their uptakes. In other words, Bulwer’s 
gestures are rather personal things. Thomas Sheridan (1719-1788) offers a bridge from 
the work of Bulwer to that of Joseph Priestley, whose rhetorical gesture, contra Bulwer’s, 
is extra-sympathetically fashioned between bodies, in currents that are not un-electric. 
Chapter Two begins this exploration of the sympathetic movement or transmission of 
rhetorical production through gesture by focusing on the aspects of Sheridan’s rhetorical 
theory that bring to bear his experience as one of the most popular stage actors in Ireland. 
The chapter also uncovers productive overlap between contemporary theories of 
persuasion in the context of speech and stage. Sheridan’s interest in gestures is manifest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 David McNeill, Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal About Thought (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 339. 
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in his work as a stage manager, on stagecraft, and focuses on performers’ ability to draw 
energy from one another through movement. Later, his elocutionary texts center on the 
gestural rhythms that form between rhetor and audience bodies, and on the role of these 
rhythms in “everyday” vernacular eloquence. This shift sets up a distinctive if gnarly (as 
in tangled up, and tough to tease out) rhetoric of what Sheridan calls, “social gestures.” 
I offer that Sheridan’s claim for rhetoric-as-delivery is worth taking seriously. For 
all his fervency, Sheridan offers means by which to consider the relationship between 
gesture and the body public. Sheridan’s delivery is less decision than possession—less a 
question of containment than contaminant. Sheridan’s work also offers a platform by 
which to think about “ecologies of gesture”—of currents of motion as resources that may 
be tapped and consumed; and of “appeal” construed of assemblages between bodies, 
rather than “private” motions that merely emanate outward. 
Sheridan’s Course of Lectures on Elocution (1762) is published more than a 
century after Bulwer’s death, but picks up on and develops a number of Bulwer’s 
exigencies—among them, the need to bring delivery back to the center of rhetorical 
studies. For Sheridan this derives in part from the national need to keep pace with the rest 
of Europe in terms of oratory, religion, politics, and art.  As with Bulwer, however, 
Sheridan insists that any project for an improved oratory will fail absent gesture. Speech 
without facial expression and gesture, which together Sheridan calls “the natural 
language of the passions,” is “artificial, weaker, and accompanied with no natural 
delight.”40 If Sheridan’s claim is that oratory fails absent gesture, the scientific work of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Thomas Sheridan, An Oration, Pronounced Before a Numerous Body of the Nobility and 
Gentry, Assembled at the Musick-Hall in Fishamble-Street (Dublin: Printed for M. Williamson, 
1757), 17. 
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Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) provides a basis for considering how bodily movements are 
not so much pre-requisites for eloquence as they are fundamental to rhetoric itself. 
Priestley, natural philosopher (best known for the discovery of oxygen) and 
dissenting minister proposes a more refined way to bring physical science to the aid of 
rhetoric. This chapter begins at the preface of A Course of Lectures on Oratory and 
Criticism (1777), where Priestley nods to Kames as the basis for his inbuilding of 
Hartlean associationism to his rhetoric’s core. Priestley elaborates a rhetoric contingent 
on physical transmission and concatenation of ideas through the principle of vibrations, 
whereby a rhetor’s word and gesture “conduct” as it were to the skin, and then to the 
mind of the audience, where it leaves an indentation (a change in constitution of the 
part)—or impression. Integrating contemporary work on rhetoric and affect, Chapter 3 
argues that Priestley’s notion of “cross impressing” helps to theorize an embodied and 
reasonable ethical speaking and listening.  Here rhetors come to steer and be steered by 
their audience, so that one might, effectively, form a habit of embodiment in relation to 
particular listeners. 
Priestley is most known as a chemist, but his chemistry and physics are both 
central to what I tease out as his contributions to the relationship between embodied 
persuasion and the agency of the rhetor. Rhetors do not “excite prey to self-motion” so 
much as provide incentive that prompts them to continue to move themselves41—i.e. do 
not awaken hidden electricity so much as collect it. Priestley’s rhetorical gesture is more 
centrifugal than Bulwer’s or Sheridan’s, centering on the persuasive potential latent in the 
conductive possibility between particular bodies. Gesture simultaneously creates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 J. L. Heilbron, Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries: A Study of Early Modern Physics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 133. 
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conditions of possibility, recognizes their existence, and fosters/guides them in particular 
ways.   
Gilbert Austin’s (1753-1837) Chironomia: Or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery 
(1806) is the only British treatise apart from Bulwer’s that focuses on gesture exclusively 
during the long eighteenth century. Austin enables a pointed return to a theory of rhetoric 
that, as in Bulwer, and Priestley, is built around a scientific frame of rhetoric as an 
ongoing physical phenomenon. Chapter 4 argues that Austin’s Chironomia gives us an 
extensive theoretical account of gesture’s potential warming effect on bodies. For Austin, 
the effect is more than metaphor. His theory has much to do with Britain’s weather, 
manifesting what had become a national fascination not only with weather’s 
measurement and predictability, but also with its ultimate uncontrollability (for all the 
Enlightenment’s effort), and the effects of its extremes as the Little Ice Age (ca. 1300-
1850) drew near its end. Bulwer, Sheridan, and Priestley all demand that we think of 
eloquence—Quintilian’s effective appeal—in terms of the cultivation of capacity for 
appropriate and effective gestural persuasion.  Austin’s climatic rhetoric points the way 
to a theory of rhetorical possibility, capacity, resource, and exigence less in terms of 
rhetorical situation, than rhetorical climate.  In Austin’s rhetoric, bodily movement 
physically transfers warmth through speech or composition to make microclimates, 
changing the temperature and thus disposition of the hearer.  
Like Priestley, Austin understands rhetorical persuasion to be a physical process 
of influence-transfer across and through bodies.  I examine what Austin takes to be the 
logistics of the transference or infusion of rhetorical effect between rhetors. If rhetoric is 
a process of influence (or energy) transfer, then ethical and effective rhetorical practice 
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should conserve heat. The Elocutionists were fond of manuals: Bulwer’s catalogued hand 
gestures, Sheridan’s bodily pose given particular exigencies of oration and stage.  Austin 
went farther to incorporate gesture into written argument, developing a complex notation 
system that he hoped could enable the written trace or signification of gesture on the 
page. Austin’s contemporaries, however—as well as recent Austin scholarship—tend to 
view his obsession with notation as part and parcel of a kind of fussiness, or a need to 
catalogue, delimit, and thus minimize the passion potential latent in gestural persuasion. I 
address Austin’s notational system as a means not to minimize, but rather to capture the 
atmosphere of argument—and to increase popular participation, in parallel to a 
contemporary popular uptake of meteorological research, in that conservation effort. 
The epilogue speaks to how these case studies inflect and inform contemporary 
conversations about material and body rhetoric, and why those inflections matter.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
PUTTING RHETORIC BACK IN THE FIST: JOHN BULWER’S CHIRONOMIA, 
CHIROLOGIA 
 
John Bulwer (1606-1656) is best known to rhetorical scholars as “the one with the 
pictures.” Billed as interesting, yet inconsequential, Bulwer appears most typically in 
rhetorical histories as a novelty figure, cast between rhetoricians of the Renaissance and 
the elocutionists, while untethered to both. Bulwer’s gesture manuals, Chirologia: or the 
Natural Language of the Hand and Chironomia: or the Art of Manual Rhetoric 
(published together in 164442), do not fit prevailing Ramistic or neo-Ciceronian narratives 
of seventeenth-century rhetoric. But this lack of fit, and with it, Bulwer’s case for the 
embodied rhetoric of gestures, is critical to a history of material rhetoric. Appearing 
around the same time as Descartes’ Principia Philosophiae (1647), Chirologia and 
Chironomia insist that argument forms and moves with the body. Bulwer’s gestures far 
exceed what has become their caricature in the histories: ancillary if “detached” 
mechanisms for the emotional manipulation of audience. Laying out one of the last roads 
not taken en route to the Cartesian revolution in rhetorical theory, Bulwer instead claims 
movement as a resource for the construction of rational discourse—that to find “civil 
conversation,” rhetors must lead as well as follow with the hands (171).43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Both essays are concerned with gestures in communication. Chirologia describes a broad range 
of commonly used “discoursing gestures”; Chironomia hones in on those gestures best suited to 
rhetors.  
43 Bulwer was certainly not the first to bring the hand to bear on rhetorical delivery. He draws 
heavily on classical sources to justify his project and as basis for many specific hand and finger 
canons—especially Quintilian. As Cleary observes, from Giovanni Pierio Valeriano’s Ieroglifici 
(1625) Bulwer gets the idea of illustrative chirograms; and particular rhetorical gestures and 
examples from Ludovico Cressollius’ Vacationes autumnales sive perfecta oratoris actione et 
pronunciatoione (1620) (James W. Cleary, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Chirologia: Or the Natural 
Language of the Hand, and Chironomia: Or the Art of Manual Rhetoric, (Carbondale: Southern 
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Bulwer’s gestures constitute more than a canonical basis for material rhetoric.44 
Repositioning Bulwer in contemporary rhetorical theory takes up Hawhee’s call for 
rhetorical theorists and historians to “stretch beyond merely noticing bodies” in rhetorical 
history so as to pointedly theorize the body’s materiality in rhetorical acts.45 Bulwer’s 
treatises challenge contemporary scholars of material and body rhetoric to attend to 
gestures—to start seeing rhetorical acts for their component parts; to mind appeal in 
affinities of movement, and response or assertion that may be gestural; to consider 
especially the relationship between gestures and the production of what Crowley calls 
“civil discourse.” A material rhetoric informed by Bulwer can help to develop vocabulary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Illinois University Press, 1974), xxii-xxiii). It is less clear whether Bulwer was privy to more 
contemporary developments in Italy, like the 1616 work of Giovanni Bonifacio’s L’Arte de’ 
Cenni (1616), a compendium of bodily signs by which a person’s inner soul may be read and 
sentiment projected onto others (according to profession), or Francesco Bartolomeo Ferrari’s 
1627 work, De veterum acclamationibus et plausu libri septem, which focuses on the gesture of 
acclimation (Kendon, Gesture, 17-42).  
44 For example, see Jenny Rice, “The New New: Making the Case for Critical Affect Studies,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 94, no. 2 (2008): 200-212; Debra Hawhee, Moving Bodies: Kenneth 
Burke at the Edges of Language (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2009); 
Richard Marback, “Corbett’s Hand: A Rhetorical Figure for Composition Studies,” Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2008): 46-65; and Phaedra Pezzullo’s Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of 
Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007). 
45 Debra Hawhee, “Somatography,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 93, no. 3 (2007): 365-374. This 
analysis also continues the historiographic effort she and others have taken toward returning 
attention to how bodies were being theorized during this time period, in particular, given its 
attention to rhetoric’s materiality. Recent scholars challenge assumptions in rhetorical studies that 
separate rationality from emotion in discourse; this includes Daniel Gross, whose Secret History 
of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science rereads rhetorical history to show 
emotion as less the product of deep organism than complex social economy, and en route, calls 
pathos “the very condition for the possibility of rational discourse” (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). Susan Miller, in Trust in Texts: A Different History of Rhetoric similarly 
aims to decentralize logos from pervading tradition to explore how a focus on emotion—and 
artifacts across disciplines and periods (including elocutionism)—complicating and expanding 
traditional rhetorical principles (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007). Other 
scholars explore diverse constructions of rhetorical bodies during this time period, like Jordynn 
Jack in “A Pedagogy of Sight: Microscopic Vision in Robert Hooke’s Micrographia,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 95, vol. 2 (2009): 192-209. Philippa Spoel comes to the long eighteenth 
century through renewed interest in delivery: “Rereading the Elocutionists: The Rhetoric of 
Thomas Sheridan’s ‘A Course of Lectures on Elocution’ and John Walker’s ‘Elements of 
Elocution”, Rhetorica 19, no.1 (2001): 49-91; as does Paul Goring, The Rhetoric of Sensibility in 
Eighteenth-Century Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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that supports inter-bodied, atextual appeal, including the bodily, rhetorical participations 
of the listener. 
1  THE DRIVING STROKE  
 
Gestures are typically conceived of solely in terms of their communicative 
function—that is, their “output.” This notion, built in part on Aristotle’s consignment of 
gesture to delivery, has long kept rhetorical theorists treating motions as ornaments that 
may somehow be taken or left. Quintilian, for example, describing improvisation, 
acknowledges “gestures which accompany strong feeling, and sometimes even serve to 
stimulate the mind, the waving of the hand, the contraction of the brow”—but quickly 
adds that these “become ridiculous, unless we are alone.”46  
Nevertheless, scholarship on body rhetoric now points to the downright creativity 
of bodies in motion47—if less to component gestures, per se.48 Gestures are, however, 
worth taking on their own terms not only because they comprise the forms that rhetorical 
bodies take in relation to one another (and in this sense deliver)—but also because they 
forge appeal. Bulwer’s manuals provide a vital resource for understanding gesture as 
such, challenging both the Early Modern and contemporary rhetorical treatments of 
gesture as ornament. Entailing 113 hand and fifty-six finger gestures named, drawn, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, X.III.21, 103.   
47 See Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); 
Denise Riley’s Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); 
and Roxanne Mountford’s The Gendered Pulpit: Preaching in American Protestant Spaces 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005). 
48	  Cf., e.g., Debra Hawhee’s “Language as Sensuous Action: Sir Richard Paget, Kenneth Burke, 
and Gesture-Speech Theory, Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 4 (2006): 331-354; and 
Anthony Corbeill’s Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). 
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described in terms of shape, motion, and use, these manuals hinge on the inextricability 
of inventio from actio. Gesture 1, Inventione laboro  (“I work in discovery”) illustrates 
this dual nature of gesture. Depicting a character with tip of index finger to mouth, 
Bulwer explains that the gesture actually helps to facilitate, as well as to complete the 
unfolding utterance. In this sense, Bulwer’s work neither accords with other seventeenth-
century takes on delivery, nor anticipates Enlightenment rhetoric, which by many 
characterizations, privileges disembodied reason, widening the gulf between invention 
and delivery.49 
The divorce of reason from passion, vis-à-vis “rational soul” from body, for 
which Descartes is usually credited, Thomas Conley says results in Enlightenment 
rhetoric bent on persuasion divorced from argument. This rhetoric exhibits the turn 
simultaneously to the inartistic proof as primary means of evidencing, and to the 
deployment of affectation in order to “insert,” as it were, truth: “as one must hide from a 
mad man the fact that we are administering drugs to cure him.”50 In other words, delivery 
becomes slipping your point in when your audience isn’t looking—not unlike a mickey. 
The rational soul is the locus for truth, the body a conduit for absorption. This separation 
results in the long-lived privileging of appeals to reason over those to emotion. Gesture is 
branded as the mickey. 
But Bulwer does not elaborate choreographies for coercion. Chironomia, the first 
rhetorical treatise in English devoted exclusively to gestures, not only points out the 
body’s ability to argue—powerfully argue, with or without attendant words—and thus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Bulwer’s work neither accords with other seventeenth-century takes on delivery, nor anticipates 
Enlightenment rhetoric, which by many characterizations, privileges disembodied reason, 
widening the gulf between invention and delivery. 
50 Thomas Conley. Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago University Press: 1990), 175. 
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the need for British rhetors to train their bodies to better issue claims. Chirologia and 
Chironomia also insist on the need for gestures to bring shape to an oration’s content. To 
construct this model of animate eloquence, Bulwer leverages his background as a 
physician, and training in philosophy and ancient medical literature. 
 
2  THE CURIOUS HAND 
 
Although little has come to light on his education, and in the treatises he does not 
elaborate on his experience as a medical practitioner, Bulwer’s orientation within the 
medical marketplace of mid-seventeenth century London is clear. In the clash between 
the theoretically trained and “empiric” practitioners of the day, where the latter were 
charged with treating the symptom but not the patient, Bulwer was a learned physician. 
Like other “physics,” as well as some “chirurgions,” he would have distinguished himself 
from empirics, quacks, and generally unlicensed professionals through humanistic, 
university training in classical medical works, and consequent commitment to 
philosophical medicine.51 Theoretically, this means Bulwer acquires an Hippocrates- and 
Galen-inspired humoral view of the workings of the human system, wherein “the 
microcosm or little world of the body had the same qualitative foundation as the 
macrocosm, or world at large,” and surface conditions stand not only for the state of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Wollock, who has unearthed the most on Bulwer’s life to date, surmises that Bulwer attended, 
without matriculating, Oxford during the 1620’s, and learned medicine through an apprenticeship 
shortly thereafter. Both Wollock and Roach elaborate the anatomical principles to which Bulwer 
ascribed in result of this education. See Jeffrey Wollock, “John Bulwer’s (1606-1656) Place in 
the History of the Deaf,” Historiographica Linguistica 23, no. 1 (1996): 1-46; Joseph R. Roach, 
The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press 1993), 23-57. 
	   24	  
body’s balance with that world, but also for that of the material soul.52 This view is 
especially evident in Bulwer’s Pathomyotomia, or a Dissection of the Significative 
Muscles of the Affectations of the Minde (1649), which treats facial gestures. Individuals 
are composed of fire, earth, air and water—of heat, cold, dryness and moisture. One’s 
mixture is “balanced” (eucratic) when one is healthy, “imbalanced” (dyscratic) 
otherwise. Restoring balance in this view is ultimately a question of movement—of inner 
shifts (the passions that traffic in humoral concentration) through outward forms (the 
body interacting with its environment).  
What Bulwer sees as the physiology of a gesture illustrates this relationship. 
Bulwer’s gesture is responsive, ensuing upon contact with other bodies. It unfolds in two 
stages. The first comprises something like inclination—a shift in the inner motions of the 
body, which prepares parts to move. Bulwer explains this “first act” in Pathomyotomia 
by way of a “motive faculty” that “does perpetually flow” through the body by way of the 
nerves.53 That no time passes between caring to shift and shifting, and “no time of 
wanting to feel, but that the knife at once cuts, and we feel it,” Bulwer uses as evidence 
against schools of psychological thought who take movement to generate far from the 
parts themselves. Even the toe (far from the brain), he says, re-acts instantly to another 
body. If a motion had to communicate through spirits dispensed by a distant soul, then it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Andrew Wear, Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 37. 
53 John Bulwer, Pathomyotomia, or a Dissection of the Significative Muscles of the Affections of 
the Minde. Being an Essay to a new Method of Observing the most important movings of the 
Muscles of the Head, as they are the nearest and Immediate Organs of the Voluntarie or 
Impetuous motions of the Mind. With the Proposall of a new Nomenclature of the Muscles. 
(London: W.W. for Henry Moseley, 1649), A2. 
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could only happen “in manifest time.”54 Rather, he thinks, as suddenly as we are moved, 
a gesture begins. 
The second stage, or bloom of the gesture, is its outward course. Without laboring 
in the mechanics of that yet, it is important to note that Bulwer believes that manifest 
gesture is ultimately purposeful—an act of will. Its trajectory, “forward, backward, 
upward, downward, to the right hand, to the left, or in orb,” as well as “figure,” or pose, 
betrays intention as well as response.55 Chirologia’s Gesture 23 offers a glimpse of this 
anatomy (Figure 1).  Upon meeting the object of this gesture, “a fit of the invading 
appetite” begins the first act; the fist that then articulates by way of “imagination of the 
act of revenge,” is the “effect of passion in the hand.”56 The gesture, a motion toward, 
covers the whole body. Even the cheeks may puff out. Its stroke is evident in the 
examples Bulwer gives of the gesture’s occasions, like that of free men and bond slaves 
casting it at their patrons and masters, who stand back. The heating effect of this gesture 
on its maker as well as its object keeps Bulwer from recommending it to the rhetor. He 
insists that through the same physiological circuitry, though, rhetorical gestures (e.g. 
those suited to “touch and handle a matter lightly,” or “explain more subtle things”57) 
condition the passions to promote good judgment. 
Important here is not Bulwer’s commitment to humoral “science” per se, but his 
insistence on the holistic nature of the body as the basis for the centrality of gesture in 
rational persuasion. The movement of the passions shifts judgment, as judgment shifts the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid., 24. 
55 Ibid.,11. 
56 John Bulwer Chirologia: Or, the Natural Language of the Hand, and Chironomia: Or, the Art 
of Manual Rhetoric, 1644, ed. James W. Cleary (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1974), 52-3. 
57 Ibid., 204. 
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passions. Illustrating this circuit, Burton in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1620) calls the 
idle hand “cause and symptom both” of melancholy. As outward motions increase natural 
heat and set the mind “aworke,” Burton aims to treat melancholy with action: “the air is 
still tossed by the winds; the waters ebb and flow, to their conservation no doubt, to teach 
us that we should ever be in action.”58 
From walking to gardening, Burton lists dozens of activities available to the body 
to “cast” thought. This is a way to shift “stuck” passions (and thus imagination) 
manually. It is no coincidence that Bulwer sees action as the heart of oratory. Hands are 
means “to open and unfold the sense of mind.”59 That movement invigorates content is 
evident in Bulwer’s descriptions of static hand postures. Their effect is like that of 
Burton’s idle hand. Just as Burton describes the dulled sensitivity that comes with 
inactivity, such that “we look upon a thing, but see it not; hear, and observe not; which 
otherwise would much affect us, had we been free”60—bound hands for Bulwer curtail 
one’s ability to reason and respond. Gesture 9, Otio indulgeo, for instance, shows both 
wrists protruding from a garment, the hands hidden in the folds. One who opts to 
constrict motion this way “neglects what his mouth requires at his hands,” dismissing 
“the more provident extension of a thought.”61 If action is means to engage and grapple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, What It Is, With All the Kinds, Causes, Symptoms, 
Prognostics, and Several Cures of It, 12th ed. (London: J. Cuthell, 1821), 403, 401. William 
Harvey, the physician commonly credited for demonstrating the circulation of blood, speaks to 
the therapeutic value of movement in this tradition in De Motu Cordis (1620). He offers, “motion 
always generates and preserves heat and spirit, while in quietness they disappear.” This is the 
basic principle behind Bulwer’s case for keeping one’s gestures up amid delivery. Likewise, in 
“no other way can [limbs] recover heat, color, and life so completely and so quickly as by 
movement.” Anatomical Studies on the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 1628, tr. Chauncey Leake 
(London: C. Thomas, 1970), 105.   
59 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 153. 
60 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, 132. 
61 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 38. Otio indulgeo is “I indulge in idleness.” 
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tactically with an issue, then inaction is tantamount to disengaging from it. Gesture 10, 
Tristem animi recessum indico shows fingers interlaced, “damping” communication for 
those “whose thoughts stray out of season, minding not what others do or say.”62 Quiet 
hands, he says, are likewise cause and symptom both of rhetorical dispassion. 
Seventeenth-century diagnostic techniques also underwrite Bulwer’s rhetorical 
theory. Action is the means by which physicians “build a bridge of empathy to the 
patient” during diagnosis.63 This empathy evolves through “hands off” delivery, 
including talk and bedside manner (voice, posture, gesture). But empathy also forms 
through contact. The typical examination in Bulwer’s time consists largely of palpation 
and of pulse taking. The hands are particularly suited to this work because as Bulwer 
points out, they have the sensitivity required for detecting subtle motions in another’s 
frame: “we do more curiously and exquisitely feel in the hand than in the other parts, and 
more exactly where the epidermis or immediate organ of the outer touch is thinnest.”64 
Through the hands, the physician explores the state of the patient’s “innate heat” and 
passions that emanate from the heart (with melancholy, for example, the pulse is “small, 
slow, faint and sparse.”65 The physician should develop a “sensitive touch,” or physical 
intuition, in addition to learning theory about the body, for only through sensation can the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 39. Tristem animi recessum indico is “I exhibit 
melancholy.” Because he takes the soul to manifest through gesture, Bulwer describes its absence 
as the “withdraw” of the soul from the body. 
63 Wear, Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 122; Susan P. Mattern, Galen and the 
Rhetoric of Healing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 78. 
64 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 130. 
65 Galen, Galen on Diseases and Symptoms, Tr. Ian Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 335. 
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physician move toward inference.66 Ideally, this “fellow feeling” not only leads to the 
best possible diagnosis, but it can actually begin the healing process. 
Bulwer argues that eloquence, likewise, emerges dynamically, through a kind of 
contact contingent on presence.  
 
3  ANIMATE ELOQUENCE 
 
To understand the body’s role in shaping argument, it is important to distinguish 
his understanding of the rhetorical utility of gesture from Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626). 
Bulwer’s association with Bacon is perhaps most responsible for the relegation of Bulwer 
to the scrap heap of the rhetorical canon. Bulwer credits as the impetus for his project this 
section of Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning (1605): “For Aristotle has…handled 
the structure of the body when at rest, but the structure of the body when in motion (that 
is the gestures of the body) he has omitted”; these “are equally within the observations of 
art, and of greater use and advantage” for “As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the 
gesture speaketh to the eye. ”67 Because Bulwer fixes on Bacon’s call to gesture, it is 
tempting to read Bulwer as reifying Bacon’s notion of rhetoric as “package.” Instead, I 
offer, the implicit and explicit connections between Bulwer’s medical understanding of 
expressive motion and his gestural rhetorical theory constitute an important theoretical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The hand’s crucial role in assessment is still evident in Thomas Apperley’s admonishment to 
physicians in Observations in Physick (1731) not “to apply one’s finger to the artery, as some do, 
while their thoughts are intent on something else.” Physicians must think from their fingers. 
Observations in Physick, Both Rational and Practical (London: W. Innys, 1731), 97. 
67 The full quote: “For the lineaments of the body disclose the dispositions and inclinations of the 
mind in general; but the motions and gestures of the countenance and parts do not only so, but 
disclose likewise the seasons of access, and the present humor and state of the mind and will. For 
as your Majesty says most aptly and elegantly, As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture 
speaketh to the eye.” Francis Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, 1605, in The 
Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath 
(London: Longman and Co., 1858), 376. 
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response to both Bacon and contemporary critics who dismiss Bulwer on the basis of that 
association. For example, Thomas Sloane examines the above passage in RSQ’s special 
issue on “The Most Significant Passage on Rhetoric in the Works of Francis Bacon.” 
Sloane describes Bacon’s call for the human philosopher to attend to gesture as “like [the 
divisions] of a professor assigning a research project that is far more detailed and far less 
ambitious than the one the student had in mind.” For Sloane, Bulwer then takes up the 
project, having “sprang” by that thrust “into an even smaller pond than the one Bacon 
described.” Sloane’s reading of Bulwer is premised on the body’s subsidiary role in 
rhetorical practice, a role refuted by Bulwer’s description of the physiology of rhetorical 
gestures. This reading of the body as subsidiary also posits rhetoric, as well as invention, 
as being “au fond oral in nature”—that is, au fond alphabetic. Bulwer’s reflection on the 
inseparability of inventio from actio in disputation is easily overlooked because Bulwer’s 
appeal is forged by hand. 
For Bacon, rhetoric is a strictly physical affair. The best lodged appeals 
“immediately and incorporeally affect most.”68 Rhetoric’s domain is the flesh, but only 
insofar as the flesh is essentially unreasonable, and must be permeated. The need for 
eloquence, he offers, is physiological. If the receiving body were readily “pliant and 
obedient” to naked reason, there would be no need of rhetoric to ferry it through the 
sense; however, given “the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,” strength of 
impression is crucial. “Reason is commonly vanquished” without rhetoric to bring its 
notion “corporeal shape” such that it can “appear as present,” sinking in.69 Gestures, 
appealing to the eye, are one such means to cloak reason. The appeal then traffics by 	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69 Ibid., 178. 
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flesh in order to “contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the 
affections.”70 Bacon’s move to materialize the appeal thus sharply distinguishes between 
the provinces of reasoning and feeling, and, (as various argue), comes at the cost of 
rhetoric’s inherence with the former. The body is at best indifferent to reason—at worst, 
inhospitable to it—and in any case, Bacon warns, has a certain capacity to compromise 
the message. The rhetor’s challenge is to fashion appeals that simply “get through.” 
Emphasizing that an argument’s thrust is in some sense more important than its proof, he 
notes that topics serve “not only in probation, but much more in impression.”71 The 
activity of invention, which serves “to draw forth, or call before us” existing knowledge 
in order to “furnish” such appeals thus happens deeply and despite affection, not by way 
of it.72  
Bulwer shares Bacon’s understanding of what impression is and does. By way of 
this imprint, “the humors and affects of the body do alter or work upon the mind,” and 
“the passions, or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body.”73 
Impression is crucial for invention on the one hand, as Bacon says, because appeals come 
to sympathetic effect. Claims should be fashioned with an eye toward touch. On the other 
hand, where Bacon insists that reason lacks bodily presence and resists physical form—as 
such, words are its “footsteps and prints,” but not motions74—Bulwer takes a different 
angle, based on his slightly different understanding of how the body works. This allows 
Bulwer to claim gesture as an asset to the activity of invention, as well. For Bulwer, a 
moving body is a moving mind: 	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71 Ibid., 180. 
72 Ibid., 113.  
73 Ibid., 130. 
74 Ibid., 168. 
	   31	  
…for that those elegant conceptions that enrich the pregnant mind, incite 
the mind…to find out apt and fit expressions; and while she labors to be 
free in pouring out her hidden treasures, she imprints upon the body the 
active hints of her most generous conceits, darting her rays into the body, 
as light hath its emanation from the sun…75 
For Bacon, the soundest organ of delivery is speech or writing because “words are the 
images of cogitations,” as cogitations have no form of their own.76 Because reason is a 
verbal faculty, gestures cannot handle most conceits, explaining why Bacon does not 
bother with them much in relation to rhetorical delivery (he recommends sonorous 
speech), and not at all in relation to invention. For Bulwer, the soundest organ of delivery 
is the body because the invisible soul with which it co-extends reveals itself through the 
continuous stream of gestures, which happen even in the absence of speech. This 
“gestural language of the body,” he says, “is more vocal and effectual than the 
explications of the tongue.”77 Emphasizing that this language does more than transplant 
emotion, he notes that the “logistical motions that appear in the hands of disputants” 
prove that the hand is an “instrument of reasonable nature.”78 Hand gestures are 
particularly suited to oratory for their diversity of forms, which “by themselves, do speak 
and show the mental springs from whence they naturally arise,” as well as for their 
positive influence, as such, upon unfolding speech.79  
The essential difference between Bulwer’s and Bacon’s take on the work of 
gesture in delivery is visible in the metaphors that each uses to describe action. Bulwer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 170. 
76 Bacon, Advancement, 119. 
77 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 131. 
78 Ibid., 156. 
79 Ibid., 165. 
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above, notes that actions draw form from the mind as light from sun—a notion that roots 
in ancient accounts of the body as little universe. Crooke, describing the human body, 
observes, “it may worthily be called a Little world, and the pattern and epitome of the 
whole universe.”80 At the center of this universe, “the sun is predominant, by whose 
motion, beams, and light, all things have their brightness, luster, and beauty…as it were a 
bright light, clears and beautifies all the parts of the body.”81 The soul governs the 
system, and “with all her powers and faculties be wholly in the whole, and wholly in 
every part” such that “if the creature live the Faculties of Sense must be present in every 
place where the soul is.”82 All parts of the system co-depend and lend balance to one 
another, and take their form from the world with which they interact. The hand is an 
important interface for such contact—it gathers and incorporates information (“the true 
office of the hand is to apprehend or to hold, and his proper action is apprehension”83) 
and expresses through the forms it takes. As to action, the following is reprised in 
Chironomia almost word for word: “Reason, is the hand of the understanding, speech the 
hand of reason, and the hand itself, is the hand of speech.”84 A couple of sentences later, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Helkiah Crooke, Microcosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man. Together with the 
Controversies Thereto Belonging (London: William Iaggard, 1615), 6. Later, emphasizing what 
he sees as the jointness of the two systems: “This Little World therefore, which we call Man, is a 
great miracle, and his frame and composition is more to be admired and wondered at, than the 
workmanship of the whole universe. For, it is a far easier thing to depaint out many things in a 
large and spacious table, such as is the world, then to comprehend all things in one so little and 
narrow, as is the compass of man’s body” (ibid., 8). 
81 Ibid., 6-7. This description refers to the heart, which was seen to be responsible for “vital 
spirits” that facilitated the body’s movements. 
82 Ibid., 659. 
83 Ibid., 731. Crooke also notes that “hand” and “hold” are cognates. The first use of the hand is 
holding; the second, “to be the judge and discerner of the touch. For albeit this touching virtue or 
tactive quality be diffused through the whole body both within and without, as being the 
foundation of the animal being…yet we do more curiously and exquisitely feel and discern both 
the first and second qualities which strike the sense in the hand then in other parts.” This is 
rehashed almost verbatim in Chirologia. 
84 Ibid., 9.  
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Crooke clarifies what he takes “the hand of” to mean: “reason itself, is the power, force, 
and efficacy of the understanding”85; so the hand is the power, force, and efficacy of 
speech (as well as, to the extent of the metaphor, the rest of the system). This 
understanding of action is foundational to Bulwer’s call to gesture in delivery. Bacon, on 
the other hand, concludes: 
…behavior seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the 
conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to 
be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of 
the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too 
straight or restrained for exercise or motion.86  
Like a good accessory, this gesture is opted, modish, and sets off the outfit by calling 
attention to certain features and not others. It blends in, or rather, does not ask questions. 
One gets the feeling here and elsewhere that the reason that Bacon does not handle 
gestures (as Bulwer notices, and does) is that they are not demonstrative enough to bother 
with—certainly, they do not serve the purpose of learning. Gesture is also a less reliable 
vehicle for expression than speech because the hands are further from the brain than the 
mouth, and rely on bodily imagination to configure. This bodily imagination, Bacon 
emphasizes, can be very fickle, “as in walking, if you begin to think eagerly and fixedly 
of something else, you immediately stand still.”87 Accordingly, Bacon recommends 
“figures of words” and not those of motions as means to forge and cast impression 
deeply. 
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86 Bacon, Advancement, 219. 
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Conversely, for Bulwer, thinking takes form: “the motions of the mind are by 
action unfolded.”88 The gesture is not applied to a preexisting notion so much as the idea 
cannot help but move. The domain of reason coextends with the body, such that the hand 
is “of a reasonable nature,” and in its motions, “we may not only see, but as it were feel 
and touch the very inward motions of the mind.”89 In gesture  
…our conceptions are displayed and uttered in the very moment of a 
thought…before our words, which accompany or follow it, can put 
themselves into a vocal posture to be understood.90  
Where Bacon’s gesture, much like his model for invention is, as Cogan puts the latter, 
“personal and internal,” Bulwer’s is manifest reaction to the lived world by way of 
impression.91 The hand, which Bulwer calls the “ingenuity of the outer man, and the 
better genius of the microcosm”92 fashions the little universe against and by way of the 
larger one. The gesture extends one’s thinking—conceptualizing as it forms. As Burton 
suggests in his cure for melancholy, to change the patterns of the hand is to adjust 
fixtures of thought. Bulwer extends this premise to his rhetorical model, insisting that 
appeal formation is a material process, inextricable from movement and, like the gesture 
itself, deeply ingrained in the dynamic world, including other bodies. In this model, actio 
and inventio concur, and the gesture at once “presents…the inward discourse of reason” 
and “conduces” it, such that “the hand many times seems to have conceived the 
thought.”93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 179. 
89 Ibid., 156, A5. 
90 Ibid., 17. 
91 Marc Cogan, “Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 14 (1981): 223. 
92 Bulwer, Pathomyotomia, B2.  
93 Ibid., B3, 170. 
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4  GESTURES AND SPEECH 
 
Chirologia’s Gesture 48 is Sollicite cogito, “I set thoughts in motion.” Its image 
depicts a man who has brought his hand to his head. Why should one enact “this recourse 
of the hand to the head, to scratch where it doth not itch?”94 Bulwer answers, 
maybe, to rouse up our distracted intellect; or else the hand, which is the 
engineer of invention and wit’s true palladium, having a natural procacity 
to be acquainted with their fancy, officiously offers itself to facilitate the 
dispatch of any affairs that perplex a faculty so nearly allied unto it, 
[since] the hand in the collateral line of nature being cousin germane to the 
fancy.95 
Bulwer offers that the gesture is means to embodied discovery, and that it has a 
particularly stirring effect on speech. While the above offered in Chirologia, is 
catalogued as a “discoursing gesture” rather than one suited to oratory per se, it has its 
match in Chironomia’s Canon 1, Inventione laboro  (“I work in discovery”), an 
“inventive meditation” in which the finger comes to the mouth, living up to the 
etymology for “finger,” he says: “the desire to find.”96 While Chironomia’s leading 
source, Quintilian, observes in passing the benefit of such gestures for improvisation, he 
dismisses those that he mentions (e.g. “the occasional striking of forehead”97) as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 72. 
95 Ibid., 72. 
96 Ibid., 121-22. He cites this “finding motion” as the reason that people often bite their 
fingernails in times of intense consideration. The examples he cites include Horace, who would 
“bite his nails to the quick”; Torrentius, who “would meditate on her tender nail,” and Cleanthes 
as depicted “for the signification of his earnest study in arithmetic and geometry, with his fingers 
gnawn about” (ibid.) 
97 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, X.III.21. 
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indecorous to public forums. This underscores the shift of Bulwer’s theory of gestures 
from Quintilian’s: Bulwer recommends that the orator move in the manner that best 
facilitates not only rapport with the audience (that kinesis) but also spontaneous speech, 
which is heavily contingent on the motions of the body for its shape. 
Quintilian’s anatomy of “flow” informs Bulwer’s justification of rhetorical 
gestures. Quintilian says that the best improvisations owe to the speaker becoming caught 
up in powerful emotion and imagination. To depict “flow” in delivery—that is, how one 
must “range far ahead and pursue the ideas which are still in front, and in 
proportion…[pay] out what he has in hand,”—Quintilian describes the mechanical, 
vaguely physiological “knack” that allows one to read several lines ahead of that which 
the hand pens:   
It is a similar knack which makes possible those miraculous tricks which 
we see jugglers and masters of sleight of hand perform upon the stage, in 
such a manner that the spectator can scarcely help believing that the 
objects which they throw into the air come to hand of their own accord, 
and run when they are bidden.98  
In the writing example, the information seems to keep once read, and to animate, 
intentionlessly. The juggler appears downright thoughtless, illustrating that motion can 
trigger release from rational thought, and is at any rate itself integral to flow. The driver 
of rhetorical delivery, similarly, is not stopping to think, otherwise “we shall halt and 
stumble…like persons who can only gasp out what they have to say.”99 The knack makes 
possible the momentary concurrence of “invention, arrangement, and style” with “voice, 	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99 Ibid., X.VII.10.  
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delivery, and gesture,”100 where the latter set operate as a sort of lagging strand. 
Quintilian admits of the “irrational” aspect of this knack; he merely stipulates that use of 
any such ineffable, physical component of delivery “nevertheless be founded on 
reason.”101 
Bulwer argues that the emotion and imagination that yield Quintilian’s eloquence 
are inextricable from the forms and rhythms that gestures take. The hands more than 
speak to others; more than “demand, promise, summon, dismiss, threaten, supplicate, 
express aversion or fear, question or deny.”102 Bulwer ties bodily motion to the 
propagation of flowing speech (and thus to the leading strand, above). Because they help 
cast argument, Bulwer calls the hands “those commonplaces and topics of nature which 
receive most of those extraordinary motions which appear in orations; the high excess, 
enthusiasms, raptures, and commanding beauty of expressions are here found.”103 He 
means this in a physiological sense—the hands take shape and trajectory from the swells 
of passion that push through the body as it processes subject matter. The hands (as well 
as the face and rest of body) receive expressive content—in particular, “the high 
excesses” that either resist being parsed to speech, or which simply have to wait for 
words to capture them. Gestures and speech, or “the flash and the report are twins born at 
the instant of the piece’s going off”; that is, they share an impetus, “conceived together in 
the mind, yet the hand first appearing in the delivery, anticipates the tongue.” Words then 
“comment for the fuller explication of the manual text of utterance.”104 What manifests 
through the hands’ pathways can differ from or accord with what is spoken. “These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid., X.VII.9. 
101 Ibid., X.VII.12. 
102 Ibid., XI.III.86 
103 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 160. 
104 Ibid., 17. 
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speaking organs are couplets, an active pair,” he says, which each pick up portions of the 
unfolding utterance. “Sometimes differing words which visibly grow on one root of 
action go for synonyms in gesture. And we shall sometimes see contrariety…in identity 
of posture.”105 The hand is not only “the index and sign of inspiration,” but is also a 
“wrestling place.”106 
Bulwer’s concept of the “active pair” with “one root of action” closely resembles 
contemporary gesture theorist David McNeill’s picture of the “growth point”: “the 
earliest form of the utterance in deep time,” or “the speaker’s minimal idea unit,” from 
which gestures and speech traverse different “channels” to expression.107 These 
manifestations mutually evolve and co-configure, facilitating what McNeill calls “a 
dialectic of speech and gesture,” whereby “the speaker’s thought evolves through the 
course of the utterance-gesture formation and comes…into existence with it.”108 Gestures 
are not only constitutive of linguistic and imagistic expression, but gesture has itself an 
impact on thought: “if our thought is a story that we are required to keep telling in order 
to think about the world at all, it’s gestures that actively influence this story and carry it 
forward most expressly.”109 As it is for Bulwer, the work of gesture is both expressive 
and generative—meaning gathers shape and transmits through the same motion. A key 
feature of utterance formation for McNeill is this feedback loop that forms between 
gesture and thought, such that the hands actually begin to inform the shape that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid., 16. 
106 Ibid., 197, 228. 
107 McNeill, Hand and Mind, 220. 
108 Ibid., 246. McNeill credits to Vygotsky the claim that thought comes into existence during the 
course of utterance formation. See Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language, ed. A. Kozulin 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
109 Ibid., 12. 
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subsequent utterances take. Bulwer also suggests that the gesture influences not only the 
body’s landscape of feeling, but also what the body has to say.  
And I know not how, whereas these motions of the body cannot be done 
unless the inward motions of the mind precede (the same thing again being 
made externally visible) that interior invisible which caused them is 
increased, and by this the affection of the heart which preceded as the 
cause before the effect, for so much as they are done, doth increase.110  
Gesture affects utterance not only by capturing content (“For as the hand moves, so 
moves the understanding speech”111) but also by intensifying sentiment through its hold. 
In the physiology to which Bulwer ascribes, sensation is inseparable from expression, 
such that, as Wollock explains, “The interchange and coordination of these three phases 
(imagination, transmission to muscles, sensation) forms a kind of circle or feedback loop, 
regulated by the ‘discursive power,’ in which planning, guiding, executing, and checking 
stages occur in a rapid and constantly overlapping cycle.”112 As Bulwer says above, “the 
affection of the heart” causes “motions of the mind,” which yield bodily motions, which 
of their own volition alter “that interior invisible which caused them.”113 For this reason, 
Bulwer admonishes the rhetor to choose gestures carefully, steering clear of those that 
might overheat him (the fist, above) as much as those that slow him to the point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 29. 
111 Ibid., 165. 
112 Jeffrey Wollock, The Noblest Animate Motion: Speech, Physiology, and Medicine in Pre-
Cartesian Linguistic Thought (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1997), 135. 
113 Wollock expands upon “animate motion” as described by Peter of Averroes, “The parts of this 
multi-layered cycle can scarcely be distinguished by the agent; indeed it is essential that they not 
be distinguished in the moment of action, since this would necessarily disrupt the coordination!” 
(Ibid.). For more on this system, please see the chapter “Galenic Classification” (ibid 97-151). 
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languished speech and thought (the drooping hands, or “the hands that hang down”114). 
The gestures that are best suited to rhetorical improvisation are those that promote 
deliberation, reflection, and sound argument. Canon 15, in which the hand alternately 
clenches and unfolds, urges thinking; Canon 47 sets off antitheses (178, 189). Canon 8 
(Figure 2), Rationes profert, is a “form accommodated to their intention who would 
openly produce their reasons”; this gesture “seems, as it were, indeed, to bring forth with 
it some hidden matter to make the argument in hand more rhetorically apparent.”115  This 
gesture (Figure 2) is more than symbolic.”116 117 Bulwer’s open hand is instead a tool by 
which the orator can come to terms. This point is underscored by Bulwer’s insistence that 
the improvised gesture almost always precedes attendant speech in utterance formation. 
(Quintilian, on the other hand, notes that gestures that anticipate the voice are rhetorically 
ineffective.118)  
Speech relies on gesture for its very dynamism. The hand, synechdochic for all 
bodily gesture, “strengthens speech with nerves and the sinewed cords of twisted reason. 
Speech divided from the hand is unsound, and, brought into a poor and low condition, 
flags and creeps upon the ground.”119 Bulwer connects those speakers with “lively force 
of…wit” and “vigorous alacrity of…spirits” to “hands [that] are never out of action but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Bulwer Chirologia…Chironomia, 37. Gestus VIII: Despero (I despair) shows “abasement of 
mind.” 
115 Ibid. 177. 
116 Zeno’s open hand, contrarily, characterizes Renaissance rhetoric; as Corbett puts it, “the open 
hand symbolized the relaxed, expansive, ingratiating discourse of the orator,” versus the closed 
fist, or “the tight, spare, compressed discourse of the philosopher.” (Corbett, “The Rhetoric of the 
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117 Butler, Institutes of Oratory, XI.III.97.  
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always stirring and kept in play.”120 In this way, gestures are also means to effect pacing 
in speech.121 To ensure the flow of ideas and words, Bulwer recommends keeping one’s 
gestures going.  
Speech also relies on the hand for arrangement:  
…if man were disarmed of this…organ intended for the special 
advancement of utterance, wanting the subtle force of his hand and 
fingers, the expression of his tongue would be very weak and unhewed; 
for the motions in the hand in pronunciation do much enrich and endear 
the expressions of the tongue which without them would many times 
appear very mean.122 
Bulwer claims that bodily gestures directly impact the way that argument comes 
together—that even the tongue’s own part in expression is weakened without them. In 
sum, the hands complement the form presented in speech (by bringing an aspect of the 
“root of action” that would otherwise be absent) as they interact with it, helping to 
“enrich” and to organize speech itself (lest it be “unhewed”). This function is clearest in 
Chironomia’s hand gestures that attend to punctuation: Canon 23, “with a gentle 
percussion, now greater, now less, now flat, now sharp, according to the diversity of the 
affections, is fitted to distinguish the commas and breathing parts of a sentence”; Canon 
42 describes an orator who “developed a kind of flow of speech closing each period with 
the clap of the hands.”123 Several gestures are noted as touching off, sustaining, or 
quelling speech altogether. Most of these involve the hand coming into direct contact 	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121 Ibid. 
122 Bulwer calls the hand “a most secret property to quicken speech” (ibid., 160). 
123 Ibid., 181, 189. 
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with the chest, whether through “vehement percussion” to testify (Canon 29), a light 
touch “[so] that our speech glides with a calm and gentle stream,” (Canon 17), or a 
sudden clap, “proper in their hands who would arrest their speech” and “restrain their 
tongue” (Canon 27).124 
Finally, we see examples of these interactions between gestures and speech in the 
finger canons, which Bulwer separates from those of the hand and arm. Cleary rightly 
observes that in general, Bulwer’s hand gestures tend to recommend “gross emotions or 
thoughts,” while finger gestures take on concepts that are “more refined” and 
“intellectual.”125 In any case, the most nuanced rhetorical gestures are here, as is the thick 
of Bulwer’s case for the mutual inherence of action and invention. The index finger, for 
example, for its “demonstrative force,” tends to bring direction to utterance. Depending 
on its shape and orientation to other fingers, Bulwer says, it can “distinguish contraries” 
(Finger Canon 9); “urge and instantly enforce an argument” (Canon 10); “[put] the hand 
into a rhetorical shape for disputation” (Canon 11); “sublimate the sense of words unto a 
point of greater vehemency” (Canon 12); and lend “rhetorical force in disputations” 
(Canon 13).126 It serves in enthymemes to “chop” logic, and “knock it down, as with a 
horn.”127 Canon 21, Colligit, this finger pointed up from the fist, is described as a 
repository by which to furnish refutation: “this action can do much in gathering together, 
and reciting the matter to be debated and concluded by reason; to wit, when that [which] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ibid., 182, 179, 182. See Canons 30 (ibid., 182), 35 (ibid., 187); Chirologia’s Gestures 52, 53 
(ibid., 74-5). 
125 Cleary, “Editor’s Introduction,” xviii, xv-xvi. 
126 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 200. 
127 Ibid., 212. Bulwer borrows this one- or two-handed gesture (in which the index finger crooks) 
from Quintilian. 
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we take up from others is such as cannot be denied.”128 Canon 8’s gesture also appears to 
play a role in arrangement (it “doth conspicuously distribute and digest the numbers, 
arguments, and members of an oration”)129; as does 29 (Figure 3).  This gesture is “a way 
of numbering and dividing arguments.”130 Like Canon 30, “rhetorical arithmetic,” this 
gesture is suited to impress the minds of audience and orator alike. The extent to which 
Bulwer thinks it can aid “living reckonings” is evidenced in his observation that this 
gesture has been recently captured in a statue in London’s new dissection theatre.131  
These gestures’ reverberation (which is briefly explored in the final section) is 
suggested by Bulwer’s quote of Tertullian: “we…rely upon the movements of his fingers 
for our reckonings.”132  
 
5  CIVIL ACTIONS  
 
The distinct flow of gestures in communicative acts draws direction from all 
bodies present. Bulwer’s theory of moving bodies mutually affecting and co-configuring 
is in some way similar to that of Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), a founding member of the 
Royal Society, perhaps best known for his unusual work on sympathy. In The Nature of 
Bodies, Digby stipulates that movement proceeds from that body toward which a motion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Ibid., 202. 
129 Ibid., 200. 
130 Ibid., 204. 
131 Ibid., 150, 205. (He refers to “the new Oval Theatre” in “Barber-Surgeons Hall in London.”) 
In defense of Canon 30, and “this subtle piece of hand learning,” which he notes that Quintilian 
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is made.133 Through succession, in which “by degrees every new [form] comes to be, all 
the others that were before, do vanish and cease to be,” motion extends to the body 
toward which it reaches. Digby uses the example of a hand tapping a ball, but applies the 
premise to living bodies inter-acting. Each body extends a “stroke,” whose “material 
participations” permeate and shift other bodies in kind. On “the sphere of continual 
motion by action and passion,” Digby says: 
the motion which is most lively must have a great, full, and large stroke; 
like the even rolling waves of a wide and smooth sea…other motions may 
vary either by excess or by deficiency: the first makes the stroke become 
smart, violent, and thick: the other slackens it and makes it grow little, 
slow, weak, thin, or seldom.134  
A body’s movement manifests strokes extended to it. This includes internal motions, like 
heartbeat, but also “external motions,” like gestures, and words. In this way, particular 
movements carve pathways across bodies. Digby observes, “We see daily, that if a person 
gape,” or yawn, “those who see him gaping are excited to do the same”; if one “converse 
with persons that are subject to excess of laughter, one can hardly forbear laughing, 
although one doth not know the cause why they laugh”; and finally, suggesting that 
humoral excesses course the same route: “If one should enter into a house where all the 
world is sad, he becomes melancholy.”135 This trafficking of sympathy is useful for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Sir Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises, In the One of Which, the Nature of Bodies; in the Other, the 
Nature of Man’s Soul; Is Looked Into: In Way of Discovery, of the Immortality of Reasonable 
Souls (Paris: Gilles Blaizot, 1644), 79: “while one [form] is in being, the others are not yet: and as 
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orator, who is able to propagate particular passions by way of actions alone. Digby 
describes it suspiciously: “[whatsoever] passion we exhibit in ourselves” comes to 
material effect—“a kind of contagion”— through “subtle” motions of spirits that “rise 
and swell in [auditors’] hearts.”136  
Bulwer’s gestures likewise form along channels of contact, and likewise, he 
suspects, can “catch,” transmitting affection. Like Digby and many before him, Bulwer 
observes a physiological shift that accompanies the experience of others’ gestures—one 
might “move,” “sway,” “rouse up,” “stir,”  “grasp,” or “pour out,” upon incident. Thus 
those orators who are still while speaking “as wood and stones, move no man.”137 But 
Bulwer diverges from Digby’s account of rhetorical action on a few important counts: 
first, Bulwer asserts that gesture connects not just with bodily imagination, but with the 
understanding: “by the motion of the hand there is wrought in the mind of the beholder 
something that is ex congruo, significant unto a thought.” The gesture thus can “conduct 
and insinuate” an “intelligible notion” by means of sensation—“it hath…efficacy to 
move the understanding by the sense.”138 This points to the second divergence: because 
for Bulwer, gesture and speech are integrally formed and bound up with one another, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
about sensations concatenating, but attaches the spark to either the instigating object rather or the 
motion per se—thus “if a man see another eat sour or acrid things which set the teeth on edge, 
this object tainteth the imagination,” and so the observer “hath his own teeth also set on edge”; 
but “if a man see another turn swiftly and long, or if he look upon wheels that turn, [he] himself 
waxeth turnsick.” Sylva Sylvarum or A Natural History in Ten Centuries, 1627, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon: Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and Lord High Chancellor of England, 
eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (London: Longman and Co., 
1857), 598. While both underscore the power of bodily imagination to come to manifest effect 
regardless of “will,” this slight distinction emphasizes the difference between Bacon and Digby’s 
understanding of how sympathy operates. 
136 Digby, Bodies, 381. Without going into detail, his theory postulates that particles actually 
move between the bodies—are emitted by one and absorbed into the other, and this, he thinks, is 
how these effects are caused. This is the premise for his so-called “powder of sympathy,” and the 
sole means (affective traffic) by which he takes rhetoric to operate.  
137 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 227. 
138 Ibid., 111. 
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Bulwer’s rhetorical gesture does not allow for the possibility (as Digby’s does) of words 
“saying” one thing, while gestures “steal insensibly” over the hearer’s body, saying 
another. For Bulwer speech and gesture form an “active pair” in effect as much as in 
origin. And just as Bulwer’s rhetor is to mind the relative heat a gesture generates for her 
own benefit, in order to observe “the ethic[al] precepts and the laws of civil 
conversation” her motions should promote eucrasia among auditors.139 (He recommends 
this actionem civilem, not hypocrisin—the generation of affection for its own sake.) 
Third, although it takes form and impetus from the world (is “touched off”), Bulwer’s 
manifest gesture is ultimately willed. Whereas Digby’s auditor can be puppeted “even 
against his will” by figures of speech and motion, Bulwer’s cannot.140 Chironomia’s 
gestures expressly encourage discourse. Bulwer defends gesture’s ability to occasion not 
just visceral reaction, but “opinion, advice, and judgment of others.”141  
Nonetheless, Bulwer builds his case for rhetorical gestures upon this phenomenon 
of the “little touch.” The “little touch” of the stroke according to Digby is means to “drive 
the medium forward.”142 Its contact with other bodies does not cease at the skin, but 
rather will “getting in, mingle itself with the spirits it finds there.”143 This communication 
of inner motions through gesture is best evidenced in gestures that physically make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid., 171. Canon 5, a swift arm gesture, and the most emotionally charged/heated hand 
gesture in Chironomia, may be used when “an oration begins to wax hot and prevalent, and the 
discoursing appetite of the hand be roused up and well heated by a rhetorical provocation”; it 
moves with the tongue such that “this glittering dart of speech, like lightening, or the shaking of 
Apollo’s beams, expatiates itself into a glorious latitude of elocution; the oration…pouring out 
itself” (ibid., 175). Bulwer admonishes that when such gestures are used, and the oration “wax 
hot” the orator is well to check them, and to try to contain them only to necessary sentences. 
140 Digby, Bodies, 381. In Pathomyotomia, Bulwer goes so far with this conviction as to suggest 
that even dream gestures, because they are embodied, are stirrings of the soul and thus 
intentional.  
141 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 123. 
142 Digby, Bodies, 342. 
143 Ibid., 357.  
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contact with other bodies (although it is no less present in those that don’t). Gesture 57, 
Reconcilio best illustrates the benefit of such gesture to rhetorical exchange: the arm and 
hand extend with the shot of spirits toward the receiving body (rather than drawing back 
and clenching, as with the fist). The receiver returns the gesture. This “declaration,” 
Bulwer says, befits those “who desire to incorporate, commix, or grow into one”; each 
hand, “moved by the same spirit…casts itself into a form”—that “works shall be 
common,” the hands clasp.144 
Motions concatenate bodies. There is energy here, as well as content that moves 
quickly and efficiently outside of the spoken arguments in which rhetors are customarily 
trained. Rhetors, Bulwer says, should start seeing action as fertile ground for garnering 
input and coming to terms.145 In other words, he underscores what ought to be the 
momentary flux and fluidity of oration unfolding. The rhetor should move by 
impression—that is, does not perfect his performance before the mirror, and call it a day. 
One who does not continually adapt to the dynamic space produced between resonating 
bodies risks failing to move and staling the content. Forms on both sides of the equation 
evolve with the production of appeals, and appeals with the configuration of forms—
moved rhetor moves. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 88-9. Other touch gestures recommend, restrain, confide, 
remind, and forgive. There are many others—more than half of Chirologia treats these (see 
Chirologia 56-113). 
145  Such action can take many forms. The eye, which is the part most precipitously moved while 
engaged, waxes “voluntary exactness of the mind” (Bulwer, Pathomyotomia, 176-77). Bulwer 
sees the physical movement of the eye, guided by gesture/image, as deepening both an impression 
and comprehension. Even the eyelid, he says, serves decision. To increase sensitivity, one 
practices noticing others’ body language. 
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6  BODILY CONCEPTIONS146  
 
In short, Bulwer resists the project Bacon begins and some Enlightenment 
rhetoricians carry on to limit the scope of rhetoric to “dressing up” reason. Bacon 
excludes reason from rhetoric’s domain for its ostensibly different substance, not only “in 
that the one is like a fist, and the other like the open hand (that is the one close, the other 
at large,” but also “that logic handles reason in truth and nature, and rhetoric handles it as 
it is planted in the opinions of the vulgar.”147 By putting rhetoric back in the fist, Bulwer 
does not, as it might seem at first glance, enumerate a framework for “implanting.” 
Rather, because of the Humanistic training he has had as physician, and the anatomy of 
the body that he inherited, he provides an alternative that hinges on reasoned engagement 
with the auditor (which is underscored in the like of Gesture 5, Collateraliter monstro, “I 
show both sides of an issue”) and locates the construction of rational argument in the 
confluence of mind and hand.  
But Bulwer’s was the rhetoric not taken by seventeenth-century practitioners, or 
since. Bernard Lamy’s (1640-1715) The Art of Speaking (1676), which circulated widely 
in English, reflects the trend. Its cordons the rhetor off from action for its immediacy and 
interference with judgment: 
The qualities of the mind are preferable to the qualities of the body; the 
eloquence of those endued with these last qualities is like a flash of 
gunpowder, gone in a moment; this eloquence makes a great noise, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Both Bulwer and contemporary gesture theorist Jürgen Streeck describe gestures this way. 
Bulwer calls gestures “corporeal conceits” (Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 120); Streeck, 
“conceptual action,” in Gesturecraft: The Manu-facture of Meaning (Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009), 151. 
147 Bacon, Advancement, 457. 
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flashes for a time, but ‘tis quickly spent and forgot. A treatise compos’d 
with judgment retains its beauty…148 
Implying that a treatise composed amid action is also “quickly spent and forgot,” Lamy 
clarifies what action can do for the orator composing: very little.  To “speak with our 
eyes, and our fingers…is not only imperfect, but troublesome.”149 Like a shot, it can take 
the listener by flesh to force meaning through. But like the spark, it is traceless. Tiring 
and distracting, it compromises the rhetor’s ability to appeal. Overall, Lamy deepens the 
theoretical disconnect between physical sensation and reasoned thought, and between a 
rational agent and rhetorical action.  
The body according to Bulwer is not that bystanding. For that reason, Chironomia 
stands as a canonical basis for the recent turn in rhetorical studies from Cartesian 
principle—which dissociates reason from action—toward material and body rhetoric. 
Establishing the body as more than a conduit for coercion is pivotal for this turn. One 
way to do that is to look more closely at the shared spaces of action and invention. 
Current work in material and body rhetoric tends to focus on the body’s role in the 
receptivity of appeal, but less on the body’s relationship to the appeal’s production. 
Crowley, for example, in Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism 
brings invention and delivery into proximity: “Words, performances, images, and other 
representations appeal to the gut. They trigger emotional responses that can set off a 
chain of ideologic that can in turn arouse additional emotional response.”150 Despite that, 
and recommending the rhetor attend to the body “receiving” while constructing appeals, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Lamy, Bernard, “The Art of Speaking,” 1675, in The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and 
Bernard Lamy, tr. and ed. John T. Harwood (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1986), 310. 
149 Ibid., 180. 
150 Crowley, Towards a Civil Discourse, 88. 
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the inventional strategy she recommends is entirely hands off; although it aims to engage 
the believing body through use of narrative and specific terms, it leaves the rhetor’s own 
body out of the picture. Bulwer’s Chirologia…Chironomia is one vehicle by which to 
reconsider that longstanding separation. Its steady focus on the inherence of content with 
physical form makes it an unrecognized but vital resource for exploring the moving body 
as inventional resource, as well as the quality of action-in-relation that moves between 
animated rhetorical subjects.  
Future work in material and body rhetoric should also begin to consider how the 
production of reasoned argument in particular also functions as an effective counterpoint 
to Cartesian underpinnings in rhetorical studies. One possible vehicle for such 
consideration is contemporary neuroscience151; another is the emergent, transdisciplinary 
subfield of Gesture Studies, which explores how bodily motions affect and infect how 
people form and process ideas in dynamic relation to one another. This subfield is a rich 
resource for rhetorical studies not only because it considers gesture’s simultaneous role in 
what Kendon calls “manifest, deliberate expressiveness” and in making sense of what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Gallese and Lakoff (2005) and Wilson (2002) both argue for the role of movement in the 
promotion of reason and language activities. Antonio Damasio (2003) similarly argues for 
passion’s inherence with reason (and that of both with the body): “The revival of the emotional 
signal accomplishes a number of important tasks. Covertly or overtly, it focuses attention on 
certain aspects of the problem and thus enhances the quality of reasoning over it.” Looking for 
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, 2003), 147. V.S. 
Ramachandran says of the emotionless thought (although “it is difficult to imagine…what such a 
state could even mean”): “If you don’t see the meaning or significance of something—if you 
cannot apprehend all its implications—in what sense are you really aware of it consciously?” V.S. 
Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the 
Architecture of the Mind (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 247. Regarding “the passionate self,” 
Ramachandran describes parts of the brain that are “driven partially by sensory input not only 
from the skin but also from the viscera—heart, lung, liver, stomach—so that one can also speak 
of a ‘visceral…self’ or of a ‘gut reaction’ to something” (Ibid., 247-48). For an account of the 
relationship of such “gut reactions” to political decisions (including campaign advertising, voting, 
etc.—as well as some of the appeals-making concerns Crowley discusses in Towards a Civil 
Discourse—see Westin’s The Political Brain (2007).  
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being said (via both words and body language), but also because here, one finds subtle 
arguments for the important influence of presence on coming to terms and mutual 
understanding.152 Streeck, for example, describes “communicative action” as “not in the 
first place a code, a repertoire of conventional signs with fixed meanings and rules of use 
and combination,” so much as “a form of human practice—or a family of practices” that 
“creatively fashions its own tools” vis-à-vis inter-bodied gestures.153 Like Bulwer (and 
other current theorists of gesture154), Streeck sees gestures as “a bodily form of 
conceiving.”155  “Ceiving” action, as such, is influenced by physical space and context, 
co-participants, and intention; it is also means by which to stir up and share rhetorical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Kendon, Gesture, 151.  
153 Streeck, Gesturecraft, 4. Streeck’s view of the internalization of thought through gestures is 
Bulwerian. Instead of describing microcosm and macrocosm, Streeck speaks of evolution. 
Quoting Llinas, he notes that “the property of motoricity is being internalized—the beast is 
literally pulling itself up by the bootstraps! The system takes properties from the outside and pulls 
them…inside…The ability to think…arises from the internalization of movement” (ibid., 177). 
154 For a rich encapsulation of those on whose work he builds, see Streeck, Gesturecraft, 171-74. 
McNeill feels that gestures are “material carriers of thinking” for speech assistance (that is 
Streeck’s description), and help to constitute thought (McNeill, Hand and Mind, 1992. Kita 
(2000) sees gestures as interfacing between the stuff of thoughts and the structuring and 
signifying possibilities of spoken language; Goldin-Meadow (2003) suggests that gestures take a 
load off of the mind, and can thus speed up problem-solving or communicative tasks that require 
concentration: “gesture offers a route…though which new information can be brought into the 
system” (Streeck, Gesturecraft, 171-74). See also Krauss and Morrel-Samuels (1992), who think 
gesture helps to spatially access particular concepts and pieces of speech from memory; Hadar 
and Butterworth (1997) feel the body provides “imagistic assistance” to utterance formation; and 
Kendon (2000) explores “visible action” as itself “utterance,” and is one of the few such theorists 
who acknowledge and examine the extent to which gesture’s communicative function extends 
beyond accompanying or helping to facilitate speech. Goodwin (2003) convincingly describes the 
“environmental coupling” of communicative gestures with other bodies and the surround. 
Overall, as Streeck says, there has been little examination of “how gestures organize co-
presence,” or what he calls (borrowing from Merleau-Ponty) “intercorporeal” gestures—those 
that involve physical contact with and reciprocal action from other living beings (Streeck, 
Gesturecraft, 208). In other words the category of “gesture” is oddly contained often to single 
speakers and to midair motions, and does not involve contact points with the world (other bodies, 
or tools—both of which Bulwer acknowledged in his categorizations of gestures). The 
importance of expanding the category of “gesture” for studies of rhetorical delivery and 
composition practice has been made by Prior (2010). There has also been a surprising dearth of 
research in Gesture Studies on gestures in the public sphere (cf. The Politics of Gesture, 2009). 
155 Streeck, Gesturecraft, 9-10. 
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motion bodily. Such premises underscore and inform Crowley’s and others’ suggestion 
that rhetorical studies turn its attention back toward the affective appeal, not in order to 
promote a coercive model for communicating, but rather to attend to the body’s presence 
in discursive acts—to the relationship between passionate inclination and decision 
making—and of course, to meeting your audience where she stands.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
INFECTIOUS GESTURES, OR THOMAS SHERIDAN’S SENSIBLE MARK 
 
Condillac begins his Treatise on Sensations (1754) with an experiment. He asks 
his reader to imagine with him “a statue constructed internally like ourselves,” but coated 
in marble “to prevent the use of its senses, and we reserved to ourselves the right to open 
them at will to the different impressions of which they are susceptible.”156 His aim is to 
explore the senses as mode of knowledge production. One by one, a sense is granted, and 
removed, beginning with smell. This statue is capable of “attention,” or the sense of the 
impression upon the nose, but cannot “have ideas of extension, shape or of anything 
outside itself, or outside its sensations.”157 The sighted statue—which might be expected 
to bridge that gap—likewise “is incapable of seeing space outside itself” (even that it has 
a body to be outside of), because it has not yet learned to touch.158 Yet tactility is itself 
not enough for the statue to feel embodied amid a wind, a wave of heat, even the author’s 
rapping on its head. “It will be just the same if I move it about in the air,” he says, “it 
cannot even then learn to know that it has a body which moves.”159 
Then the statue is granted a hand, and with it the capacity to respond. “I allow the 
statue the use of all its members,” Condillac explains, but “Nature must produce the first 
movements.”160 The hand “will naturally be carried to some part of its body, to the chest 
for example,” where “distinguishing its chest from its hand, the statue will find itself in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Treatise on Sensations, tr. Geraldine Carr (Los Angeles: 
University of Southern California Press, 1970), 3. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 58. 
159 Ibid., 78. 
160 Ibid., 84. 
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each, because it will feel itself equally in both.”161 This, the author says, might still 
confound the statue, in that each time it feels this resonance in a new part, it might think 
that part another body—that its self comprises a constellation of the things. But 
contiguity is established when the hand happens by another coincidence to follow along 
its opposing arm to chest and neck. “As it continues to touch itself, everywhere the 
sensation of solidity will represent two things which exclude one another,” and in this 
gesture, “the same sentient being will reply from one to the other, this is myself, this is 
still myself!”162    
If the statue’s revelation, as much observed,163 is a comment upon Descartes’ 
famous epiphany, and ensuing description of human being as “moving statue,” it is 
nevertheless interesting—and apt to the tectonic shift in then-contemporary rhetorical 
theory—that Condillac’s statue locates its “self” as well as voice by way of its own 
moving hand. That self and voice appear to take shape from the gesture itself and creep 
into the flesh. This gesture, divined from the surround, makes contact and absorbs. It 
apparently responds to the world it seeks. Soon after prompting the above “C’est moi! 
C’est moi, encore!,” the statue’s hand encounters other bodies, and becomes the platform 
for what it is to see. At first, the statue is surprised “at not being all it touches.”164 
Condillac’s description of this confusion encapsulates his hungry, nature-drawn gesture: 
It takes hold and lets go, and takes hold again of everything round it; it 
seizes hold of itself, and compares itself with the objects it touches; and as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Ibid., 87. 
162 Ibid., 88. 
163 See, for example, Daniel Heller-Roazen’s The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New 
York: Zone Books, 2007), 226-27. 
164 Condillac, Treatise on Sensations, 89. 
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it attains to more exact ideas so its body and the objects in contact with it 
appear to it to be forming under its hands.165 
Ultimately, Condillac’s notion of “extension,” and with it relationship between bodies, is 
realized only through currents of gesture. Sensations, then associations and ideas form 
through contrast across their pathways and sequences. In this way, Condillac’s 
hypothetical gesture is playful. The statue enjoys its motility: “Sight, hearing, taste, and 
smell are limited to sense-organs, but movement spreads over all parts, extending 
enjoyment to the whole body.”166  
In this chapter, I consider the work of Thomas Sheridan (1719-1788) as it 
intersects and poses against what he sees as the trend among stagecrafters (and other 
imitative artists) toward turning their constituents—their “talent” as well as audiences—
to stone. Published around the same time as Condillac’s influential Treatise on the 
Sensations, Sheridan’s works on elocution likewise reflect then-current fascination with 
sensation, synaesthesia, and gesture-as-intermediary not only between “nature” and 
“self,” but between intuition and understanding, such that workable motion, as well as the 
unit of the gesture, become increasingly noticed and sought for various ends. Having 
spent fifteen years acting and stage managing,167 privy to the training practice of turning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Ibid.,  89-90. 
166 Ibid., 91. 
167 Sheridan attended Trinity College in Dublin, where he received both a B.A. and M.A. in 
education, ostensibly intending to take up his father’s vocation of schoolmaster. Sheridan defers 
entering the profession, Sheldon notes, by way of playwrighting, and then acting; The Brave 
Irishman is produced for the first time in 1743 at Smock Alley—one week after Sheridan first 
takes the stage there. [Esther K. Sheldon, Thomas Sheridan of Smock-Alley: Recording his Life as 
Actor and Theatre Manager in Both Dublin and London; and Including a Smock-Alley Calendar 
for the Years of his Management (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 20.]  
Although early in his career, he was compared in terms of ability with David Garrick—with 
whom he performed in Dublin and to whom he seemed a friend for a very short time (Garrick 
asks Sheridan to spend a summer in London, which Sheridan declines, calling himself “‘a well-
cut pebble’” to Garrick’s “‘diamond’” (ibid., 38-9))—Sheridan was by some critics then as most 
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actors to sculpture, paintings and other staid works of art as a source for “movement,” 
Sheridan calls for conceiving gestures not as pose points but rather as the mutable 
material “between”—the stuff of transitions and transformation—and thus, the need to let 
living gestures through. This solicitation is embedded in his proposition to restore oratory 
(living models of gesture) to prominence in public education, as well as in his 
determination of how rhetoric works.  As Ulman and Goring observe, Sheridan’s 
rhetorical theory is largely contingent on his unusual notice of “the living voice,” but 
especially, I will argue, on the way he configures and promotes “sensible marks”—the 
subcategory of this voice that includes gestures, tones, and looks, for which, unlike 
articulation, accent, emphasis, and stops, Sheridan offers no formula, and no intricate 
guidelines for decorous deployment. In fact, he makes the argument to let these marks 
loose. Sheridan’s theory of rhetoric as more than performance—as possession—is a 
stepping stone between the work of Bulwer in the seventh century, and the lively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
now characterized as middling in terms of acting ability. This view is especially pronounced in 
direct comparison with Garrick, who Sheldon says has a “wider range of reaction” than Sheridan, 
whose gift was “thoughtful understanding” (ibid., 304). One review of Sheridan late in his career 
typifies those that assess Sheridan to have unconvincing action, especially: “‘If it was possible for 
spectators to be pleased with meaning alone, uttered through very ungracious, inadequate organs, 
Mr. Sheridan [as Othello] might stand in high public estimation’” (ibid., 305). Telling of Sheridan 
as an actor, perhaps, and of his message about the influence of presence on negotiating feeling is 
an anecdote that Sheldon shares about the first performance in which Sheridan’s audience turned 
against him (it “disrupts his honeymoon with the Dublin public” (ibid., 40)). The spark is lit when 
Sheridan refused to appear on stage for the title role of Cato (FIGURE 5) because the robe that he 
usually wore for the part was missing, which he felt he needed to hide “‘Defects, and add Gravity 
and Dignity’” (Sheldon quotes from Sheridan’s Address to the Town (1743) (ibid., 41)). 
Theophilus Cibber, in the supporting role, refusing “‘to appease a Person beside himself with 
Passion,’” said, “‘the Play shall not stand still for you,’” and offered to read both his own role and 
Sheridan’s, which the audience cheered for, and happened. Sheridan fled. The confrontation led 
to both a heated letter-writing campaign and brawl at the theatre between supporters of Sheridan 
and those of Cibber, which “drove Cibber off the stage” (ibid., 42). 
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conjectures about gestures and sympathy that gather momentum in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century. 
In what follows, before digging into Sheridan’s “social gestures,” I offer a short 
depiction as to what would have seemed stony in the partition of theatrical arts at the 
time. (Sheridan does not bring his complaint expressly into his elocutionary writing for 
reasons one might attach to his ethos.) Afterwards, at the chapter’s close, a 
countergesture, and glimpse of where things are headed for the progressively popular and 
signature rhetorical gesture is shown in the work of John Walker. 
 
1   STONE PORTERS 
 
Another statue—or series of statues are enlivened168 in the work of theatre 
manager and playwright, Aaron Hill. Hill is known as the father of the so-called 
“naturalistic” school of acting for his move away from old rhetorical precepts on delivery 
in the training of actors. As the namesake of his twice-weekly theatre journal, the 
Prompter (1734-1736), Hill vows by catcall and whistle to root out the stage action that 
ruins audience’s willing suspension of disbelief.169 The title character in Hill’s farce, The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Reprising Galatea in Ovid’s Metamorphosis, the living statue recurs in theatrical works of this 
time, presumably related to the fascination in natural philosophy with the senses, and the famous 
Molyneaux question. Roach tells us that Hill’s The Walking Statue (1746) is published about two 
years before Rameau’s Pygmalion (1748) (Roach, The Player’s Passion, 68); both of these post-
date Boureau-Deslandes’ Pygmalion, or, The Living Statue by about five years.  
169 Toby Cole and Helen Krich Chinoy, Actors on Acting: The Theories, Techniques, and 
Practices of the Great Actors of All Times as Told in Their Own Words (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1970), 116. The authors cite the Prompter to show what Hill means to fix (on actors): 
“They relax themselves, as soon as any Speech in their own Part is over, into an absent 
Unattentiveness to whatever is replied by Another: looking around and examining the Company 
of Spectators with an Ear only watchful of the Cue; at which, like Soldiers, upon the Word of 
Command, they start, suddenly, back to their Postures, TONE over the unanimating Sound of 
their Lesson; and, then (Like a Caterpillar, that has erected itself at the Touch of a Twig) shrink 
again, to their CRAWL, and their QUIET; and enjoy their full Ease, till next Rowsing” (ibid., 
117). 
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Walking Statue (1746), aptly, is flesh before plaster, and arrives at its concrete state by 
way of an imitation of a painting, which imitates a statue that a knight has commissioned. 
A character performs this statue in order to gain access to the knight’s castle, but for all 
his likeness to the model, the man’s vitality manifests—it twitches, shifts weight, and 
cannot but react. (When the knight pulls its leg, it kicks him.) In this character and 
situation, Hill’s comment on popular acting practice also reveals. The contemporary stage 
crawls with this pallor, with imitations of imitations of imitations, which reduce to the 
effect of this title character: the suggestion of squirmy inclination bound up by the 
studied posture of the cast. Its posture cannot hold. A line from the character who hauls 
this fleshy statue from place to place captures the criticism: “o’my conscience, my master 
is the first that ever went about to send a message by a stone porter!”170 
Despite the apparent irony, by Hill’s—and Sheridan’s—time, the practice of 
drawing one’s gestures, passions, and even thoughts from classical statues and paintings 
is firmly entrenched in the training of actors. So firmly entrenched, in fact, that actors 
receive accolades for seeming statue-like while in character. Barnett notes that “in 
general an actor’s postures and gestures were guided by laws similar to those observed by 
painters and sculptors.”171 What she calls the “emphasis on pictorial interest and beauty” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Aaron Hill, “The Walking Statue: Or, the Devil in the Wine Cellar,” in The Dramatic Works of 
Aaron Hill (London: For T. Lownds, 1760), 61. Note that this piece was performed at Smock-
Alley during Sheridan’s tenure as stage manager there (March 1751); the role of the statue is 
played by Theophilus Cibber, “in which Character will be represented the Clock-Work Statue, in 
the manner it was originally performed by him…in…the Pantomime called Doctor Faustus at the 
Theatre Royal in Drury-Lane” (Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 463). 
171 Dene Barnett, “The Performance Practice of Acting: The Eighteenth Century Part III: The 
Arms,” Theatre Research International 3 (1978): 84. 
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she sees in reviews of actors, as for opera singer Nicolini172: “There is scarce a beautiful 
Posture, in an old Statue, which he does not plant himself in, as the different 
Circumstances of the Story give occasion for it.” While “every Limb, and Finger” play 
their part, “He performs the most ordinary Action…even in the giving of a Letter, or 
dispatching of message, etc.”173 The language of the review seems appropriate to the state 
of the action: the gesture is “planted.” It comes over the actor so completely as to surface 
the “old Statue” down to the finger. It stays put, never wandering too far from its 
attendant plot point. It is a gesture “on call.” Likewise, Barnett refers to actor Barton 
Booth, whose “attitudes were all picturesque. He had a good Taste for Statuary and 
Painting, and where he could not come at original Pictures, he spared no Pains or 
Expense to get the best Drawings and Prints.”174 Roach also suggests that Booth excelled 
at the “tableau,” which “was equivalent to the cinematic stop frame,” as well as all the 
rage.175 
But the picturesque attitude must be tenuous, so keenly (as Hill implies) do 
stagecrafters attempt to pin the gesture to its decorous manifestations, as well as tableau. 
Charles Gildon in The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton (1710) is an early proponent of this 
approach to action by way of the imitation of statues.176 His audience comprises both 
actors and orators. Gildon is frank about his concern for what is happening on stage, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Dene Barnett, “The Performance Practice of Acting: The Eighteenth Century Part V: Postures 
and Attitudes,” Theatre Research International 6 (1980): 12. See also Roach, The Player’s 
Passion, 68-9. 
173 Here, Barnett says, Cibber quotes the 115th Tatler, January 1710 (ibid., 4).  Colley Cibber, An 
Apology for the Life of Mr. Colley Cibber, Comedian, and Late Patentee of the Theatre-Royal. 
With an Historical View of the Stage during his Own time (London, 1740), 346.  
174 Barnett, “Arms,” 5. From Theophilus Cibber, The Life and Character of that Excellent Actor 
Barton Booth, Esq. (London: 1753), 51.  
175 Roach, The Player’s Passion, 73. 
176 See both Barnett, Postures, 330, and Roach, The Player’s Passion, 67. 
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well as at the bar and pulpit. Certain skittish gestures are popping up where they do not 
belong, interrupting tender moments, and propagating. Gildon begins with the premise 
that “Action is Motion, and Motion is the Support of Nature, which without it would sink 
into the sluggish Mass of Chaos.” Recommending action, of course, “The Eye is caught 
by any thing in Motion, but passes over the sluggish and motionless things.”177 On stage, 
“the best Speaking, destitute of Action and Gesture (the Life of all Speaking) proves but a 
heavy, dull, and dead Discourse.”178 Later, however, in search of a source, he proscribes 
the imitation of living bodies, offering instead that the actor “ought not be a Stranger to 
Painting and Sculpture, imitating their Graces so masterly, as to not fall short of a 
Raphael Urbin, a Michael Angelo, &c.”179 It is the “nature” in these works that he 
wants—more specifically, their subjects’ passions—as well as the subjects’ abiding, 
postural commitment to the scene and its scope (these characters are, after all, still-lifes). 
Gildon shows what variance of passion may be harvested from such works by tracking 
subtle manifestations of grief across a scene, noting one character’s grief is “mingled 
with Love and Tenderness,” while another’s is “more contracted in himself.”180 While I 
will say more about Gildon’s strategy for gesture uptake later, for now it is enough to 
note that he sees passions as strict manifestations of action, and feels that passions may 
be steeped inward through a sort of “trying on” of the gestures of others. Thus he means 
this literally: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Charles Gildon, The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, The Late Eminent Tragedian. Wherein The 
Action and Utterance of the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit Are Distinctly Considered (London: Printed 
for Robert Gosling, 1710), 25-6. 
178 Ibid., 51. 
179 Ibid., 139. 
180 Ibid., 36-7. 
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what a Player now might do by the fine Pieces of History-Painting [i.e.] 
carry off the beautiful Passions and Positions of the Figures, or the 
particular Appearance of any one Passion.181 
Not only are these passions preserved in medias res by way of their gesture 
combinations and so ready for “carrying off,” but they appear to be diffused equally 
among the cast. Gildon notes that all characters in LeBrun’s Tent of Darius, for example, 
externalize the exigence of their situation; that is, “there is never any Person on the Cloth, 
who has not a Concern in the Action.”182 This synchronicity, or passion sharing, “would 
render the Representation extremely solemn and beautiful,” whereas at present, “not only 
the Supernumeraries, as they call them, or Attendants mind nothing of the great Concern 
of the Scene, but even the Actors themselves,” on stage, “shall be whispering to one 
another, or bowing to their Friends in the Pit, or gazing about.”183 The gestures 
circulating among orators, where present, he says, are not much better: “Some strike their 
chins, some their Thighs, and some their Foreheads in Trifles, and others, perpetually 
buffet the Pulpit, or Place of Action; some proceed so far, as to pull off their Hair.”184 
Here Gildon makes a key distinction, which he extends to actors as well: “For tho the 
Passions are very beautiful in their proper Gestures, yet they ought never…to transport 
the Speaker out of himself.”185 This suggests at least three important assumptions about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Ibid., 56. 
182 Ibid., 37. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., 86. 
185 Ibid. This close comparison between the work of orators and actors had fizzled somewhat by 
the time of Sheridan’s writing, in part on the basis of lack of action. John Wilkes in 1759 notes 
“how faint is…the persuasion of the orator, when weighed against the strength of the stage; there 
we are truly animated: there we impress not on our memories barely, but on our hearts, ideas that 
intermixing with, become of a similar substance with the passions: those arguments which had 
but voice from the orator, catch from the actor existence, and glow with life.” Emphasizing 
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what the statue brings the orator (also what is to be avoided in imitating living beings), 
and gesture, generally. These ideas have gained ground by the time of Sheridan’s writing: 
first, this binding of particular, “proper” gestures to particular passions. These linkages 
have been taking shape, of course, for as long as has “actio” (since at least Quintilian’s 
Institutio, which Gildon frequently cites), but now the “living” passion is cordoned off as 
referent, in what comes across as an effort to stop gestures themselves from mutating and 
getting out of hand. Second, that although you are strapped to your tableau, passionate 
gestures are exhibitions—personal, private things, to be summoned and ditched. As such, 
they should be divined, measured, and most of all, contained. Third, gestures have the 
capacity to transport one out of oneself. 
Hill, then, does the unexpected when about midway through the century he tries 
to call for leaving gestures to their own devices. On the first page of An Essay on the Art 
of Acting (1753), Hill says, “To act a passion well, the actor never must attempt its 
imitation”—until, that is, the actor sufficiently impels “impressive springs within his 
mind” to unleash. These strings “form that passion when it is undesigned and natural.” 
186 Here is his recipe, in effect, for a gesture:  
First, The imagination must conceive a strong idea of the passion. 
Secondly, But that idea cannot strongly be conceived, without 
impressing its own form upon the muscles of the face. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contrast with Gildon here, John Wilkes says, “Warmed by the strength of character, we [actors] 
almost possess it, and are transported beyond ourselves.” A General View of the Stage (London: 
For J. Coote, 1759), 4. 
186 Aaron Hill, An Essay on the Art of Acting; In which, the Dramatic Passions Are Properly 
Defined and Described, with Applications of the Rules Peculiar to Each, and Selected Passages 
for Practice (London: For J. Dixwell, 1779), 9. Emphasis added. 
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Thirdly, Nor can the look be muscularly stamped, without 
communicating, instantly, the same impressions to the muscles of the 
body. 
Fourthly, The muscles of the body (braced or slack, as the ideas 
was an active or passive one), must, in their natural, and not-to-be-avoided 
consequence, by impelling or retarding the flow of the animal spirits, 
transmit their own conceived sensation to the sound of the voice, and 
disposition of the gesture.187 
It is, at least superficially, an interesting reversal—although it is hard to miss the 
Cartesian underpinnings (as Roach says188), as well as what continues to be the 
introverted, personal quality of the gesture formed. That gesture is allowed to be “one’s 
own,” in consultation with what is “natural” (it is drawn from living material, and 
robustly mutable) but it is no less consigned to its representative passion. That is, 
although Hill wants to release the gesture from the courses and meanings laid out for it by 
rhetoricians and stagecrafters, he cannot resist the siren song of prescription, limiting the 
quantity of available passions to exactly ten, which he then spells out in terms of what the 
imagination should call for when prompted. Ultimately, he draws his own sort of statue in 
the mirror. The actor who will summon joy will see in the glass “that his forehead 
appears open, and raised, his eye smiling, and sparkling, his neck will be stretched and 
erect, without stiffness,” as well “his breast will be inflated, and majestically backened; 
his back-bone erect, and all the joints of his arm, wrist, fingers, hip, knee, and ankle, will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Hill, Art of Acting, 10. 
188 Roach, The Player’s Passion, 80. 
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now be high-strung and braced boldly.”189 If he does not see these things, Hill coaxes this 
actor to remain there, so posed, until his imagination musters the right adjustment to 
course the feeling through. 
But even so, this precise swelling of pride’s, as a pose, tires. While eighteenth-
century stagecrafters after Hill remain loathe to unpin the gesture from its conscripted 
sense,190 it is interesting to note that for a short time in the study of oratory, there is an 
abandoning of such conscriptions in the rhetorical theory of Sheridan—who had, 
doubtless, trained with many old gestures.  
 
2  THE LIVING TONGUE 
 
Historians of rhetoric tend to describe Sheridan as surfeit of something that must 
be skimmed off his concepts in order to get at what is useful. Bizzell and Herzberg call it, 
simply, an “excess of insistent overvaluation of elocution,” which “led to criticism and 
undervaluation of his project.”191 Similarly, Spoel describes “an inspirational, if at times 
excessive foundational justification for the importance of Elocutionary study.”192 Oddly, 
this “excess” is typically associated with both why Sheridan had such an effect in his 
time, and why he deserves only nominal attention at present. W. Bacon says British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Hill, Art of Acting, 14. 
190 Wilkes, for example, suggests that Hill’s “astonishment” gesture is off; where Hill says the 
animal spirits retreat to the heart pulling motion inward to the point of cessation, Wilkes says that 
it inclines outward, “the whole body is…thrown back, with one leg set before the other, both 
hands elevated, the eyes larger than usual, the brows drawn up, and the mouth not quite shut” 
(Wilkes, A General View, 118). John Walker, likewise, takes issue with Hill’s “pity,” asking, 
“And how, according to this writer, can the muscles be intense and the eye languid at the same 
time?” He offers, rather, that pity’s gesture comprises “a gentle raising and falling of the hands, 
and eyes, as if mourning over the unhappy object.” John Walker, Elements of Elocution. Being 
the Substance of a Course of Lectures on the Art of Reading; Delivered at Several Colleges in the 
University of Oxford (London: Printed by S. Hamilton, 1781), 290, 301.  
191 Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times 
to the Present, 2nd ed. (Boston: Bedford St. Martin’s, 2001), 779-80. 
192 Spoel, “Rereading,” 90. 
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Education indicates Sheridan’s “missionary zeal, which lead him frequently to absurd 
claims for oratory as a panacea.” Sheridan’s “repeated insistence that oratory would 
reform bar, pulpit, and senate by purifying the channels of communication both as to 
speech and deportment seems to us,” Bacon says, “as it seemed to some of his 
contemporaries, to be lacking in humor.”193 In such characterizations, Sheridan is accused 
of superfluous language, immoderate heaping and construction of argument (“claims that 
are larger than life”194), and “no trace of self-doubt”195 in the name of the ultimate 
problem: his claim about the power of delivery. That claim is overstated, if not wrong. 
What contemporary critics often write between the lines is captured in this review from 
Sheridan’s time: 
 
he is rather too sanguine in his expectations, and lays too great a stress 
upon the efficacy of declamation…He has studied the subject until he is 
grown warm in the pursuit, and kindles into a degree of enthusiasm, which 
sometimes hurries him to the borders of extravagance. One would 
imagine, by reading these lectures, that he considers elocution as the 
consummation of all earthly perfection; and that even the virtues of the 
heart depend, in a great measure, on the utterance of the tongue, and the 
gesticulations of the body.196 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Wallace A. Bacon, “The Elocutionary Career of Thomas Sheridan (1719-1788), Speech 
Monographs 31, no. 1 (1964): 12. 
194 Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 2. 
195 Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 228. 
196 Anon., Scots Magazine 24 (1762): 481. From Spoel, who cites this passage while discussing 
Sheridan’s local ethos (Spoel, “Rereading, 69). 
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Spoel notes “Sheridan’s assertive and hyperbolic characterization of the powers of 
elocution…exposed him ‘to the ridicule of discerning readers.’”197 The above review, 
likewise, aligns Sheridan’s own ebullience, or “warm…pursuit” with what becomes the 
excess of his claim. That Sheridan could take elocution to be “the consummation of all 
earthly perfection” is roughly equated by the reviewer, in terms of faceit, with “the 
virtues of the heart depend…on the utterance of the tongue, and the gesticulations of the 
body.” The last is, in fact, the warrant Sheridan uses to make his argument for enlivening 
delivery.  
Howell suggests that this excessiveness—both in terms of delivery and of claim—
is a hangover from Sheridan’s own career in the theatre. With this observation Ulman, in 
his wonderful assessment of Sheridan’s words-as-actions, agrees, noting “Sheridan’s 
argument reveals that his exaggerated claims for the power of oratory,” characteristic of 
Sheridan’s writing on elocution, “grew out of his background as an actor and his grossly 
distorted views of ancient rhetoric.”198 But where Howell insists that Sheridan, as such, 
got the story all wrong—that he collapses the whole art of rhetoric into the “single 
concept” of delivery, and as such, feels he “glimpsed a peninsula through the fog of his 
own folly and thought he discovered a continent”199—Ulman argues that such spurns 
overlook Sheridan’s contribution to rhetorical theory. Although (as above) Ulman takes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Spoel, “Rereading,” 69. The reference she cites is to Scots Magazine 24 (1762), 481-86, 593-
601 (481). Samuel Johnson, for instance, supposedly quipped of Sheridan, “Such an excess of 
stupidity…is not in Nature”; he likened Sheridan’s project to “burning a farthing candle at Dover, 
to shew light at Calais” (Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 47). 
198 H. Lewis Ulman, Things, Thoughts, Words, and Actions: The Problem of Language in Late 
Eighteenth-Century British Rhetorical Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1994), 152. The quote finishes with “and of George Berkeley’s philosophical work,” and refers to 
Howell, Eighteenth Century, 222-30. Howell conflates Sheridan’s selective sampling of citations 
from Cicero and Quintilian (mostly on delivery, or the role of the body in persuasion) with 
Sheridan’s having interpreted these sources as concerned with nothing except these topics (ibid). 
199 Howell, Eighteenth Century, 239. Howell appears to take his cue from Samuel Johnson. 
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Sheridan’s claims for delivery to be overstated, Ulman observes that Sheridan harnessed 
“his uninformed notions” into what became the then-eminent theory of elocution, whose 
“chief end” was action.200 Ulman emphasizes Sheridan’s distinction, as such, from 
Campbell and Blair, who spotlight written discourse: “Sheridan sees words (and their 
‘accompaniments’—looks, tones, and gestures) primarily as actions intimately tied to 
physical presence and performance.”201 In this sense, although Campbell, Blair and 
Sheridan all question “the autonomy of rational thought from the passions and 
imagination,” Sheridan “mines a very different vein of resources for rhetorical theory 
than do Campbell and Blair”: namely, the rhetorical subject in situ.202  
But even Ulman cannot resist tongue-in-cheek when it comes to the matter of 
Sheridan’s own language. Certain claims manifest “grandiose” vision in what seems the 
“affected” sense of that term; others outright “grandiloquence.”203 Most of the block 
quotes are disclaimed by such adjectives, hedging what Ulman is willing to reap from 
them, including the following description of the eloquent orator, which is characterized as 
“hyperbolic”: 
All his internal powers are at work; all his external testify their energies. 
Within, the memory, the fancy, the judgment, the passions are all busy; 
without, every muscle, every nerve is exerted; not a feature, not a limb, 
but speaks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Ulman, Things, 152, 148. 
201 Ibid., 148. 
202 Ibid., 175. 
203 Ibid., 169, 172, e.g. 
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Ulman offers this quote as evidence of Sheridan’s view of language “not only as 
reference but also as performance.”204 But I suspect that Sheridan means what he says 
here—and that this description of what the body brings to argument warrants inspection 
for something more than dramatic effect. That is, I think that it is worth considering the 
stuff of the much-noted excess—the speakable twitch, for example—as its own kind of 
rhetorical resource. Thus while Howell closes his assessment of Sheridan’s rhetoric by 
calling it “foredoomed to become a leading influence in reducing rhetoric to…a condition 
in which it began…to mean merely declamatory rather than fully persuasive utterance,” 
we will ask what of Sheridan’s notion of action-as-oratory argues for the inverse of that 
claim.205 
In fact, there is disagreement about the extent to which Sheridan’s theatre and 
Elocution careers overlapped, as well as what brings Sheridan to Elocution in the first 
place.206 Sheridan’s own account, issued in his An Oration…at the Musick-Hall in 
Fishamble-Street (1757), attests that he had been interested in education reform for some 
time, but is driven most precipitously to the career shift by a riot. Having cited both his 
father’s vocation of schoolmaster and a pivotal conversation with Sheridan’s godfather, 
Jonathan Swift (who, Sheridan says, quipped to him of universities not teaching 
speaking, “Then they teach you nothing”)207, Sheridan offers that his thirteen odd years 
involved with theatre were but necessary practical training for this end. This speech, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Ibid., 174. 
205 Howell, Eighteenth Century, 243. 
206 Bacon, for example, strongly suggests that Sheridan is driven from his career as stage manager 
by bad luck and business decisions following “his exile in London” after his theatre was 
ransacked. As he puts it, “Everything began to go wrong. Sheridan had hired star performers at 
salaries greater than he could really manage; receipts at the box office did not indicate that 
Sheridan himself was in favor as an actor now,” and casting the heaviest blow, a rival theatre 
opened to Sheridan’s Smock-Alley opened in Dublin (Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 15). 
207 Sheridan, Oration, 19-20.  
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offered in Dublin to potential benefactors, calls for infusing the public school system in 
Ireland with the study of oratory (as well as establishing an Irish academy to compete 
with England’s Westminster and Eaton) in order that “our whole System of Education 
should be rendere’d more complete.”208 Having restated the thrust of British Education 
(1756)—that “there never could be any Settlement of the English Language, nor could it 
possibly be reduced to Rule, unless the Art of Speaking were first revived,”209 he 
describes his passage from the stage, to that purpose, this way: 
In my first Motions towards it, I was only groping my Way in the Dark, 
and my Journey ended in a Chaos, where there could not be said to be 
Light, but, as Milton expresses it, rather darkness visible. 
At length I found that Theory alone would never bring me far on 
my Way; and that continual Practice must be added to furnish me with 
Lights to conduct me to my Journey’s end. To obtain this, there was but 
one Way open, which was the Stage. A Way so thorny, so dangerous, so 
full of Precipices, that nothing but my eager Pursuit of the Point in View, 
could have made me venture into it.210 
This excerpt, as well as its ensuing caveat demonstrate the rhetorical canny that Spoel 
calls attention to throughout her essay. Sheridan carefully distances himself for this 
audience from the theatre (“come at that precious Ore, I scrupled not to dig myself in the 
Mine”211), even as he locates his expertise through it. But this is also as close as Sheridan 
gets to describing from where the thick of his language theory comes—as well as what he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Ibid., 11. 
209 Ibid., 20. 
210 Ibid., 20-1. This passage is cited in part or at more length in Bacon, Howell, and Ulman. 
211 Ibid., Oration 21. 
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takes to make him expert in the subject’s exigence. (Where the journey ends in chaos is 
the riot.)  
Only in this Elocutionary writing does Sheridan expressly link himself to the 
theatre, implying that this explanation is designed for apology, or to justify the transition, 
rather than as an actual claim to theory practiced. But this lecture suggests rather that at 
this point, Sheridan does feel that theatre per se has something to offer oratory, and 
namely, the delivery problem. Elaborating the above passage, Sheridan explains that he 
had two goals for the interim: first, “establishing a regular Stage, upon a solid and lasting 
Foundation”; second, “that the Theatre would become an admirable Assistant to the 
School of Oratory, by furnishing to the young Students constant good Models and 
Examples in all the different species of Eloquence.”212 Of course, Sheridan is not the first 
to suggest that oratory might be served by players’ action. Gildon, most immediately, 
offers “Tho’ the Pulpit must be allow’d to be the more sacred Place,” because “the 
Gospel consists of…Practice as well as Belief, and since the Practice is so forcibly 
recommended from the Stage by a purifying our Passions,” that “the Stage may properly 
be esteem’d the Handmaid of the Pulpit.”213 Both Gildon and Sheridan in some sense 
qualify playing—certainly, action—as the practice of oratory. Sheridan signals his 
understanding of rhetoric as performance by noting that it was “giving what Assistance 
and Instructions I could to some young Performers” as stage manager that “became the 
Means of first laying open…some of the fundamental Principles of the Art,” which led 
him “thro’ Time and Application to trace the whole System.”214 Here, as above, Sheridan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Ibid., Oration 23-4. 
213 Gildon, The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, 19. 
214 Sheridan, Oration, 21-2. 
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also insinuates his basic stance on imitation: that it works as a means to share insight, and 
moves inevitably among the living. 
The idea that the theatre could be at the center of such an academic reformation is 
swiftly hacked to pieces. There is enthusiasm at first—“the Hibernian Society for the 
Improvement of Education” emerges to back the enterprise; the Hibernian Academy is all 
but built—for Sheridan’s cause: “to encourage the liberal arts,” and “to inspire those, for 
whose use and delight, these arts are encouraged” (whether striving for “the Pulpit, the 
Senate-house, or the Bar…Glory in the field, or…the Quiet of a rural life”).215 The 
Hibernian Society, which according to Sheldon “reads like a Who’s Who of Ireland in the 
mid-eighteenth century” forms not only to subsidize the would-be Academy (given 
Sheridan’s claim of losing his fortune when “an Earth-quake Came, and in one night 
reduced the long labored Pile”—/foundation of the theatre-based academy—“to an heap 
of ruins”216), but also to forge curriculum, whose core would comprise oratory and the 
English language.217 Quashing that momentum is tasteful censure of the notion that 
theatre could play a role (let alone the lead) in any such curriculum.218 Sheldon samples 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Ibid., 30, 25. See Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 236-41 and Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 13-21 for more 
on the short-lived Hiberian Society/ Project. 
216 Sheridan, Oration, 24. 
217 Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 237. The 200+ constituents of this group include “‘Lords, both Spiritual 
and Temporal, Privy-Counsellors, Members of Parliament, Doctors of Divinity, Fellows of the 
College, and Gentlemen of Fortune’” (From Dublin Journal, January 14-17, 1758). Sheldon 
thinks that the proposed curriculum, which attended to diet and exercise, and banned corporal 
punishment, was ahead of its time (237). 
218 Both Sheldon (Smock-Alley, 238) and Bacon (Thomas Sheridan, 21) observe that it is the 
theatre-related aspect of the plan, in particular, which gave Sheridan’s opponents the necessary 
ammunition to kill it. Bacon notes that on January 8, 1759, the Hibernian Academy “opened on 
King-street, Oxmantown, under the supervision of another man. Sheridan had been talked out of 
the superintendancy…because ‘…letters upon letters were sent him, to shew that an Actor, at the 
head of such a Seminary, would be an insurmountable obstacle to its success”; and that “‘After a 
few years, the principles of the founder were forgotten, the Academy withered, and finally fell’” 
(ibid., 21. Here he quotes Samuel Whyte’s Miscellany). Bacon adds that Whyte himself, friend of 
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some of the quick-cutting gibes: “Sheridan himself, rumor has it, will teach the dancing 
by delineating figures on the floor with chalk”; “Signor G—, who imitates an organ with 
his voice, will instruct in church music.”219 One particularly acrimonious pamphlet 
disclaims Sheridan’s own eloquence, and the need of public action, generally. This author 
observes “We are apt to…lump our Ideas where they ought to be most separated”; 
“Eloquence and Rhetoric pass for the same thing…and yet one consists in giving Rules, 
the other in practicing them” (Quintilian was a rhetorician).220 Because they are merely 
eloquent, and not rhetorical, the author sees no need of dealing with gestures. Thus,  
I propose reviving, along with Elocution, the Roman Practice of one 
secretly placed, reading his Composition to the Assembly, and another, in 
view, going along with the Reader in the elocution Part, with proper 
Gestures, and then, I think, fifty Masters of Elocution may do for the 
whole Kingdom; ten for Dublin, and forty for the rest of it…these 
Gentlemen may be sent for, on Occasion, to accompany the Reader.221 
This partition between eloquence and rhetoric (and action and interpretation)—and the 
association between performance and fakery—is not uniquely conceived by this writer. It 
is the popular sentiment that Sheridan and later Elocutionists strive against. In Sheridan’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sheridan, opened the English Grammar School that adhered largely to Sheridan’s principles, and 
this thrived (Sheridans’ sons were among its first students) until the turn of the century (ibid., 21). 
219 Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 238-39. Both summarized from Shea, P. A Full Vindication of Thomas 
Sheridan, Esq; being an Answer To a Scurrilous Pamphlet. Dublin, 1758 (13-16). “Writing 
seriously,” Sheldon notes, “they protested that young gentlemen would be seduced and 
debauched by the ‘ladies’ of the theater, or at least lead into idleness and folly by the men; that 
the stage was the worst school of oratory extant, its pompous diction and ridiculous delivery 
justly known by the name of ‘theatrical’” (ibid., 238). 
220 Anon., A Letter to a School-Master in the Country, from His Friend in Town, Relative to Mr. 
Sheridan’s Scheme of Education (Dublin: 1758), 19-20. Bacon notes the passage in which this 
author reflects that “every Preacher and Pleader” must have “both Sense and Elocution; whereas, 
on our present Footing, God be thanked, we do pretty well without either” (Bacon, Thomas 
Sheridan, 20, and Anon., Letter, 20-1). 
221 Anon., Letter, 21. 
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work after Oration, one does not see this explicit union of theatre and education again. 
Sheridan, weathering feedback, got the picture: the public might cede to reviving oratory, 
but not by way of actors. It must have seemed that Gildon had it righter, referring both 
actors and orators to the inert representations of ancients instead of each other for 
direction (i.e. the stuff of action is that of oratory by much subtler implication). Although 
the vision Sheridan professes in Oration would appear summarily dissolved, it is no less 
evident in the mortar of Sheridan’s ensuing language theory, and in the case he gradually, 
more sneakily builds for rhetorical action.  
To clarify what the anonymous pamphlet writer misses with his caricature of the 
gesturing rhetor, it is necessary to first explore how Sheridan figures body language.  
  
3  THE LEGIBLE HAND 
 
Sheridan’s A Course of Lectures on Elocution (1762) and A Discourse Delivered 
in the Theatre at Oxford, in the Senate-House at Cambridge, and at Spring-Garden in 
London (1759) illustrate his professional trajectory as well as change of pitch. The former 
comprises a seven-part treatise that advocates for “the noble ends which might be 
answered in a free state, by a clear, lively, and affecting public elocution, [which] are in a 
great measure lost,”222 reprising content from lectures delivered at sites spanning Bath, 
Belfast, Bristol, Cambridge, Edinburgh, London, and Oxford.223 The latter, subtitled an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Thomas Sheridan, A Course of Lectures on Elocution: Together with Two Dissertations on 
Language; and Some Other Tracts Relative to Those Subjects (London: Printed by W. Strahan, 
1762), 111. 
223 To this treatise is appended two dissertations, “On the State of Language in Old Greece and 
the Means by which it was brought to Perfection,” and “On the State of Language in Other 
Countries, But More Particularly in Our Own, and Its Consequences.” The former was appended 
to the seven parts of the lecture series as it was delivered on site, in which he claims that ancient 
Greeks “never were so vainly employed as to search for [the human heart] in books, in the 
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introduction to the Lectures, is published about three years after the Lectures begin (1759 
also marks the year after Sheridan steps down as Dublin stage manager, and the first he 
has gone without appearing on stage since 1743224).225 Both aim to expand the conception 
of language to include that of the “living tongue” by way of the study of elocution. 
Together, they paint a picture of language, in toto, as material participation that suffuses 
through and negotiates between forms as well as bodies, which even as it mutates, 
vectored by “custom,” communicates, incorporates, and thrives on the irresistibility of 
imitation. To emphasize this fugitive, inter-bodied quality, he qualifies language as “any 
way or method whatsoever” by which “our thoughts may be communicated.”226 Book VI 
in Lectures marks the place where Sheridan draws the line between what of the living 
tongue he has already discussed—articulation, accent, emphasis, and stops, which are all 
very much bound up with words—and what he feels is the stroke of language, as such: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
artificial characters of human invention, which have no affinity or natural connection with their 
archetypes, have no stamp of truth, wearing the same form in selfhood as in truth, and utterly 
incapable of representing or communicating emotions, by any power in themselves.” (Sheridan, 
Lectures, 148.) The latter is appended for publication, and centers on a side-by-side comparison 
of Greek-versus-English languages treatments. For example, the Greeks “Employed their chief 
care and attention about their living tongue,” while the English, “about their written language.” 
(ibid., 163.) 
224 Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 250, 259-60. 
225 Audiences overlap and vary widely, evidenced by the list of subscribers, which include “Hon. 
Lord Kaims.” Spoel notes that in 1761 and 1764, “Sheridan lectured in Edinburgh at the 
invitation of the Scottish Select Society,” whose members “included Allan Ramsay, David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Alexander Wedderburn, James Burnett, Alexander Carlyle, William Robertson, 
Hugh Blair, and Lord Kames, among many others” (Spoel, “Rereading,” 59). For discussion of 
who likely filled out Sheridan’s audiences, please see Spoel, here, and Ulman, Things, 25-36, and 
153. Ulman notes that the audiences comprised a mixture between those interested in theories of 
language, and those looking for practical tips and guidelines for manner (ibid., 34). Paul Goring 
specifies that Sheridan’s audiences “consisted predominately of gentlemen, but there were also 
numerous clergy, and several military men and members of parliament; about 10 per cent of the 
subscribers were women.” The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2005), 99. 
226 Sheridan, Lectures, 94-5. 
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“tones, looks, and gestures.”227 These reach around and through, and in the absence of 
words to convey what Sheridan calls “sensible marks,” through which an “infinite variety 
of emotions”—some which have been named, most of which have not—spread, and 
disappear on incident.228 These marks are not thinking things, but rather “are understood, 
by being felt.”229 He offers the sensible mark as a kind of companion to the word, a kind 
of contrast to it—in effect, a unit of a sentence of the body.  
Had Locke acknowledged this language stratum in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Sheridan thinks, “We might then have had, as accurate a knowledge, of 
the whole of language” as for words; but Locke focused solely on that of “human 
understanding; his only object was, to examine the nature of words, as symbols of our 
ideas: Whilst the nobler branch of language, which consists of the signs of internal 
emotions,” or body language, “was untouched.”230 This apparent hole he proposes to fill. 
Were man “like the Houynhms of Swift,” he adds, “always directed by a cool, invariable, 
and as I may say instinctive reason,” this could be sufficient.231 “But as there are other 
things which pass in the mind of man, beside ideas,” as “the passions, and the fancy, 
compose great part of his complicated frame,” a way must be found “of manifesting those 
emotions” to communicate them.232 The sensible marks must then inhabit the bodies that 
perceive them: 
Now, in order to know what another knows, and in the same manner that 
he knows it, an exact transcript of the ideas which pass in the mind of one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Ibid., 100. 
228 Ibid., 99-100. 
229 Ibid., 106. 
230 Ibid., 97. Line finishes: “…by him as foreign to his purpose.” For further examination of 
Sheridan’s debt to and criticism of Locke, see Ulman 184-89. 
231 Ibid., 98-9. 
232 Ibid., 99. 
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man, must be made by sensible marks, in the mind of another; so in order 
to feel what another feels, the emotions which are in the mind of one man, 
must also be communicated to that of another, by sensible marks.233 
Quick to qualify that the sensible mark is “entirely different from words, and independent 
of them,”234 Sheridan emphasizes that it connects bodies in real time sensationally. It 
cannot be captured because it subsists on movement (touches); nor can it be 
choreographed, because it arises through and in response to “the legible hand of nature” 
(is touched-off). This detail is particularly important, because it makes the sensible mark 
so persuasive. Sheridan offers, “But tho’ it be not necessary to society, that all men 
should know much; it is necessary that they should feel much, and have a mutual 
sympathy, in whatsoever affects their fellow creatures.” This “language of the 
passions…is not only understood,” but “it excites also similar emotions, or corresponding 
effects in all minds alike.235 More specifically, from Spring-Garden: 
In proportion to the exertion of the powers of the intellect, or the 
imagination, the various emotions of the mind, the different degrees of 
sensibility, and all the feelings of the heart; they will find, upon searching 
for them, that in the human frame there are tones, looks, and gestures of 
such efficacy, as to not only make all these obvious, but to transfuse all 
those operations, energies, and emotions into others…236 
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To speak in sensible marks is to enact and exact motion from those in sensing distance. 
Ideally, this resonance draws people into community by involving them bodily in the 
story. This justification brings to mind Quintilian’s description of a primary mover (by 
hand or by foot) emanating conviction through action, as well as, nearer to Sheridan, 
Weaver’s observation in The History of the Mimes and Pantomimes that “Every spectator 
must behold himself acted.”237 But here one nonetheless begins to make out Sheridan’s 
distinctive rendering of action (if contradictory attitude)—namely, that the marks 
themselves are both contained by and uncontainable to the body; although natural, gather 
momentum, shape, and meaning across use and uptakes; may be encouraged, but not 
summoned (he emphasizes that thinking stops them cold238); and infect—seemingly with 
a volition their own, yet are suited to rhetorical purpose, because they play an important 
logistical role in “social being.”239 This role is perhaps best characterized through 
contrast with what Sheridan deems to be the mark’s antithesis: writing. 
Sheridan’s assessment of written language reads as though it could have come 
from an acting manual: “The eye can have no pleasure in viewing a succession of 
crooked characters, however accurately formed.”240 The case against the written word is 
not totally dissimilar to that against acting by “freeze frame,” or tableau. Elaboration in 
Spring-Garden comes from British Education (he quotes himself): “Its use is to give 
stability to sound, and permanence to thought; to preserve words that otherwise might 
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perish as they are spoke, and to arrest ideas that might vanish as they rise in the mind.”241 
Elsewhere, writing is merely “a repository.” Its absorption cannot be shared among 
participants, encouraging isolation. But especially, “it contains no visible marks” to do 
what embodiment does for words through expression, or to guide the body that would 
deliver the written words: “And as [tones, accent, emphases, and gesture] must…contain 
in them, all the powers of strongly impressing the mind, captivating the fancy, rousing 
the passions, and delighting the ear,” Sheridan concludes the letter on the page is 
“dead.”242 To become fully persuasive, it needs a life form. This dependence, he says, is 
evident in the listlessness of sight-readers, who must soak it in through many repetitions 
before they begin to feel it move. An example of such an ignition is that of comedians, 
who must recite “the sentiments of others,” but deliver them as if “their own immediate 
feeling.”243 Sheridan notes “it is not at the first, second, third, or even twentieth reading 
of their parts” that these actors “hit upon” the just delivery; “it is only by repeated trials, 
and constant practice” that “the just tones, looks, and gestures, that ought naturally to 
accompany them” once “associated,” settle in.244 The sensible marks, as such, might not 
appear for several iterations; “yet he can by no means command [tones, e.g.] at his 
pleasure; and he must be obliged to own, that to conceive, and to execute, are two 
different things.”245  
Sheridan’s sense of having to accept what sensible marks come to the written 
word absorbed holds for rhetorical delivery. That these marks, as well as the whole 
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“living voice”246 (including articulation, accents, emphasis and stops) are somehow 
natural, and “found” when welcomed, is one of Sheridan’s key selling points to the 
suasion, as well as virtue of elocution: 
It has pleased the All-wise Creator to annex to elocution, when in its 
perfect state, powers almost miraculous! and an energy nearly divine! He 
has given to it tones to charm the ear, and penetrate the heart: he has 
joined to it actions, and looks, to move the inmost soul. By that, attention 
is kept up without pain, and conviction is carried to the mind with delight. 
Persuasion is ever its attendant, and the passions own it for a master. Great 
as is the force of its powers, so unbounded is their extent. All mankind are 
capable of its impressions…247 
Describing “words-as-actions,” Ulman notes that Sheridan describes words as signs of 
ideas, while this living voice “naturally [accompanies] articulate sounds and [helps] to 
enact their meaning through appeals to the passions and imagination.”248 As he puts it 
later, by virtue of these effects, “oral knowledge carries more knowledge than written 
language.”249 Yet the above quote makes clear that Sheridan is doing more than 
knowledge sharing with his elocution. He is making the case for the effects themselves—
which yield “energy,” “charm,” “attention,” “conviction,” and “delight.” Sheridan 
advertises that such “living speech” (whether recited or extemporized), transforms the 	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body through which it acts. This transformation resembles that which Gildon promises to 
the orator as well as actor who would, similarly, give the full extent of his body over to 
the word: “when any Discourse receives Force and Life,” not only from speaking, “but 
from a proper Action and Gesture for it, it is truly touching, penetrating, and transporting; 
it has a Soul, it has Life, it has Vigour and Energy not to be resisted.”250 The tactile 
quality of this transformation is not to be missed. Gildon would have “Discourse” begin 
at the skin (with a touch) and, as with Sheridan’s sensible mark, penetrate and exact 
movement. At the core of both pitches is that full-bodied delivery is pleasureful and 
catchy. The nation, Sheridan says, that advances elocution is  
opening a source of one of the highest delights, which the nature of man is 
capable of feeling in this life, but also by the extraordinary benefits and 
advantages thence resulting to society, which cannot possibly be procured 
in any other way.251  
Here, in effect, is Sheridan’s call to action. Delivery turns people outside of themselves 
through concatenating motion, and brings about a fuller form of “social 
communication.”252 One last point is to be made about this turning outside of oneself, or 
the stakes of not learning to deliver. Sheridan on multiple occasions reissues this quote of 
Bishop Berkeley’s, which asks, “whether half the Learning and Study of these Kingdoms 
is not useless, for want of a proper Delivery and Pronunciation being taught in our 
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Schools and Colleges?”253 Sheridan, taking this literally, adopts this charge as a focal 
point for his exigence. The neglect of delivery is a national issue on multiple levels. In 
addition to the above (propagating social action), it attracts people to, and is means to 
manifest and communicate “Learning and Study”; and would allow those with “most 
ardent inclination to serve their country,” who have thus far “sat still in silent indignation, 
where her interests were nearly concerned, for want of a practiced tongue to disclose 
what passed in their minds.”254 Because “living speech” is the best means by which “all 
the faculties of mind, are brought forward, moulded, polished, and exerted,”255 the study 
of elocution becomes means by which to stir up “funds of knowledge…shut up in 
[peoples’ own] breasts.”256 This appeal—which speaks greatly to the creature of the 
sensible mark—reads like a question of health:  
And how many others, after a few attempts, have closed their lips for ever, 
from self-disappointment, in not finding their utterance correspond to their 
conceptions? The experience of what they have suffered on such 
occasions, will teach them to feel, and as far in them lies, to prevent the 
sufferings of others in like circumstances.257 
I am particularly taken with this point, not only because it captures the sensible mark’s 
role in communication, as well as the stricture of tendency. To that point, we see the 
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action itself play a role in “finding,” above, and in giving tangible shape to the utterance. 
But as much as the movements, associations, and attractions forged with living speech 
may be a pleasure, and by suggestion, discoveries themselves, to clip the extent of one’s 
motions is to suffer. (It is no less sensational.) This is a very clever appeal, of course, 
because it underscores that feeling, essentially the driver of good delivery, “far in” even 
in the speechless “lies,” ready for tapping. As with the actor, it needs only exercise, 
circumstance, and so many repetitions to manifest. The marks, he seems to promise, they 
will come.  
 
 
4  THE ANIMAL TONE 
 
Key to this notion of acquisition is Sheridan’s understanding of nature’s role in 
shaping and distributing motion. This can be encapsulated in the life cycle of the sensible 
mark, which I explicate first through the example of tones. 
The “natural” and “artificial” tones are two of a species. In Lectures on the Art of 
Reading (1775), Sheridan describes what he calls “the corruption of delivery,” 
characterized by “artificial tones” that are catching like bugs and overriding “natural 
action”—or that to which “nature has affixed a power indicative of the passions.”258 In 
part, he blames reading teachers for “introducing” these tones by way of parsing the 
technical accuracy of what is being said. Emphasis on “stops” has “annexed to them 
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different notes of the voice, as well as different portions of time.”259 He illustrates the 
yoking of tones to punctuation marks this way (a sentence which, read aloud, still 
illustrates his point): “Those which marked an incomplete sense, had an elevated note of 
the voice joined to them; those which marked a complete sense, a depressed, or low 
note.”260 Sheridan’s ensuing description of these tones suggests their protean quality and 
parasitic lifestyle: 
This uniform elevation and depression of the voice, in all sentences alike, 
produced a new kind of tone…with which all who learned to read, even 
such as were free from every other kind, became infected.261 
Through institutional propagation, this tone acquires longevity. Its lurking is revealed in 
an experiment, the results of which, Sheridan boasts, he has replicated unexceptionally. 
Sheridan “found a person of vivacity, delivering his sentiments with energy, and of 
course with all that variety of tones which nature furnishes”; and “put something into his 
hand to read.”262 To close one’s eyes, he suggests, is to not recognize the reader. He notes 
“an immediate change,” and describes the surge of the above-described tone:  “A 
different pitch of voice took place,” with “a tedious uniformity of cadence.”263 Emphasis 
is on the deference of the natural to the so-called artificial mark, and the latter being no 
less material and quick than the former.  The artificial tone cleaves to certain 
circumstances, occasions, and even objects (the book); and, recognizing one of these, 
suffuses across sentences, paragraphs, and readers. “Thus has this…spread itself in the 
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senate-house, the pulpit, the bar, the stage, and every place where public declamation is 
used.”264  
In short, these artificial tones are damming the emotional excesses that usually 
“manifest and communicate by their own virtue.”265 By stripping the speaker of her 
affective power, Sheridan says that these tones strip the utterance (vis-à-vis body) not 
only of much of its meaning, but also of much of its energy, which he says “lies in the 
tones themselves.”266 
This stuff of tones—or sound—“contains in itself a natural power over the human 
frame, in rousing the faculties of man, and exciting the affections.”267 This power is 
evident not only in how readily members of the same species can instigate and react to 
one another wordlessly, but also in the ability of a member of one species to 
communicate motion through tones to the body of one of another. To illustrate, Sheridan 
says, “The neighing of the steed, calls up all the attention of the horse-kind; they gaze 
towards the place from whence the sound comes, and answer it, or run that way, if the 
steed be not in view.”268 This description says much about the work and the anatomy of 
the tone—which is, above all, material means to drive bodies together or apart. It draws 
gaze (even if the steed is not in view); it elicits tonal response (through “answer”); and it 
manifests inclination, or “motion toward” (both by its trajectory, and the second horse 
setting off). By the same principle, “the howlings of the wolf, alarm the flock.”269 
Emphasizing the tone’s rub through sheer perception, and the affinity of sensation and 	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disposition, or stance, he notes, “Those [sounds] which excite sympathy, may be 
supposed to be all in concord; those which rouze antipathy, to be discords; which by 
creating an uneasy sensation, immediately dispose them to flight, to avoid the enemy.”270 
Similarly, in human-to-human contact, “the very tones…independent of words” activate 
stance. In their particular intensities, so fervidly do tones call for reciprocal motion that 
they appear to swallow the word up: 
...yet that the whole energy, or power of exciting analogous emotions in 
others, lies in the tones themselves, may be known from this; that 
whenever the force of these passions is extreme, words give place to 
inarticulate sounds: sighs, murmurings, in love; sobs, groans, and cries in 
grief; half choaked sounds in rage; and shrieks in terror, are then the only 
language heard. And the experience of mankind may be appealed to, 
whether these have no more power in exciting sympathy, than any thing 
that can be done by mere words.271 
Sheridan’s tones appear to issue trajectory with their entreat—one knows, for example, 
that a sob might draw another body toward it. Subtly, Sheridan suggests that the tone not 
only allows the receiver to absorb the sense of the utterance, but also shows her 
something of what to do about it. Because tones incite that inadvertent push and pull 
between bodies, “the communication of our internal feelings [by way of tones], was a 
matter of much more consequence in our social intercourse, than the mere conveying of 
ideas.”272 This motive force is at the core of Sheridan’s argument for presence as 
rhetorical strategy; for a particular, unaffected kind of presence, at that. As with the 	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whinny of the steed, the tone stirs as it instructs. Sheridan offers this explanation as 
exigence for accepting and protecting natural tones, since these are the ones that can draw 
this motion-toward most effectively. “We are moved” by their resonance (seemingly, 
propelled): “the tones of all domestic animals,” for example, “expressive of their wants or 
distresses, have a wonderful power over the human heart, and mechanically rouse us to 
their relief.”273 Or, the dog walks sullenly away from its owner when a certain tone is 
used, because its certain feeling has happened between them. 
Reading tones, “tho’ they excite feeling, as it is in the nature of all tones to do so, 
it is only of a vague and indeterminate nature”274 (compared to shrieks, etc.). These tones 
draw upon words for material, taking shape and gaining association over the courses of 
sentences. Sheridan’s depiction of the sounds facilitated by words underscores his notion 
of “the legible hand of nature” in speech; specifically, of man’s debt to other animals and 
objects in bringing notes to his own “nobler passions.” “Thus among the vowels the a(3) 
was borrowed from the crow, the a(1) from the goat, the a(2) from the sheep, the o(3) 
from the dove, the o(2) from the ox, the ow from the dog, & c.”275 Consonants are 
adopted from sheep, crows, ox, dogs, serpents, geese. “F is like the sound of winds 
blowing through certain chinks. V is the noise made by some spinning wheels when 
rapidly moved,” and “S by the flight of darts.”276 Other sounds draw form from “the 
collision of bodies,” or like “squeel, squall, scream, shrill, shrivel, hiss, jar, hurl, 
whirl…burst,” and “patter,” collect their shape, he says, from their stuff.277 When 
Sheridan emphasizes “This expressiveness of words is every where to be found in our 	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tongue,”278 he means, of course, both the language, and the organ; that the use of words 
owes to feeling that circulates with sounds.  
While explaining such tones, Sheridan notes a problem with Henry Home, Lord 
Kames’ distinction between emotion and passion in Elements of Criticism (1762). Kames 
calls an emotion “an internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it passes away 
without raising desire”—or the  “impulse which makes us proceed to action.” Emotions, 
for Kames, most often derive from stationary objects (“a smooth extended plain…a 
barren heath”), are either “pleasant” or “painful,” and like the objects from which they 
come, “continue long stationary.”279 Sheridan continues: “and when desire is raised, the 
motion or agitation is denominated a passion.” In order to exert an action, Kames 
emphasizes, “that desire must have an object.”280 Kames is in this conundrum: 
Is passion in its nature or feeling distinguishable from emotion? I am apt 
to think there must be a distinction, when the emotion seems in all cases to 
precede the passion, and to be the cause or occasion of it. But after the 
strictest examination, I cannot perceive any such distinction between 
emotion and passion.281 
In other words, inaction feels disconcertingly similar to action. Sheridan reorganizes 
Kames’ categories so as to explain the sensate (and no better pinned by the inspecting 
thought) work of sound itself upon the body, which substantiates his depiction of the 
appeal of tones. Namely, he offers that Kames is “laboring to oppose the generic, to the 
specific term,” rather than two of a species. Sheridan proposes that “emotion” express 	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“all sorts of agitations of mind,” and that this “genus” is subdivided into at least two 
categories: “passions,” which “implies a consequential desire of action”; and 
“affections,” which “have their end in the agitation itself, and are afterward quiescent” 
(or dormant).282 Affections are “those finer feelings of the soul, which seem too delicate 
for the inspection of our mental anatomists,” in that they cannot be tethered to 
“manifestation,” or signs—and in this sense, they resist not only being mulled over, but 
also an identifiable utility. While Kames’ “emotions” are categorically similar to that of 
Sheridan’s “affections,” note the important distinction between affections, which “have 
their end in the agitation itself, and are afterward quiescent”; and Kames’ “emotions,” 
which are merely “quiescent, because not productive of desire.” 283 It is a subtle 
difference, but in “have their end,” Sheridan suggests a sense of purpose.  
Sheridan asserts that the affections play a key role in the impulsions of tones (and 
tones in those of affections). In Part II of Art of Reading, which centers on verse, 
Sheridan offers an example of affection produced through “poetic numbers,” which “keep 
the mind in a constant state of gentle agitation, by a continued series of emotions, 
resulting from their mechanical part, independent of thought.”284 (“Their” here refers to 
the numbers.) Suggesting that the sound’s effect is self-activating, he admonishes 
rationalists beware: “it may seem a strange paradox, to talk of emotions raised in the 
mind, independent of thought”; but instrumental music, likewise, “conveys no ideas, nor 
operates by thought, but excites feeling by its own immediate energy.”285 Music and 
numbers “have one common matter, which is sound; and one common modification of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Ibid., 308. 
283 Kames, Elements of Criticism, 37. 
284 Sheridan, Art of Reading, 309. Emphasis added. 
285 Ibid. 
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matter, which is measure or proportion of sound.”286 That is, the sound of the lines—the 
rhythms and stops, materialized and maneuvered through tones—comes to effect 
alongside, but not by way of the words:  
we are acquainted with nothing external, which has so great a power of 
stirring the mind, and consequently of exciting emotions, as sound; and 
the produced emotions correspond always to the nature of the sounds that 
produce them. Rough, boisterous, and irregular sounds, trouble, agitate, 
and disorder the mind, and cause disagreeable emotions. Those which are 
smooth, gentle, and proportioned, excite emotions of an agreeable kind.287  
Kames asserts a thicker distinction between the material object and its incorporation. So 
on seeing a garden, for example, “I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable as…one of its 
qualities. When I turn my attention from the garden…I am conscious of a pleasant 
emotion.”288 Even a “rotten carcass,” letting off a smell that is sniffed in, “is 
disagreeable…the disagreeableness is a quality of the object, the pain the quality of the 
emotion…the former [categorically] belongs to the objects, the latter exists within us.” 
But Sheridan’s affection does not discriminate. Whether “artificial” or “natural,” subtle 
tones subsistent on words circulate by this principle, “such that the hearer both feels and 
understands…insomuch, that were those expressions to be uttered, without those tones, 
they would not convey their full meaning.”289 He summarizes: 
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288 Kames, Elements of Criticism, 31. 
289 Sheridan, Lectures, 107. 
	   90	  
not only…every thing which is forcible and affecting in utterance, but also 
the most material points necessary to a full and distinct comprehension, 
even the sense of what is uttered, depends on tones. 
The long shot of Sheridan’s tones is best captured by tacking it to the trajectory of 
then-popular stagecraft (against which Sheridan reacts). The twin impetus for Hill’s 
tones, in An Essay on the Art of Acting (1753) is the “strong idea” conceived in the 
imagination spurned by the words on the script. To illustrate a tone that would convey 
astonishment, Hill first quotes lines that could produce it: 
‘I feel my blood 
Cool and grow thick; as melted lead flows heavy, 
And hardens in its motion.—A little longer, 
And I, who have a heart already marble— 
Shall petrify throughout—and be—a statue.’290 
The word collects its particular tone through reflection.  
It would be impossible, after an actor had conceived an idea correspondent 
to the picture, in the words of this, not to impress every lineament of the 
passion upon his look, and every attitude of it upon his gesture; and then, 
the tone of his voice, concurring, cannot fail to sound the slow, conflicting 
struggle of astonishment.291 
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There is little discussion of transition or variation between such pictures, and what 
becomes of other bodies in relationship to them—it is what Sheridan might consider 
“successive landscapes shown by a camera obscura.”292  
Gildon’s tones, in The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton (1710)293, are very much tied 
to the tongues that produce them, but are effectively caught, pinned and catalogued like 
so many butterflies for the user’s selection. Noted and named for textures, colors, sounds, 
manners and effects, the “brown” tone is far from brightness; the “alluring…abounds 
in…harmonious Warblings.”294 Gildon painstakingly tries to outline how the tongue can 
attain “flexible” tone, which “obeys the Modulation, as Wax does the Fingers.”295 His 
tones are procured through formulation and measurement, memorization and planning. 
For orators, he recommends 
after the Confutation, [the speaker, to summarize] ought to make a little 
Pause, and begin it again with a lower Tone, and a different Accent from 
the last Cadence of his Voice; then raising himself, he should break out 
into a louder Voice, and carry it on to the End with more Gaiety, 
Magnificence, and Triumph of Pronunciation, which would seem born of 
his Assurance in the Justice of his Cause…296 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Sheridan, Lectures, 182. In its context, this refers to “the shadowy arts” that leave little 
impression because they are blanched from imitations of imitations.  
293 Howell notes that Sheridan was almost certainly familiar with this work (as well as with 
Curll’s The History of the English Stage) (Howell, Eighteenth Century, 228). 
294 Gildon, The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, 89, 92. Wilkes, similarly, compares tones to 
instruments, and then connects instruments with their motivating passions: “the mellow warblings 
of a German flute have finer effect in moving the tender passions, than the rougher tones of a 
bassoon; and certainly an Actor, with an articulate melodious voice, is more proper for love 
scenes, than he whose voice has all the roughness of a base-viol.” (Wilkes, A General View, 111). 
295 Gildon, The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, 92. 
296 Ibid., 126. Emphasis added.  
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Gildon goes so far with his defense of this method as to mock the notion of leaving tones 
to themselves. Nature, he surmises, needs interpreters to pinpoint which tones should be 
affixed to which chunks of discourse. Noting “all sides agree, that Nature is the sovereign 
Guide and Scope; but then they are not so agreed in what Nature is,” he moves swiftly to 
affirming his own position: 
The skillful lay down those Signs, Marks, and Lineaments of Nature, that 
you may know when she is truly drawn, when not; the Unskillful, which is 
the greater and more noisy part, leave it so at large, that it amounts to no 
more, than every one’s Fancy, which would make Contradictions Nature; 
for what pleases one, he calls Nature; what pleases another, that he calls 
Nature; and I once heard a Man of the Stage, say Nonsense was 
natural…297 
Indeed he spends several pages categorizing subjects of discourse, and pairing those 
subjects to combinations of tones. “If your Discourse be on the Actions of Men,” for 
instance, the tones adjust to the “quality” of depictions, “the Just and Honest” one renders 
“with a full, lofty, and noble Accent, with a Tone of Satisfaction…but the unjust…with a 
strong, violent, and passionate Voice, and a Tone of Anger.”298 Of course, Sheridan 
would argue that the tones described here elide Gildon despite his effort, since their stuff 
cannot be captured in written words.299 But Sheridan takes quite a different tack, 
generally, arguing against further binding the tone (or any sensible mark) to signification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Ibid.,  88. 
298 Ibid.,  111. 
299 Commenting on “The variety of treatises which have lately been published on the passions,” 
Sheridan describes, “the vanity of ingenious men [who] think, that they can do that by writing, 
which is beyond the power of writing to accomplish…Nor are the writers of such treatises 
employed about a work less absurd, than would be that of endeavoring to communicate new 
simple ideas by definitions; or that of attempting to paint sounds” (Sheridan, Lectures, x). 
	   93	  
because a) he thinks there are no such interpreters (or models) living; b) such 
prescriptions and judgments facilitate the spread of “artificial” tones (which, again, have 
the same infectiousness as the “natural”); and c) most importantly, planning, or thinking, 
which comes with wanting to get the tone “right” hampers the body’s drift, which, taking 
the long shot, restricts the “social passions” that can move with discourse. Thus, he says 
that the tones will find better signs by which to manifest than he could find for them—at 
once emphasizing that such tones do not come from formulation, but rather excess of 
other tones (or sound); and their governance, or sudden, “come over” quality, which 
brings about the appeal that allows them to “catch.” Sheridan’s tones, all in all, are less 
like words (as Gildon suggests) and more like fickle, but prolific hangers-about. This 
language of the passions, Sheridan says, “bursts,” and “breaks out,” and like laughter 
(also a tone) “can be modified into an infinity of shapes.”300  
Tones are conceived as gestures accompanied with sound. What of the soundless 
sensible mark? 
 
5  SUGGESTIBLE GESTURES 
 
The opening of British Education (1756) reckons with the “enormity of our 
times,” which Sheridan characterizes as a “torrent” that is “still too strong to be resisted” 
by the “weak dams” of penal law.301 In short, “the law is trampled under foot” by way of 
“an universal corruption of manners.”302 Sheridan calls for “materia medica” in the form 
of better public education.303 More precisely, he argues for putting the moving body (vis-	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301 Sheridan, British Education, 1. 
302 Ibid., 3. 
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à-vis oratory) at the center of the system, due to its role in facilitating the acquisition and 
enactment of virtue (“a painful renunciation of all selfish passions”304). “What instruction 
can be of such advantage,” he asks, “as that which improves [one] in the knowledge of 
human nature, the use whereof he must daily and hourly experience in every action of his 
life?”305 The gesture’s suggestibility is the warrant for this argument. Integrally bound up 
with which passions persist, the shape and course of gestures themselves are enmeshed 
with those of social formations, and should be national concerns. This claim has many 
tentacles. Most important to the current inquiry, the state of the gesture—its nature, 
habits, concatenations, trajectory, measure is everyone’s problem, and the possibility of 
reform as seemingly instant and possible as gestures’ own inevitable mutations. 
Apparently at a loss for where to turn for the particular gestures required, Sheridan makes 
a kind of blanket call to all concerned (but most exigently, public speakers) to let their 
gestures loose, in order to find and reclaim those most stirring. Although he is well 
known for this call to “naturalistic action”—to drawing upon one’s own inclination for 
how best to move others—it is worth noting that Sheridan longs to stay and systematize 
such “social gestures,” but he claims to be impeded in this pursuit by their absence at 
large. 
This suggestibility of gestures (and thus the distance of those most popular from 
“natural action”) is evident in orators and audiences in public spaces, in those motions 
that accompany speech as well as those that speak alone. The overarching trajectory of 
“artificial action” (“that which like the language has no natural congruity with the 
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passions”—i.e. has become codified306) has trended toward the “shrinking” of most 
manifest gesture, some to the point of apparent stillness. Frequent are Sheridan’s quips 
about what such gestures could do if it weren’t in such good taste to restrain them: “With 
respect to the power of the hands,” he notes, following Quintilian, Bulwer, and so forth, 
that many gestures already have “doing” functions (demand, promise, threaten, ask, etc.); 
“But how much farther their powers might be carried, thro’ our neglect of using them, we 
little know.”307 The principle behind this trajectory is a kind of trussing, or “binding of 
motions,” which Sheridan likens to that of body parts, and blames upon fashion.308 
“Natural” action, he avers, comes out mostly in private, and, rarely, in the course of 
extemporaneous public speaking. Such narrow public gestures reflect (and materially 
reinforce) what the country is asking of its constituents: to hold still, keep any necessary 
outreach close and conservative, and in general, to mind one’s own business. Noting that 
ironically, this curtailment is a consequence of “good breeding,” and that perhaps the 
only place where natural action happens publicly is among those who have not spent time 
in the school system, he laments that restoring such action more broadly requires making 
it popular, and would take “revolution.”309 The popularity of print, especially, has taken 
its toll on what is seen to be the communicative necessity of presence.310 
As such, he admits the outlook for revolution is bleak. In British Education, he 
leads a hypothetical artist (e.g., a painter or sculptor) who is in search of “impassioned 
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309 Ibid., 123: Artificial action, and with it disaffecting affection are so prevalent that “restoring a 
natural manner of delivery, would be bringing about an entire revolution, in its most essential 
parts.” 
310 See e.g. Sheridan, Lectures 139, 148. 
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looks, forcible gesture, and graceful attitudes”311 that are “warm from life,”312 through 
public spaces where he might hope to find them. In the senate house, she might find 
“excellent discourse…delivered with [the speaker’s] hands in his bosom, or if decorated 
with action…playing with his hat, fumbling in his pockets, settling his periwig.” If she 
goes to the bar, it is to witness “an eloquent piece of pleading with an unmoved 
composure,” the orator “twirling a piece of pack-thread round his fingers” or managing a 
“snuff-box.” Most urgently, for Sheridan draws heavily on the stagnancy of religious 
discourse to make his case: “As to the pulpit, I believe I need hardly mention that [the 
artist] would find little or no assistance there, unless it were for pieces of still life.”313 
Tucked away in this small corner of British Education is a distinction that 
Sheridan makes expressly only once in his elocutionary texts, which he marshals as 
support for the central claim in Book III: that rhetoric is the “common fountain” from 
which all “liberal arts sprang,” and, if restored, would reinvigorate these arts. This 
distinction sheds light on Sheridan’s unusual definition of rhetoric (instantiating what of 
this part of British Education Howell views as a gross misinterpretation of ancient 
rhetorical principles314), as well as what is at stake in the social gesture’s survival: 
All arts are accomplished and ended either in a work, or an energy. A 
work is that whose parts are co-existent, and the perfection of whose 
essence depends upon their remaining in the same state. An energy is that 
whose parts exist only in succession, and which hath its very being in 
transition. Thus a statue and a picture are works…as their parts in that case 	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314 See, e.g., Howell, Eighteenth Century, 243. 
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become co-existent and fixed. But dancing, playing on any instrument, 
and speaking or reciting, are only energies.315 
The distinctiveness of action-oratory against the backdrop of the eighteenth-century Neo-
Ciceronian trend is pronounced by a quick comparison with Joseph Campbell’s 
“eloquence” in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776): “In speaking there is always some end 
proposed, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer. The word 
eloquence…denotes ‘That art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end.’”316 
Campbell’s description of the mechanics of eloquence similarly entails calculation and 
periodic ends, taking leave of the passions as necessary: “a discourse addressed to the 
understanding,” will not “admit an address to the passions, which, as it never fails to 
disturb the operation of the intellectual faculty, must be regarded by every intelligent 
hearer as foreign at least.”317 Sheridan says that the movement of one’s body and 
passions is inseparable from others moved in any case. This eloquence is one of middles 
and ineluctable “delicate touches”318 contingent on proximity. It “can be known only to 
[one’s] immediate spectators and hearers; and, except such part of them as is 
impressed…must necessarily perish with himself.”319 Of course, for Campbell, 
excitement is born of the semantic content—of the bolder figures like prosopopoeia, as 
opposed to the tones and gestures that form along their pathways; and appeals to passion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Sheridan, British Education, 294. 
316 Joseph Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: For W. Strahan, 1776), 23. Note 
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“’Dicere secundum virtutem orationis. Scientia bene dicendi.’ Quintilian. The word eloquence, in 
common conversation, is seldom used in such a comprehensive sense. I have, however, made 
choice of this definition on a double account: 1st. It exactly corresponds to Tully’s idea of a 
perfect orator; ‘Optimus est orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet, et delectat, et 
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317 Ibid., 24. Line finishes “…if not insidious.” 
318 Sheridan, British Education 293. 
319 Ibid., 294-95. Note that impressions “sink deeper at every new stroke.”  
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must be deemed and directed, whereas Sheridan emphasizes that the best “distinguishing 
faculty” for action is “a sensation, not a reflection; a perception, not a judgment.”320 Just 
as the best artists receive the most strokes fresh from life, presence makes for better 
arguments because the audience is caught up in the forms that gestures take.321 
Campbell’s eloquence, in which body submits to successions of directive, is, by 
comparison, one of tableaus, of passions hunted and pecked.322  
To better understand what is at stake in the survival of social gestures, we return 
to the opportunistic nature of the sensible mark. This opportunism is evident in 
observable currents of particular public gestures, like those that Sheridan points out 
among localized groups who spend a lot of time in one another’s presence—lawyers and 
judges and senators (as above), players, religious sects, etc. Among the last, especially, 
he notes common “species of action,” characterized by “certain modes of looks and 
deportment…which run thro’ the different bodies, and make them appear as distinct from 
the rest of their countrymen.”323 Observing “the countenance, gait, and gesture…one 
would think that they were all cast in the same mould.”324 Even when some sects “give 
way” to “wild gestures, proceeding from the fancied operations of the spirit,” individuals 
“generally resemble each other,” and are “moved by the spirit in the same manner.”325 In 
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a word, this is the infection of action, which even among individuals outside of such 
collectives, is pervasively described in the manner of bacteriophage:  
Those are generally taken up by chance, and confirmed by habit, and 
become in time so much a part of man’s self, that he uses them 
involuntarily, and applies them indiscriminately to all sorts of subjects, 
only with more or less vehemence, according as he himself is more or less 
actuated.326 
It is less that you choose your mark (e.g. gesture) than that your mark (e.g. gesture) 
chooses you. Among the most critical exigencies Sheridan cites for his purpose in the 
Lectures is “the contagion of example,” which is “regularly transmitted” between 
generations and individuals, “and leads us ever after into…the guidance of a false 
rule.”327 Of propagating strains, Sheridan says, “most public speakers are unknowingly 
infected. I mean certain peculiarities which prevail, in each of the three different species 
of delivery, in the pulpit, the senate-house, and the bar, both in phraseology and 
manner.”328 Each bears “motions, equally unimportant, and insignificant,” owing “to 
imitation of the faults (for faults are easily imitated)” of other group members: “They 
have been adopted into such general use by each society, that it is hard for any member of 
those bodies, to avoid catching them.”329 
These vectors spread by simple means: exposure. Simply, as Kames had worried 
on noting the missing difference of sensation between an “emotion” and a “passion,” or 
the lack of felt impetus to move and the ensuing movement, the gesture “takes” just by 	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being perceived enough in real time.330 This makes the occurrent gesture more dynamic, 
but also more fragile than Gildon’s, which, borrowed by actors from statues “that [actors] 
would not only have other Thoughts themselves, but raise others in the Audience,” 
requires putting oneself into position for the sensation to take hold (and, of course, 
“History-Pieces” from which to draw “Figure and Lineaments”).331 That the occasion of 
presence promotes the spread of certain actions and not others is a frustration to 
Sheridan—in that the “artificial action, tho’ directly opposite to the natural, is established 
in its room, so that no traces of the latter remain”332—but it is also the key selling point of 
his venture.  
 
6  THE CONTAGION OF EXAMPLE 
 
A Vindication of the Conduct of the Late Manager of the Theatre-Royal (1754), 
delivered two years before the publication of British Education and first traveling 
Lectures, is Sheridan’s attempt to exculpate himself from the second of two riots that 
brought down his theatre (the first was in 1747, and not nearly so thorough). Despite 
having gone to great lengths to keep audience members at bay—off of the stage and out 
of the script—it seems that on March 2, 1754, the audience rose against a gesture of sorts 
made by Sheridan. Months before, Mahomet opened the day that newspapers announced 
that the king dismissed the Irish Parliament amid popular unrest over a money bill.333 A 
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impression must be weaker than the former [that is also Hume]; and the performance of a copier 
taken from one who was himself a copyist, must be considered as a reflection from a reflection, 
or an echo from an echo; every successive repetition of which must grow fainter and fainter.” 
(Sheridan, British Education, 324) 
332 Sheridan, British Education,318. 
333 Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 199. 
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particular character in Mahomet had a speech that resonated with popular, “Country 
Party” sentiment, and the actor, getting raucous applause upon delivery, repeated that 
speech.334 A supporter of the “Court Party” (whether or not that detail pertains is disputed 
among biographers), Sheridan revived this play only once, by popular demand, the night 
in question, and prompted actors before curtain to be prudent about encoring.335 When 
that actor received his raucous applause once more, he fell out of character, and declined, 
citing “his Compliance would be greatly injurious to him.”336 The audience called for 
Sheridan. The rest may be surmised from Sheridan’s own Vindication: “the Gentlemen in 
the Pit desir’d the Ladies to withdraw, and then proceeded to tear up the Benches, pull 
down the Wainscoat, and destroy every Thing in the Audience Part of the Theatre. They 
then mounted the Stage,” whereon the curtain was set on fire and extinguished, then 
shredded, and “All the Scenes within reach were entirely demolish’d.”337 From there the 
mob went to wardrobe and set production, and then razed the house.338 Sheridan’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Sheridan charges this actor, Digges, as being “the first Tragedian I ever heard of, who repeated 
a Speech upon the Encore of an Audience. I am in Hopes it was the Suddenness of the Thing, and 
want of Time to reflect upon the ill Consequences which might attend it, that led you into it.” A 
Vindication of the Conduct of the Late Manager of the Theatre-Royal Humbly Address’d to the 
Publick (Dublin: 1754), 9. 
335 In Vindication, he shares his reasoning: “I know not why new Claims may not be made every 
Night; I know not why [the audience] may not insist upon Performers doing whatever they 
please…” (Sheridan, Vindication, 8). 
336 Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 204. Dates, order of events as well as this quote taken from Benjamin 
Victor’s The History of the Theatres of London and Dublin, From the Year 1730 to the Present 
Time (London:1761), 167. 
337 Sheridan, Vindication, 10. 
338 Ibid. “…others drew the large Grate in the Box-room from its Place into the Floor, and 
heaping the Benches and Wainscot upon the Fire, would soon have consumed the House, and 
probably that whole quarter of the Town, as the Building stand so close there, had not 
this…rouz’d fix of the Servants belonging to the Theatre, to a desperate Courage…[they] 
extinguish’d the Flames, barricaded the doors, and afterwards dispers’d the Mob, by firing out of 
the Windows upon them. During this whole Transaction, which lasted from Eight at Night, till 
two in the Morning, there was no Peace Officer to be found in the City of Dublin, tho’ Numbers 
were in Quest of them, and tho’ the Town Major was several Hours traversing the whole town in 
search of one” (ibid). 
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Vindication blames the incident on a “Party Stroke.” Such a stroke occurs where “in 
order to Please Part of that Publick, [an actor] should by any unusual Emphasis, Gesture, 
or significant Look, mark out a Passage in his Part (which at another Juncture he would 
have passed by lightly)” for the party.339 This, he suggests, happened explicitly on 
Mahomet’s opening night, but also when the actor fell out of his part to apologize, 
implicating Sheridan. In both cases, the stroke reaches around the words to effect the 
wink, and thus, rest. One who casts such a stroke, Sheridan calls “an Incendiary” 
(literally, he thinks), “one who throws the Brand of Discord amongst [the Publick].”340 
Note “brand” here suggests both an identifying mark and a torch.   
An Appeal to the Public: Containing Account of the Rise, Progress, and 
Establishment of the First Regular Theatre, in Dublin: With the Causes of its Decline and 
Ruin (1758) is delivered two years after the publication of British Education, and four 
years after the incident it revisits. Ostensibly a last remonstrance, angled at acquiring 
support for his floundering theatre (in the wake of both the riot and competition across 
town), here, Sheridan attaches to the party stroke not only impetus for his impending 
departure from the stage341, but also passion-at-large, which of course plays a role in any 
stroke’s effect, but also contributes to its formation. This gives us one last window to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Ibid., 4. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Note: this is quite a different explanation of his transition than he gives to audiences at his 
lectures on elocution: “As the Date of Mr. Sheridan’s Theatrical Life, in his Capacity of an Actor, 
is drawing towards a Period, before he makes his final Exit…he humbly begs leave to return the 
Public his sincere Thanks for their constant kind Acceptance of his poor Endeavors to please, but 
more particularly for their uncommon Humanity shewn to him…overloaded with Business, 
surrounded with Difficulties, persecuted by the most unrelenting Malice, and struggling with a 
most dispiriting Disorder. Under these weighty Pressures was he often obliged to appear before 
them in Characters that required a vacant and unruffled Mind, a perfect State of Health, and an 
even flow of Spirits. They saw him exerting himself as much as it was possible for a Man so 
circumstanced to do…” Thomas Sheridan, An Appeal to the Public: Containing an Account of the 
Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the First Regular Theatre in Dublin: With the Causes of its 
Decline and Ruin, 6th ed. (Dublin: by J. Hoey, 1771), 61-2. 
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what Sheridan drives at with his call to “social passions.” Regarding letter writing 
campaigns and the local vibe after the first riot (touched off by a similar spark), he notes 
“many who were then swayed by Passion, Prejudice, and Party Zeal,” were “thus 
blinded” from hearing any side of the story but their own. In his written replies, Sheridan 
“[had] studiously avoided even touching upon Points that might inflame Minds already 
but too warm”; worried his account would “blow up the Fire of Discord, which already 
rages but too violently in this unhappy Country.”342 But once “Times of Party” died 
down, the “Gentlemen” came around: “They have since been more calm, their Eyes have 
been opened. They have tried by every…Act to make him Amends.”343  
Sheridan’s notion of “social passions” bears substance of seventeenth- and early-
eighteenth-century natural philosophy, to be sure. Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739) famously describes communicable passions, saying, “The passions are so 
contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and 
produce correspondent movements in all human breasts”344—such that, as Gross 
surmises, one’s passions (and reasons) are never quite at one’s disposal.345 In An Essay 
on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections  (1728), Francis Hutcheson 
calls for nourishing “publick Affections” by building up a resistance to unproductive 
passions.346 He contravenes the assumption that “kind generous Affections” cannot be 
cultivated, “that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was 
only Dissimulation”; in fact, he notes, our “moral Actions and Affections may be in good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Sheridan, Appeal, 27. That is a quote from Vindication. 
343 Ibid., 28. 
344 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1740, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1888), 605. 
345 Gross, The Secret History of Emotion, 113-156. 
346 Francis Hutchison, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (London: Printed by J. Darby and T. Browne, 1727), 53. 
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order, when our Opinions are quite wrong about them.”347 Through a strict regimen of 
Nature and will, we can discern “that just Balance and Oeconomy” of passions (e.g. anger 
and joy) “which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the 
greatest Good in the whole.”348 Where Sheridan extends these particulars is, of course, to 
identify body language (or specific sensible marks) with the vectors along which social 
passions compete and traverse, and these marks’ suggestibility as an opportunity to run 
interference in that contest. (He also identifies a particular market for social passions.) 
The operative principle here suggests Hume’s notion of the relationship between social 
passions and gestures, wherein “When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture 
of any person, my mind immediately passes…into their causes, and forms such a lively 
idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself.”349 Although Hume’s 
“idea” is “the faint images of [sensations, passions and emotions] in thinking and 
reasoning,”350 compassion no less appears to transmit gesturally, upon example: the 
passion evoked by imagining a floundering ship, Hume compares to seeing that ship 
flounder on the horizon, to seeing the terror in the faces of those aboard. In the last, “No 
man…[can] withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion.”351 Hutcheson skirts the 
particulars of passionate motion, but observes that motions affect temperaments, which 
“either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, 
or frequent Returns of it”; for example, 
after strong friendly Passions…some considerable Injuries or Losses, 
which at other times would have affected us very much, shall be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Hutcheson, Nature and Conduct, iii, vii, viii. 
348 Ibid., 56. 
349 Hume, Treatise, 576. 
350 Ibid.,  1. 
351 Ibid., 594. 
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overlooked, or meekly received, or at most but slightly resented; perhaps 
because our Bodies are not fit easily to receive these Motions which are 
constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger.352 
He implies that “the Occasion…of these Dispositions” are the motions, themselves.353  
According to Sheridan, the state of social passions (and passions of the state) is 
observable in landscapes of sensible marks. As such, it may be pronounced, tinkered 
with, and redirected. This is Sheridan’s intervention as well as business plan. In Book III 
of British Education, he makes clear that by a) restoring oratory to the core of public 
education, he means to b) identify and provide imitable actions in order to c) motivate 
certain social passions to gain strongholds among populations through which the actions 
thread. (Reinvigorating the “imitative arts” happens somewhere between b) and c), and is 
in any case a side effect to gestures flourishing among living bodies.) In emphasizing the 
asocial consequence of artificial action—which pervades public expression—Sheridan 
not only tantalizes the product (the “right” natural action), and implicates everyone 
(including “gentlemen”) as potential clientele, but he also appeals to potential 
beneficiaries.354 Sheridan notes that while other countries supplant their natural actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Hutcheson, Nature and Conduct, 56, 57. 
353 Ibid., 57. Sheridan suggests buy-in to this particular idea by emphasizing that his fitness (both 
his health and ability to run the theatre) has suffered in the course of having to perform such 
diverse characters night after night (Sheridan, Appeal, 62, e.g.).   
354 British Education opens with an address to the Earl of Chesterfield (who “first made me think 
[this] scheme possible” and “convinced me that the design was right”) by way of “throwing an 
opportunity in [Chesterfield’s] way of doing a great public good” through patronage (Sheridan, 
British Education, xii, xviii). Bacon notes Hitchcock’s account in An Historical View of the Irish 
Stage, Volume I (Dublin, 1788 [163]), which says Chesterfield told Sheridan before he left 
Dublin, “‘Never let the thoughts of your oratorical institution go out of your mind.’ Yet, a few 
years afterwards when Mr. Sheridan waited upon him in London to fulfill his promise, that 
celebrated patron…bountifully presented him with a guinea, as his contribution.” The revised 
edition (1769) omits this dedication in favor of the generic but hopeful: “If there be in England 
one man of consequence who has understanding enough to comprehend the following Work, and 
who has virtue and spirit enough to exert his best endeavors to carry into execution the Plan of 
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increasingly, among the English, “who have more liberty than any other people,” all is 
not lost: one finds—when gestures are not truncated, as is the fashion—“almost as many 
species of action as there are individuals in the country.”355 Saying plainly in the subtext, 
here and elsewhere, that he who holds the public gestures (/dictates toward what custom 
trends) is powerful indeed, Sheridan’s surface claim is simply that constructive 
(“virtuous”) actions have only to be recovered and cultivated in order that the many act as 
one: “Such an intercourse, frequently repeated, tends to eradicate all selfish passions, and 
to bring forward and invigorate all the fine emotions of benevolence” as well as 
“duty.”356 Here is his promise of that: 
To effect [eloquence] must be the utmost effort, of the most improved 
state of human nature…every muscle, every nerve is exerted; not a 
feature, not a limb, but speaks. The organs of the body, attuned to the 
energies of the mind, thro’ the kindred organs of the hearers, 
instantaneously, and as it were with an electrical spirit, vibrate those 
energies from soul to soul! Notwithstanding the diversity of minds in such 
a multitude, by the lightening of eloquence, they are melted into one mass; 
the whole assembly actuated in one and the same way, become as it were 
one man, have but one voice.357 
This passage gets picked up with some frequency as demonstrative of Sheridan’s 
outlandish claims for delivery (or of the Elocutionary Movement’s overarching 
witchcraft). But the baseline principle is not unlike some of the things coming out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Education founded upon this Work…the author will esteem himself happy to have an opportunity 
of prefixing such a name to a future edition” (Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 8-9). 
355 Sheridan, British Education, 319. 
356 Sheridan, Lectures, 183. 
357 Ibid., 188. 
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contemporarily about mirror neurons and kinesthesia, or what makes e.g. dance, theatre, 
and other performing arts so viscerally stirring. Sheridan thinks that there is something 
possessive in the experience of witness (both for the dancer and audience, speaker and 
auditors). That in the orator, “not a feature, not a limb, but speaks” is less hyperbolic here 
than Ulman suggests; elsewhere, Sheridan notes that it is “when [the orator’s] silence 
permits them to give way to the fullness of their hearts” that delight is “reflected from eye 
to eye” and “poured out from breast to breast,” emphasizing the touch of action, and that 
the sensation of another’s action is communicable.358 
Emboldening his case, he emphasizes that there is no single living paragon of 
gesture to imitate.359 He seems, at times, almost to call for a savior by way of calling all 
gestures to rise up and try (and by way of that, to implicate himself as savior of these 
particular gestures). If properly trained, rhetors could resuscitate the imitative arts and 
facilitate social reform simply by hosting those most profitable, and affording them to 
others through public performance. Theorists of delivery before him, he suggests, have 
been operating by the wrong metaphors regarding such rhetorical gestures (this is 
important, because the ground these metaphors gain affects the way the gestures 
themselves are treated)—stocks, collections, deployments, signification, prescriptions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	  E.g. Sandra and Matthew Blakeslee’s The Body Has a Mind of Its Own: How Body Maps in 
Your Brain Help you Do (Almost) Everything Better (New York: Random House, 2008). 
Following others, they claim “your brain annexes this space [around your body] to your limbs and 
body, clothing you in it like an extended, ghostly skin…Your self does not end where your flesh 
ends, but suffuses and blends with the world, including other bodies” (ibid 3).  
359 The closest Sheridan comes to proffering a model is that of the Vice Chancellor at Oxford (“a 
man of a speculative turn…of that awkward bashfulness, which is usually the attendant of those, 
who have much commerce with books, and little with the world”) who had to give a speech on 
behalf of the new Chancellor. Sheridan notes that those who knew this man “did not expect that 
he would acquit himself well”; but “His tones were such, as result from a glad heart; his eyes 
sparkled with pleasure, and his whole countenance and gesture were in exact union…it was just, 
it was forcible, it moved everyone.” Thus he “excited bursts of universal applause…from hearts, 
that felt themselves agitated, by a participation of kindred feelings, resulting from his manner, 
independent of his matter” (Sheridan, Lectures, 128-29). 
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etc. Sheridan’s gesture is less about the body of one man (containment) than the motions 
themselves (contaminant)—less about the landing points than the flux: subsistence, 
competition, and lifespan. 
 
7  WALKER’S EXERCISE OF ARMS  
 
Even some of Sheridan’s critics say it was a shame that subsequent elocutionists 
reverted to prescribing body language for delivery, admitting the merit of Sheridan’s 
recommendation that people move with inclination, rather than intention.360 But this 
return to the fixed gesture comes quickly—albeit a gesture often more full-bodied, and 
sometimes less tethered to denotation than had been some of Bulwer’s, e.g. (which is 
probably an effect that Sheridan has on subsequent elocutionists). One such returner, 
formerly an actor both at Drury Lane in London and Crow Street in Dublin,361 is John 
Walker (1732-1807), whose Elements of Elocution (1781) answers what was surely 
clamor for formulae as to how to acquire the power of elocution. That Walker takes issue 
with Sheridan’s course for loosing the sensible mark, as well as the utility of this for the 
English, is evident at the beginning of the “Gesture” chapter: “The common feelings of 
nature, with the signs that express them, undergo a kind of modification, which is suitable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Howell, for example, offers Sheridan this compromised praise; noting those elocutionists who 
followed him “did not value Sheridan’s notion that perfection could be achieved without teachers 
if a person followed his own manner and like Betterton sought only to be in earnest. They valued 
instead his idea that rules could be devised to enable ordained teachers to instruct other teachers 
in the art of arousing passions by a system of fixed tones and gestures…Systems of fixed tones 
and gestures became the bane of the elocutionary movement, and, as they were often 
accompanied by mysticism and quackery, they increasingly attracted the poseurs and the 
charlatans into the ranks of the teachers of oratorical delivery.” (Howell, Eighteenth Century, 
242-43).  
361 At Drury Lane, David Garrick was then-stage manager; at Crow Street—which had been 
established as the rival theatre to Sheridan’s at Smock Alley—Spranger Barry (Howell, 
Eighteenth Century, 248; Sheldon, Smock-Alley, 255-283). 
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to the taste and genius of every nation.”362 Whether the local action is “too scanty” is not 
the question; “those who would succeed as English orators must speak to English 
taste.”363 The operative metaphor for Walker’s gesture (as well as to whom these gestures 
are entitled) is here, in the justification: “as a general must learn the modern exercise of 
arms to command modern armies, and not the discipline and weapons of the ancients.”364 
The arms are drawn:  
The right hand, when in action, ought to rise extending from the side, that 
is, in a direction from left to right; and then be propelled forwards, with 
the fingers open, and easily and differently curved: the arm should move 
chiefly from the elbow, the hand seldom be raised higher than the 
shoulder, and when it has described its object, or enforced its emphasis, 
ought to drop lifeless down to the side, ready to commence action 
afresh.365 
Through sample sentences, he links this motion to “the emphatical word” in so-called 
“beating time to the emphasis” (this can be contrasted with Sheridan’s observation that 
the tongue’s own emphasis improves when an actor gets caught in the passion of a 
dramatic scene366). Likewise, the diagram in Figure 4 colors Sheridan’s critique of the 
artificial tone. 
As Sheridan aims to keep the correspondence between sentences and tones 
slippery in order to preserve their gut feeling, Walker means to make them stick in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Walker, Elements, 278. 
363 Ibid., 278. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid., 280. 
366 Ibid., Sheridan Lectures 73: “… the passion which they represented took full possession of 
them…”  
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name of his eloquence, which is correctness—that is, to “have recourse to principles 
more permanent and systematical.”367 (For this, too, is good business.) Finally, both 
Elements and The Academic Speaker (1797) refutes Sheridan’s admonishments against 
taming gestures. Apparently remembering his audience in Elements—which is distinctly 
more English than British, more tasteful than ubiquitous368—Walker offers the caveat 
that this regimen works especially well for youth; to those whose habits are firmly 
entrenched, “it may be proposed to make use of no more action than they can help.”369 
This is the contradiction in Walker’s depiction of the work of action. He needs to affirm 
strictures on gesture to enfold what is English with his audience (i.e. because it is tasteful, 
very little gesture works quite well), but nevertheless to create the demand for his own 
system (but more “right” gestures is better).  
Meanwhile, in a precipitous reversal, citing Edmund Burke, Aaron Hill, and 
James Burgh (all English), Walker throws down his chips on seeming to feel something 
(that is, enacting a posture or a tone) precisely in order to feel it. Burke, he cites, connects 
“the internal feeling of a passion, and the external expression of it,” such that “we cannot 
put ourselves in the posture or attitude of any passion, without communicating a certain 
degree of the passion itself to the mind.”370 With Sheridan, he offers that “certain sounds 
naturally produce certain bodily agitations,” but then that upon adopting a prescribed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Ibid., 3. 
368 Walker’s Elements is dedicated “To Dr. Samuel Johnson, in acknowledgment of the assistance 
gained from his labours, the pleasure and improvement derived from his conversation, and the 
obligation conferred by his friendship and attention.” (Walker, Elements, v). Johnson was an 
explicit critic (“rival” is Bacon’s word) of Sheridan’s. Boswell recounts Johnson saying, “‘I ask 
[Sheridan] a plain question, “What do you mean to teach?” Besides, Sir, what influence can Mr. 
Sheridan have upon the language of this great country, by his narrow exertions? Sir, it is burning 
a farthing candle at Dover, to shew light at Calais’” (Bacon, Thomas Sheridan, 47). 
369 Walker, Elements, 281. Emphasis added. 
370 Ibid., 286. 
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tone, the speaker “is wrought upon by the sound he creates; and, though active at the 
beginning, at length becomes passive, by the sound of his own voice on himself.”371 
(Walker devotes to this possibility The Melody of Speaking (1787), in which he calls for 
“singing tones” and speech scores).372 Ultimately, he observes “the necessity of studying 
and imitating these tones, looks and gestures…for by the imitation of the passion, we 
meet it, as it were, half way.”373  
Rather than from statues, Walker calls for borrowing postures from living forms. 
First, most immediately, those of teachers: “The Teacher, after placing the Pupil in the 
position, Plate I.,” is “to stand at some distance exactly opposite to him in the same 
position,” and then “while the pupil is speaking, to show him, by example, the action he 
is to make use of.” The student “will soon catch the method.”374 Second, as Sheridan 
suggested in Oration, Walker encourages teachers to use actors as living models for 
delivery in certain respects,375 for most pupils “must be roused by something strong and 
excessive, or they will never rise even to mediocrity.”376 He recommends staging plays 
(in addition to orations, etc.) in schools, not only because it trains one to summon certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Ibid. 
372 John Walker, The Melody of Speaking Delineated; Or, Elocution Taught Like Music, By 
Visible Signs, Adapted to the Tones, Inflexions, and Variations of the Voice in Reading and 
Speaking; with Directions for Modulation, and Expressing the Passions (London: Printed for 
author, and sold by G. G. J. et al., 1787), 8. 
373 Walker, Elements, 286.  
374 John Walker, The Academic Speaker; Or, a Selection of Parliamentary Debates, Orations, 
Odes, Scenes, and Speeches, From the Best Writers, Proper to Be Read and Recited by Youth at 
School. To Which are Prefixed, Elements of Gesture; or, Plain and Easy Directions for Keeping 
the Body in a Graceful Position, and Acquiring a Simple and Unaffected Style of Action (London: 
for JW, sold by G. G. et al., 1797), vii. 
375 However, Sheridan was being more literal when he proposed an Academy centered on the 
theatre that would use actual actors to model motions and scenes; Walker recommends playing, 
but notes that it is not the stuff of actors that he seeks: “It is a plain, open, distinct, and forcible 
pronunciation, which school boys should aim at; and not that quick transition from one passion to 
another, that archness of look and that jeu de theatre…at which actors themselves can scarcely 
arrive at” (Ibid., ix). 
376 Ibid., x. 
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passions, but also because it teaches students to accord their postures and gestures with 
those of other players and the audience, as well as with the overarching scene. While this 
is remarkable especially in the sense that most elocutionists who recommend habituating 
particular gestures depict the practitioner solely in isolation, one cannot miss the 
emergence of Gildon’s freeze frame: “the two personages who speak should form a sort 
of picture,” and, “supposing the stage or platform where they stand to be a quadrangle, 
each speaker should respectively face that corner of it next to the audience,” as these 
postures are “absolutely necessary to form any thing like a picturesque grouping of 
objects.”377  
In this sense, the variable that Walker’s formula lacks is that for the quality of 
transition in the ideal that Sheridan describes (indeed, an ideal), or of flow, which did 
become spoken for with the resurgence of interest in the full-bodied/statue imitation that 
came with certain threads of 19th-century Delsartism. Genevieve Stebbins, for example, 
taught “statue posing” and “tableaux drills” in her course on expression. Stebbins, who 
trained with Delsarte, says that when she learned Delsarte “had devoted many years to 
the study of antique statuary,” she then spent months at the Louvre, “making notes.”378 
Ruyter explains that Stebbins’ ensuing posing work was distinctive for two reasons: “a 
focus on the general rather than particular qualities in the choice of subjects to be 
depicted and the use of designed, motional transitions between poses.”379 Her 
performance of these transitions, Ruyter says, leads one reviewer to remark “[I]t is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Ibid., xi. 
378 Nancy Lee Chalfa Ruyter, The Cultivation of Body and Mind in Nineteenth-Century American 
Delsartism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 49.  
379 Ibid., 116. 
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impossible to tell where one line ends or the next one begins.”380 The instruction in 
Stebbins’ Delsarte System of Expression (1885) hones in on the centrality of transition to 
acquiring any “pose”: 
the motion must be magnetic, i.e., slow, rhythmic, and as unaffected as the 
subtle evolution of a serpent…one form must gradually melt into the other 
by the following rules: a) Regarding each statue as an attitude expression 
an impression, the rules of transition of attitude and gesture should be 
carefully observed, such as the arm moving in an opposite direction to the 
pointing of the hand; (b) harmonious balancing of arm to arm; (c) 
prepatory movement in opposite direction to intended attitude; (d) and, 
finally, rhythm of movement in harmony with character of statue or 
emotion depicted.381  
To gain such fluidity, Stebbins notes, “Excitement or passion tends to expand gesture” 
while “Thought or reflection tends to contract gesture”; and with all exercise, “much of 
your practice will cling to you, without conscious thought.”382 Student postures that 
reflect “the tendency of thought to contract the body” call for intervention—an expanded 
vocabulary—lest “Inspiration may be yours without bodily power to express.”383 This is 
Sheridinian sentiment, its relevance to orators-in-training perhaps best captured by 
Stebbins’ lead-in to “decomposing exercises”:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Ibid.,  118. 
381 Ibid.  
382 Genevieve Stebbins, Delsarte System of Dramatic Expression (New York: Edgar S. Werner, 
1886), 168, 79. 
383 Ibid.,  169, 79. Also: “trying to suppress the passion, contracts the form gradually. Those 
thermometers of passion, the nostrils and the upper lids, will indicate the passion. The mouth will 
contract, so will the hands and whole body. This will go on until…the sudden and vehement 
expansion of the gesture” (ibid 169). 
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I withdraw my will-power from fingers, then hand. Touch it. Do not 
shudder. Do you feel as if a dead thing had struck your living palm? Now I 
will show you the same phenomenon with forearm, entire arm, waist, 
spine, hips, knees, ankles, toes, jaw, eyelids. Now I fall. Give me your 
hand and help me to rise. I did not mean to startle you so…I simply 
withdrew my vital force into the reservoir at the base of my brain.384   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
COMMUNICATION BY ELECTRIFICATION (JOSEPH PRIESTLEY’S 
RHETORICAL AFFINITY) 
 
 
1  THE HANGING BOY 
 
In 1706, through a concatenation of accidents, Francis Haukesbee (1660-1713) 
stumbles from a variation on Boyle’s air pump, to what would become for electricians in 
mid-18th century Britain385 means by which to replicate “the operations…of God of 
nature himself”386 through friction: the electric machine.387 To a basic air pump, 
Haukesbee appends a wooden fixture, comprising a horizontal wheel crank and 
stepladder.388 The crank turns a stopcock plugging the pump’s glass globe, producing 
eerie light and friction enough to summon small objects and cause them to behave 
strangely. An electrified feather, for example, Haukesbee describes as “ascending and 
descending,” “repell’d,” “thrown,” “return’d,” and “suspended” by confounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Late eighteenth century marks the leap to quantifying electricity rather than approaching its 
phenomena qualitatively (Heilbron, Electricity, 1-8); also Patricia Fara, An Entertainment for 
Angels: Electricity in the Englightenment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 133-
170. The shift happens about the same time that Priestley publishes the second edition of The 
History and Present State of Electricity (1775). 
386 Joseph Priestley, The History and Present State of Electricity, with Original Experiments, 2nd 
ed. (London: Printed for J. Dodsley in Pall-Mall, 1779), x. 
387 Haukesbee’s electric machine stems from and shares operative principle with the modest 
version developed by Otto Von Guericke in 1670’s Germany. Guericke mounted a small glass 
globe filled with sulpher onto a wooden rod, which gathered friction from a baseboard when 
turned. Guericke is typically credited with discovering the “electric light” produced by static 
electricity (Heilbron, Electricity, 213-218; see also Priestley, History, 8-11). 
388 The “prototype” later developed by Haukesbee streamlines the version described here. [Image 
of prototype here.] The figures at left depict configurations of the threads, which lead to 
Haukesbee’s conjectures about effluvium (Heilbron, Electricity, 232). 
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“effluvia.”389 To better understand this efflux that caused electrics (as Priestley put it) to 
“attract all kinds of bodies promiscuously, whether electric or not”—Haukesbee designs a 
wooden U that suspends several pieces of thread at regular intervals.390 When the U is 
brought near “an excited globe or cylinder,” the threads point together at the center of the 
globe, and hold their poses for about four minutes after the globe ceased rotating.391 No 
matter if the U is held above or below the globe, horizontally or vertically. Haukesbee 
next observes “that the threads pointing towards the center of the globe were attracted 
and repelled by a finger presented to them”; and “if the finger, or any other body, was 
brought very near the threads, they would be attracted; but that if it were brought to the 
distance of about an inch, they would be repelled.”392  
Effluvia, as Priestley narrates it, emulate rhetoric in a particular sense: it describes 
force between bodies, succeeds and fails, is manipulable, and bodily but not essential or 
fixed to particular bodies. Understanding effluvia—the electricity’s “reach”—was critical 
for piecing together the puzzle of why some bodies connect, and others do not.393 Before 
Haukesbee, electricity was an unpredictable, innate property contained in certain bodies. 
Transmittance, occasioned by the body’s own inclination, happened by blow. Effluvia 
were one-way affairs, tantamount to tentacles wrangling other bodies in.394 What 
Haukesbee finds, rather, is that the effluvia emanating from the machine are more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Francis Haukesbee, Course of Mechanical, Optical and Pneumatical Experiments, to Be 
Performed by F.H., and the Explanatory Lectures Read by William Whiston (London: 1714), 54-
5, 67, 74-5, 143, 154-5. See also Heilbron, Electricity, 237.  
390 Priestley, History, 6. 
391 Ibid., 16. 
392 Ibid. 
393 This question, according to Priestley, should interest doctors, theologians, judges and 
laypeople as much as natural philosophers. 
394 William Gilbert (1544-160) says effluvia “lay hold of the bodies with which they unite, enfold 
them, as it were, in their arms, and bring them into union with the electrics.” Duane Henry Du 
Bose Roller, The De Magnete of William Gilbert (Amsterdam: 1959), 95. 
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complex than that picture suggests—effluvia that “stand in continuous, stiff, glass-
piercing chains,” unbroken by prodding fingers and blown breath.395 The threads’ 
behavior disrupts the going understanding of electrical matter and its relationship to 
bodies, and sets the stage for the explosion of experiments that follow Haukesbee’s, to 
and including Priestley’s own. Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), a fan of Haukesbee’s, 
describes the force between bodies in Haukesbee’s effluvial terms in this query for the 
revised Opticks (1717): “Do not all bodies therefore abound with a very subtile, but 
active, potent, electric spirit by which light is emitted, refracted, and reflected, electric 
attractions and fugations are performed, and the small particles of bodies cohere when 
contiguous, agitate one another at small distances, and regulate almost all their motions 
amongst themselves?”396 Not surprisingly given his devotion to associationism, Joseph 
Priestley (1733-1804) lingers on “queries annexed to [Newton’s] treatise on optics” that 
connect “electric bodies” with “elastic fluid,” whose “emission was performed by the 
vibratory motions of the parts of the excited bodies.”397 
Priestley’s theories of electric communication, commutation, and attraction—
which he lays out through this narrative of the history of electricity, his own electrical 
experiments, and later, Heads of Lectures on Experimental Philosophy (1794)—more 
than inform Priestley’s rhetorical theory; I argue that they comprise it. The move to 
connect electricity with forces of the human body sparks the conspicuous experiments of 
Stephen Gray (1666-1736), and is thus of particular interest to Priestley. Gray’s notice of 
effluvial paths to and through the human body ground Priestley’s theoretical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Heilbron, Electricity, 233, Priestley, History, 16-7. 
396 J.E. McGuire, “Force, Active Principles and Newton’s Invisible Realm,” Ambix 15 (1968): 
154-208. See also Heilbron, Electricity, 239-41. Fara suggests that Newton is responsible for 
Haukesbee’s bid for fellowship in the Royal Society (Angels, 38-41).  
397 Priestley, History, 14. 
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interventions in both a history of electricity (which is disputed) and of rhetoric (which is 
not).  
Briefly, Gray’s insight begins with a feather. Tethered to a stick and dangled by 
the machine’s glass tube, then fetched back, the feather acquires cling, “as if there had 
been some electricity communicated to the stick, or to the feather.”398 Wondering 
whether this cling would come over the feather simply by running it through his fingers, 
Gray finds “the small downy fibres of the feather being attracted by his finger, when held 
near it; and sometimes the upper part of the feather with its stems would be attracted 
also.”399 The clingy feather sheds light on the electric property of human bodies, but it 
also says something new about the incentive by which electricity moves. The electric 
tube touches off a flow of effluvia from the feather, Gray says, “as if there had been some 
Electricity communicated”—not awakened, as had been thought—“to the Stick or 
Feather,” allowing it to float to and cling to other bodies.400 The feather commuted an 
“attractive virtue.”401 To test, Gray electrifies a cork, and then fishes it around; he 
electrifies small objects via pieces of packwire (at one point he “actually conveyed the 
electric virtue seven hundred and sixty five feet”402); he electrifies maps and table cloths, 
seeing “how large surfaces might be impregnated with the electric effluvia”; finally, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Ibid., 26. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Stephen Gray, “Experiments and Observations Upon the Light that is Produced By 
Communicating Electrical Attraction to Animate or Inanimate Bodies,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society, 39 (1735-6): 104. 
401 Priestley, History, 53. Gray suspects that “as a tube communicated its light to various bodies 
when it was rubbed in the dark, it might possibly, at the same time, communicate an electricity to 
them” (ibid., 27). 
402 Ibid., 31. 
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makes the “electric virtue” jump between surfaces without contact—being “near” the 
excited tube becomes “sufficient.”403  
In each experiment where the virtue has to jump, Grey “always observed, that the 
attraction was strongest at the place which was most remote from the tube.”404 A hand 
rubs the globe of an electric machine. Gray notices that the string of light appears to be 
cone-shaped, “with its vertex at the finger”—and not the tube—suggesting that the light 
and thus the charge follow from the hand and not the machine.405 The feather-tube’s point 
of pull is the feather. Complement matters (Gray): “As all bodies emit so they receive 
part of the effluvia of all other bodies that environ them…the attraction [being] made 
according to the current of these effluvia.”406 Coursing yards of thread and feet of air, 
effluvia do not lead the charge so much as follow the pathway by which the electric 
communicates. These conclusions are particularly stirring in view of Gray’s infamous, 
latter experiments on “hanging” boys. 
April the 8th. 1730, Mr. Grey suspended a boy on hair lines in a horizontal 
position, just as all electricians had, before, been used to suspend their 
hempen lines of communication, and their wooden rods; then, bringing the 
excited tube near his feet, he found that the leaf brass was attracted by his 
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404 Ibid., 32. Some of these experiments are co-facilitated by Gray’s colleague, Granville Wheeler 
(1703-1770). 
405 Heilbron, Electricity 235. 
406 Edmund Taylor Whittaker, A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity: From the Age 
of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Century, 1910 (London: Longmans, 1951), 279-80.  
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head with much vigor, so as to rise to the height of eight, and sometimes 
ten inches.407  
These experiments—which eventually include multiple subjects connected by thread, or 
touch, and elaborate configurations of held rods—ask how “animal bodies” propagate, 
diminish, or communicate electric virtue across distances (a line of inquiry that began at 
the feather winding through Gray’s fingers).408 Gray becomes fascinated and perplexed 
by body parts whose virtue seems more communicable than others—hands, head, feet—
and the trajectory through the body that effluvia take. Gray’s best gander, with Priestley’s 
paraphrase: “By [these experiments], says he, we see, that animals receive a greater 
quantity of electric fluid than the other bodies; and that it may be conveyed from them 
several ways at the same time, to considerable distances.”409 Priestley dismisses Grey as 
mistaking moisture for animal per se, but acknowledges nonetheless the animal 
propensity to conduct—a propensity connected with the latent persuasive potential 
inherent in all bodies. 
 
2  THE FALLING MAN 
 
In Priestley’s A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, the canons of 
memory and delivery are termed “elocution,” but have been pared out of the treatise in 
favor of invention, arrangement, and—consuming a full half of the treatise—style. 
Priestley acknowledges this lack, which occurs in part because at Warrington Academy, 
where he instructs, elocution is taught as a performing art in a distinct set of lectures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Priestley, History, 34. Continues, “When the leaf brass was put under his feet, and the tube 
brought near his head, the attraction was small; and when the leaf brass was brought under his 
head, and the tube held just over it, there was no attraction at all” (ibid.). 
408 Ibid., 34-42. 
409 Ibid., 35. 
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wherein “great pains were taken to form the pupils to a habit of just and graceful 
delivery.”410 Anticipating critics, Priestley also suggests that a fair amount of this content 
does not (of course) lend itself well to transcription.411 The obvious snippets of 
Priestley’s view on elocution that do exist make way for interpretations like those of 
Bevilacqua and Murphy (editors to the 1965 edition), and Schofield, Gibbs, and other 
biographers—that is, Priestley has a dim concern about it, but offers nothing new, nor 
anything to set him apart from predecessors and late eighteenth-century rhetoricians. 
Priestley acknowledges, for example, that delivery matters—that “both our minds and 
bodies are equally impatient in a state of rest and inactivity. Hence we are constantly 
impelled to exert ourselves with vigor in the station in which we are placed; and we can 
never be happy, and enjoy our being, unless we fulfill the great ends of it.”412 Priestley’s 
delivery is imitation-centric. He calls for “graceful earnestness” in preaching, and for 
“words and gestures…unmixed with any appearance of art”—even if that means 
wittingly stopping mid-sentence, retracting one’s gesture, and doing something abruptly 
different for the sake of “attracting” and “engaging” attention.413 Bevilacqua and Murphy 
call Priestley a “naturalist,” his treatment of delivery “incidental.”414 Schofield observes 
that Priestley’s elocution is mostly derivative of John Ward’s.415 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, 1777, eds. Vincent M. 
Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), iv. 
411 Priestley might also have neglected this discussion because he was a notoriously poor public 
speaker; biographers suggest that Priestley could not find a regular preaching gig early in his 
career as a result of possible stuttering and otherwise lackluster delivery. 
412 Ibid., 138. 
413 Ibid., 267, 111, 85. 
414 Ibid., xlix. See also E. W. Gibbs, Joseph Priestley: Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century 
(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1967), 100-01. 
415 Robert E. Schofield, The Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work 
from 1733 to 1773 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 108-09. 
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Priestley’s rhetorical gesture, I argue, is captured in less obvious places. One such 
place is an odd speculation in Lecture 17, “Of the Pleasures of Imagination in General,” 
in the context of a discussion on storytelling. Priestley argues that elocutionary address is 
particularly effective for persuasion because of its ability to not only transmit to but 
transmute a rhetor’s arguments within his audience. This Lecture follows that on “the 
stronger passions and emotions” (described in the next section) that are useful for “those 
forms of address which are peculiarly adapted to gain assent”416 The “finer feelings” here 
are more like Kames’ category of emotion (see Chapter 2) that loosely correspond to raw 
sensation, or possibly, to affect. They require “inlets” to the body, and “no sensible 
interventions of the corporeal organs by which they are transmitted.”417 This notion of 
transmittance is critical, and distinguishes Priestley’s views from those of Kames, “whose 
proliferation of innate causes for rhetorical effects is pre-eminent” even among the 
Scottish common-sense school.418 Upon such transmittance, rather, 
the mind perceives, and is conscious of thing, but the ideas that are present to it, it 
must, as it were, conform [sic] itself to them; and even the idea it hath of its own 
extent, (if we may use that expression) must enlarge or contract with its field of 
view. By this means also, a person, for the time, enters into, adopts, and is 
actuated by, the sentiments that are presented to his mind.419  
Priestley then transcribes a couple of gestural transactions. These gestures are not the 
Bulwerian “call to attention” or ironic wink of Ward’s. These gestures look more like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Priestley, Course, 125. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid., xxvi-vii. Bevilaqua and Murphy argue that Priestley “drew the major portion of 
rhetorical and critical theory” from Kames and Gerard, “whose basic view of man if not of 
rhetoric was repugnant to him” (ibid.). 
419 Ibid., 126-27. 
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those of Nollet’s electrified courtesans. In the first, a person startles backward, adopting 
the posture of a near fall, while stood firmly on the ground. In the second, a person takes 
on the would-be trajectory of a bowling ball, “writhing…into every possible attitude.” 
Priestley calls this drawn-off gesture “conversing.” 420 One might converse with “mean 
and low objects,” like the bowling ball, with “large and grand objects” of the sublime, 
and of course, with human bodies, especially those close by.421 The reception of gesture 
is the stamp of persuasion. 
One sees in Priestley’s “instantaneous,” “mechanical,” “useless and ridiculous” 
gesture trace of the spectator in Abbé DuBos’ tightrope walker, and before that, Francis 
Bacon’s shared pucker when one person sees another eat a lemon. But Priestley does two 
things with his ugly gestures that are distinctive to those. One, he deploys them for 
rhetorical effect (notes the extension of such effects—that they bounce back and forth 
between bodies, i.e. do not “start” at one and get absorbed by another; collateral damage); 
and two, he uses them to construct a physicalist model of rhetorical transmission that 
centers on the two phenomena he sees operating there: Newtonian mechanics and bodily 
electricity. (Three, he ties them to God, but only indirectly.) These ugly gestures reflect a 
kind of bonding between bodies, and what of Priestley’s rhetoric graduates from theories 
of motion put forward by Digby, Bulwer, and Sheridan. Gesture is part extension, part 
retraction; part attraction, part repulsion; part artifact, part antefact (as any such gesture 
often imparts intention). Priestley’s rhetorical gesture follows the laws of human action 
and attraction; it can grant as it takes away a charge.  
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In this chapter, I consider the subtle connections between Priestley’s discourses 
on electricity, religion (vis-à-vis spiritual matter) and oratory in terms of method, 
application, and rhetorical implication. I pay special attention to the use of the 
term/concept “attraction” both in Priestley’s rhetoric and in scientific discourse. While 
rhetorical sympathy most commonly connotes pathos, or even a move to agreement or 
shared opinion, here I will consider as alternative “affinity,” a strictly motive sense of 
correspondence with another’s action. This alternative to traditional depictions of 
rhetorical sympathy links minds, bodies, and world by way of motions that conduct, 
attract, and flow. It challenges traditional notions of the rhetor’s agency and underscores 
the dynamic, relational interplay between bodies in proximity. This affinity in Priestley’s 
work beckons language, exigence, and especially phenomenal principles from the popular 
science of electricity.  
To tease out what Priestley’s picture of delivery might look like—and how that 
presents an alternative to sympathetic gestures, the physiology of associations is held up 
to that of electricity on animal bodies, as induced both by some of the electrical 
experiments that Priestley reports, and some he conducts himself.422 To begin, I briefly 
sketch out the traditional notion of rhetorical sympathy from which Priestley departs.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422  Note proximity of Priestley’s publishing dates: History of Electricity 2nd ed. (1775), Hartley’s 
Observations on Man (1775), Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), and Course of 
Lectures (1777).  
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3  CONTAGIOUS VIRTUES  
 
By the time of Haukesbee’s threads, theories of electric sympathy423 began to fail 
as an explanation for certain phenomena—a tangle shared by mid-eighteenth century 
theories of rhetorical transmission. Gaspar Schott (1608-1666) offers that sympathetic 
electricity “arise[s] from a friendly affection, or coordination and innate relation, of one 
thing to another…so that if one is acting, or reacting, or only just present, the other also 
acts or is acted upon.” Sympathy “originates directly from the particular temperament of 
a thing, being nothing but a certain natural inclination of one thing towards another.”424 
Heilbron summarizes, “electrics excite their prey to self-motion.”425 Digby’s (1603-1665) 
electric effluvia, for example, like “steams” that “issueth from sweating men on horses,” 
pour out, and then, upon contact with another body, either absorb it or withdraw like “the 
little tender horns of snails used to shrink back if anything touched them, till they settle in 
little lumps upon their heads.”426 “The reason hereof,” Digby explains, “is the 
resemblance, and sympathy.”427 Bodies are fountains; electric reach flows from 
“each…attached to its font.”428 
Sympathetic bodies in the mid-eighteenth century are understood to operate upon 
one another by the same principle, and in the case of some theorists, literally the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Priestley also notes the contribution of William Gilbert (1544-1603), who before and contra 
Schott and Digby, suggests that friction—or direct contact—is requisite to “excite the virtue” in 
electrics (Priestley, History, 3). 
424 Heilbron, Electricity, 26. From Gaspar Schott, Thaumaturgus Physicus Sive magiae 
Universalis naturae et Artis Pars IV (Wurzburg, 1659), 368-70. 
425 Heilbron, Electricity, 211. 
426 Digby, Bodies, xix. 
427 Digby, Discourse, 110. 
428 Emanuel Maignan, Cursus Philosophicus, (Lyon: 1673), 360. Heilbron offers this summary of 
Maignan’s viewpoint: “B’s spirit stimulates A to emit a vapor that in turn increases B’s 
productivity. The greater the ‘friendliness’ (amicitia) of the bodies, the faster their spirits flow 
and the sooner their self-moving principles actuate” (Heilbron, Electricity, 211). 
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process of sympathetic transition of electrical charge. So much so that some physicians 
and philosophers speak of “cognate effluvia,” which pass “to and fro” such that actions 
befalling one person can affect another at great distances.429 Electric and animal 
sympathy are at least similar enough to share terminology, operating principle, and 
manifest effect. At most, they overlap in terms of territory and substance. By 
“electricity,” Priestley means “only those effects which will be called electrical, or the 
unknown cause of those effects, using the term, as we use the letters x and y in 
algebra.”430 The effects of electricity are glimpsed above—floating feathers, sparks 
jumping between fingertips, crackling sounds. Recall that David Hume’s (1711-1776) 
contagious bodily passion is “known only by its effects and by those external signs in the 
countenance and conversation which convey an idea of it.”431 Passion’s effects include all 
manner of action, including words. Where electric sympathy ignites its own virtue in 
kindred bodies, Hume’s sympathy is ignited when “this idea is presently converted [back] 
into an impression and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very 
passion itself.”432 The greater the similarity—and proximity—between two individuals, 
the stronger the bond (as with electrics): “we must be assisted by the relations of 
resemblance and contiguity in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection.”433 This 
“resemblance and contiguity” occurs between animate bodies, inanimate bodies, spiritual 
bodies, or any combination thereof.434 In a nutshell: “Sympathy is often an imitative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Abraham Tucker, Light of Nature Pursu’d, 1765, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 1831), 227. 
430 Priestley, History, 434. 
431 Hume, Treatise, 317. 
432 Ibid.  
433 Ibid., 320. 
434 In Observations on Man, e.g., David Hartley follows his chapter on “Of the Pleasures and 
Pains of Sympathy” with “Of the Pleasures and Pains of Theopathy.”  
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faculty, sometimes involuntary, often without consciousness.”435 The transmission of 
passion occurs through the sympathetic transfer of mimetic response; a body receiving it 
serves as further conduit for the charge of emotion.  
The pathology of animal sympathy suggests the utility of this physiological 
mechanism of transmission for models of communication as well as ethics. Adam 
Smith’s (1723-1790) sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) picks up where 
Hume’s leaves off in terms of resemblances, but more than Hume, grounds sympathy in 
physiology, both in terms of cause and effect. “How selfish soever man may be 
supposed,” Smith says, “there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest 
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he 
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”436 One has “no immediate 
experience of what other men feel,” and so can only get a sense of “the manner in which 
they are affected…by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”437 
Through imagination, 
we enter as it were into his body and become in some measure him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, 
though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when 
they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Seguin Henry Jackson, A Treatise on Sympathy in Two Parts, I. On the Nature of Sympathy in 
General; that of Antipathy; and the Force of Imagination…II. On Febrile Sympathy and Consent; 
and on the Balance and Connection of Extreme Vessels (London: Printed by J. Murray, 1781), 13. 
436 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, or, An Essay Towards an Analysis of the 
Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their 
Neighbors, and Afterwards of Themselves (London: For W. Strahan et al. 1774), 1. 
437 Ibid.,  2. 
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made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and 
shudder at the thought of what he feels.438 
Identification jumps between bodies through expression. But one’s quality of feeling and 
of health (in the moment, and longer term) is born of such trembles and shudders. Robert 
Whytt (1714-1766) calls this the “wonderful sympathy between the nervous systems of 
different persons,” by which “various motions and morbid symptoms are often 
transferred from one to another, without any corporeal contact.”439 According to Smith, 
for example, 
Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that 
in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the 
streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the 
corresponding part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at 
the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves 
more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they 
themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are 
looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually 
affected in the same miserable manner. 
These bodies’ grasps begin to resemble that of the electric machine. Calling to mind 
Gray’s electrified feather, the sympathizer takes away a charge, and so is fleetingly 
imprinted with the feeling of the other (Smith): “He not only feels a sorrow of the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Ibid.,  2-3. 
439 Robert Whytt, An Essay on the Vital and Other Involuntary Motions of Animals (Edinburgh: 
For John Balfour, 1763), 583. For in-depth treatments of medicalized sympathy in this context, 
see Joanna Bourke, “Pain, Sympathy and the Medical Encounter Between the Mid-Eighteenth 
and the Mid-Twentieth Centuries,” Historical Research 10, no. 11 (2011): 1-23; and Chapter 
Three, “Sympathy and Persons,” in Jonathan Lamb, The Evolution of Sympathy in the Long 
Eighteenth Century (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2009). 
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kind with that which they feel, but as if he had divided a part of it to himself, what he 
feels seems to alleviate the weight of what they feel.”440 Smith emphasizes the 
importance of seeing to such acquisitions of others’ passions, noting that even “men of 
the most robust make,” when “looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible 
soreness in their own…that organ being in the strongest men more delicate than any other 
part of the body is in the weakest.”441 
Another way to put this is that the manifest effect of “invisible agent[s]” 
electricity and passion “looks like” something—an imitation, an approach, a gesture. 
Gesture is the signature of sympathetic persuasion. Although in general, Smith’s 
sympathy is less infectious than Hume’s—it “does not arise so much from the view of the 
passion, as from the situation which excites it”442—Smith acknowledges that sympathy 
“may seem to arise merely from the view”: 
The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one 
man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what 
excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for 
example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once 
affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable 
emotion.443 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Smith, Theory, 13. 
441 Ibid., 4. 
442 Ibid., 7. The counter example to the subsequent block quote, e.g., describes situational 
sympathy—“some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but before we 
are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against 
them.” We are angrier at an angry man than at his provocateurs until “we plainly see what is the 
situation of those with whom he is angry, and to what violence they may be exposed from so 
enraged an adversary” (ibid., 6).  
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It is the motional resonance (“the look and gestures”) that makes sympathy visible, 
identifiable—and interruptible. Thus motions are where natural philosophers and 
physicians begin in trying to mediate sympathy for particular ends. Seguin Jackson’s 
(1750-1816) A Treatise on Sympathy in Two Parts (1781) reflects the trend among 
physicians, connecting “interruptible” sympathetic actions to conditions of the body (like 
gout). One goal for engaging sympathy this way, he says, is “restoring animation, or the 
vital principle, when apparently lost.”444 It is no different among certain rhetoricians, who 
connect to the identification-through-sympathetic-motion principle, especially as relates 
to delivery. (Smith’s rendering of situational identification, which—contra Hume—
leaves room for an intentional component in any identifying action, is particularly useful 
for theorizing gesture.) James Burgh (1714-1775), for example, in The Art of Speaking 
(1768) says of “true eloquence”: 
It ought to hurry us out of ourselves, to engage and swallow up our whole 
attention; to drive everything out of our minds, besides the subject it 
would hold forth, and the point, it wants to carry. The hearer finds himself 
as unable to resist it, as to blow out a conflagration with the breath of his 
mouth, or to stop the stream of a river with his hand.445  
The sympathetic mechanism has been widely criticized for its claim to 
containment—for the innate capacity to communicate and respond (see Smith, above: 
“Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body”); for differentiating between 
individuals and groups along this line (e.g. how to gesture for vulgar versus learned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Jackson, Treatise on Sympathy, 4. Contrary to Whytt, Jackson contends, “Sympathy does not 
belong more particularly to the nervous system, than to other solids in the body” (ibid.). 
445 James Burgh, The Art of Speaking, 1761, ed. Carol Poster (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 
2003), 29. 
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audiences); and for propagating communication by capitulation (Burgh: “His passions are 
no longer his own. The orator has taken possession of them; and with superior power, 
works them to whatever he pleases”446).447 As a model for communication, and for 
rhetorical gestures in particular, sympathy (I gesture, you feel) also tires.  
David Hartley’s (1705-1757) sympathy differs slightly.448 For Hartley, 
sympathetic transmission and reception is mediated by gesture; through physical and 
verbal rhetorical articulation, bodies negotiate the conditions of the transmission of 
meaning. Like Hume and Smith, Hartley describes a bodily disposition—certain places 
wherein “flare ups” of other peoples’ feeling are contained. But for Hartley, these flare 
ups are not entirely discrete from the motions that provoke them. Sympathy is born when 
“in the intercourses of life the pleasures and pains of one are, in various ways, intermixed 
with, and dependent upon, those of others, so as to have clusters of their miniatures 
excited.”449 These miniatures forecast the natural, manifest variety of Smith’s, in that 
“persons whose nerves are easily irritable” and “those who have experienced great trials” 
have more robust clusters.450 Standing apart in Hartley’s model is the clusters’ location—
the sympathetic nervous system—and the mechanics of the connection between the flare 
up and its foments: “countenances, gestures, words, and actions.”451 As with objects (the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Ibid. 
447 See, for example, Lawrence Grossburg, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular 
Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1992), and Gross’ Secret History 
of Emotion.  
448 Hartley draws heavily from Locke, whose sympathy provides means only to account for those 
reactions that somehow do not correspond with, or “mismatch” a trigger—“unnatural” things. 
Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. To Which is Added the History of 
the Philosophisophical Doctrine Concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter, 2nd 
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449 Joseph Priestley, Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, On the Principle of the Association of 
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feathers, etc.), it is both the innate nature of bodies in rhetorical interaction, and the 
manner in which they are assembled, deployed, and manipulated that set the conditions 
for sympathetic transmission and reception of persuasive meaning. 
 
4  THIS ELECTRIC AND ELASTIC SPIRIT 
 
These persuasive interconnections between bodies are nowhere better exhibited 
than in experiments with static electricity.452 The rhetor/audience as bodily agents set the 
conditions of possibility for rhetorical transmission, but their agency does not entail total 
control over the agency of the charge itself. The “operations [power]d...of the God of 
nature himself” manifest here—in the visible effects of this “invisible power”—in both 
what is explicable and patterned in an acting body, as well as what is “occult.”453 “Here,” 
Priestley says in The History and Present State of Electricity, aiming to hook would-be 
electricians, “we see a piece of cold metal, or even water, or ice, emitting strong sparks of 
fire, so as to kindle many inflammable substances; and in vacua its light is prodigiously 
diffused, and copious.”454 Throughout The History, Priestley cannot help but linger on the 
electric gesture, per se: “contrary to the principles of gravitation, we see bodies attracted, 
repelled, and held suspended by others, which are seen to have acquired that power by 
nothing but a very slight friction; while another body, with the very same friction, 
reverses all its effects.”455 Priestley hones in on the “agency” of electricity in relation to 
bodies, all of which are susceptible to its transit: “The electric fluid is no local, or 
occasional agent in the theatre of the world. Late discoveries show that its presence and 	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effects are every where.”456 Conductivity is a property “as essential and important as any 
[bodies] are possessed of, and can hardly fail to show [itself] wherever the bodies are 
concerned.”457  
Sometimes this electric gesture is more obvious than others. Priestley is intrigued 
by Abbé Nollet (1700-1770) and Pierre Le Monnier’s (1715-1799) respective courtier 
electrifications. In The History’s chapter “Experiments on Animal, and Other Organized 
Bodies in this Period; And Other Experiments Connected with Them,” Priestley pokes 
fun at the pair, who are unafraid to conduct their experiments on humans—calling Nollet, 
“the ingenious philosopher,” referencing “his darling theory of affluences and 
effluences,” which Priestley deems wrong.458 Indignantly, Priestley: “The English 
philosophers, who led the way in almost every other application of electricity, were 
among the last to try its effects upon animals, and other organized bodies.”459 Priestley 
has, however, apparently dropped the irony by the chapter’s close, on reflecting that 
Nollet opened up “a new and noble field” with his experiments on living subjects, and 
that he deserves merit for pursuing them with “attention, perseverance, and respect.”460  
In these famous electrifications, long strings of connected people pass around a 
shock. Priestley reports that Daniel Gralath (1708-1767) in Germany “first found, that the 
same shock could be communicated to a number of persons, who took hold of one 
another’s hands,” given that someone at one extremity holds the Leyden jar, and the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Ibid., xi. 
457 Ibid. 
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Nollet’s is from one Mr. Trembley, “who says that several persons had observed, that while they 
were electrified, their pulse beat a little faster than before”; and that upon remaining electrified 
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at the other touches a conductor: Gralath “gave a shock to twenty persons; and he says, 
he did not doubt, but it might have been given to a thousand.”461 The Abbé Nollet then 
gave it to one hundred and eighty of the guards, in the King’s presence; 
and at the grand convent of the Carthusians in Paris, the whole community 
formed a line of nine hundred toises, by means of iron wires between 
every two persons (which far exceeded the line of one hundred and eighty 
of the guards) and the whole company, upon the discharge of the phial, 
gave a sudden spring, at the same instant of time, and all felt the shock 
equally.462 
One can see the shock itself by electrifying a chain of bodies connected by water-filled 
glass tubes. As the shock passes, the water flashes, as would our bodies, Nollet says, 
“were we as transparent as glass and water.”463  
By his description of these experiments, Priestley, suggests that our bodies do 
flash, but in a different way—and in a way that is pertinent to orators. He fascinates on 
movements communicated through electricity across animal bodies—by twitch, by 
shudder, by extended motions—as well as peoples’ inclination to experience this 
seemingly involuntary movement. The above description is one of many in which 
Priestley tries to render both the “look” and the “feel” of electricity—and most 
importantly for the present concern, the line between one’s “own” agency, and the 
electricity’s. Here, the company give “a sudden spring.” Nollet and Le Monnier, who 
take the phial shock themselves, report “commotion” in their bodies, Priestley says, 
which “instantly spread through the court and the city, from whence all ranks of men 	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crowded to see…and to experience the effect of it.”464 Effects include “striking” of the 
“arms, shoulders, and breast”; ankles shaking; “an odd sensation upon the face, as if a 
spider’s web were drawn over it”465; and “great convulsions” across the body.466 The 
hand clutches—another hand, a rod, a glass—without one intending it to.467 Le Monnier 
comments, Priestley explains, on the absurd strings of gestures that pop up across these 
bodies passing shocks: “It is singular to see the multitude of different gestures, and to 
hear the instantaneous exclamation of those surprised by the shock.” Priestley reflects 
It was this astonishing experiment that gave éclat to electricity. From this 
time it became the subject of general conversation. Everybody was eager 
to see, and, notwithstanding the terrible accident that was reported of it, to 
feel the experiment; and in the same year in which it was discovered, 
numbers of persons, in almost every country in Europe, got a livelihood by 
going about and showing it.468 
The “pleasure” of the experiment, he says, “bears considerable resemblance to that of the 
sublime,” usually traversing electrical machine, experimenter, and audience along vectors 
that annex “crowds of pleasing sensations to…contemplation.”469 This annexation makes 
electricity not only an important subject for civil history and vehicle for experimental 
philosophy, but also means by which to explore the different ways that bodies tangle with 
one another through motion. Here is Priestley’s pitch to would-be rhetoricians: engage 
involuntary motions. No experiment in “the compass of philosophy” is so tactile, or so 
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plainly tangles sensation with intellect, “mixing something of action with speculation, 
and giving some employment to the hands and arms, as well as to the head.”470 
In his segment of “Original Experiments” that follow The History proper, 
Priestley admits executing a miniature version of the human chain experiment. Here, and 
in related observations, Priestley corrects Nollet’s work in at least two senses, both of 
which inform Priestley’s notion of communicable motion between animal bodies. The 
first pertains to Nollet’s “darling theory of affluences and effluences.”471 (It is a quasi-
sympathetic notion of electric transmissions.) Observing “a sensible blast from the hand 
of a person not electrified,” as well as “the appearance of flame…and almost every other 
appearance and effect of electricity” when a hand approaches a charged globe, Nollet 
concludes that the fire “had been carried by the affluent electricity from his own body to 
the globe.”472 In other words, when the spark passes from the hand to globe, or hand to 
hand, Nollet sees that as an emission of internal fire, rather than the exchange of “two 
different and opposite electricities.”473 Priestley, on the other hand, asks, “Does not the 
electric matter pass chiefly on the surface of bodies?”474 And then, “Do these experiments 
likewise favor the hypothesis…that there is no electrical attraction without a 
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communication of electricity?”475 Priestley first describes experiencing the shock for 
himself.  
I made a torrecellian vacuum in a tube about a yard in length and holding 
one end of it in my hand, I presented a part near the other end to the prime 
conductor; and observed that, while the electric fire was pouring along the 
whole length of it, I felt some peculiarly smart twitches every now and 
then in my hand…On removing the tube from the prime conductor, it 
threw out spontaneous sparks from the place where it had touched the 
conductor…Then, bringing my other hand near the place where the tube 
had touched the conductor, I received a very considerable shock in both 
my arms and breast.476 
Priestley then notes that when “three persons besides myself joined hands,” the latter 
shock “shook all our arms greatly,” discharging “a very dense spark of electric fire” into 
the tube. The superficial communication of electricity across bodies, Priestley says, 
explains why “electricity was often observed to be peculiarly strong, when the room was 
full of company, and more particularly, when numbers of them drew near together, to see 
the experiments”—the company, “constituting a large surface, when any of them took a 
spark…would feel it more sensibly than if he had stood single.”477  
Priestley pays particular attention, however, to the odd, ambient twitches, and 
what of the electric gesture they suggest. At the outset of The History, Priestley says, 
“Hitherto philosophy has been chiefly conversant about the more sensible properties of 
bodies; electricity, together with chemistry, and the doctrine of light and colors, seems to 	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be giving us an inlet into their internal structure, on which all their sensible properties 
depend.”478 Later, citing the “at present occult properties of bodies,” he observes 
“chymistry and electricity are both conversant about the latent and less obvious properties 
of bodies; and yet their relation to one another has been little considered.”479 A bigger 
observation than it sounds like—Priestley proposes to bring Newtonian mechanics, and 
considerations of gravity, into conversation with bodily electricity—subjecting electricity 
and bodies to the same rules and motions. This sets up Priestley’s most-acknowledged 
contribution to a history of electricity480, and which allows him to fully develop his 
electrical theory of rhetorical agency.  
Following up on the twitches, Priestley notices that when Leyden jars discharge, a 
subtle shock would run through him, although his body was not a key part of the circuit. 
This occasions Priestley’s “lateral force” experiments, in which Priestley identifies the 
“side-flash,” or wayward force from the electric discharge. At first drawn to the colored 
rings that the flashes left on a metal plate, Priestley notices that he “could laterally 
disperse objects from near the path of an electrical discharge through air or even through 
an imperfectly conducting wire”481—that is, that charges passing through circuits indeed 
transmit to and move neighboring bodies.482 Second, electric discharges follow all 
available paths, and that “the whole fire of an explosion does not pass in the shortest and 	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Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley, 232-35. 
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best circuit; but that, if inferior circuits be open, part will pass in them at the same 
time.”483 Third, Priestley finds “If the electric circuit be interrupted, the electric matter, 
during the discharge, will pass to any other body that lies near its path, and instantly 
return.”484 Shortly after this determination, Shofield notes that Priestley admits in a letter 
to Canton that such experiments “make me inclined to think, there is no electric fluid at 
all, and that electrification is only some [new?] modification of the matter of which any 
body consisted before that operation.”485  
By supplanting the notion of a body’s stagnant, electric “atmosphere” with that of 
its “sphere of action,” Priestley carves a space out of the sympathizing self for the 
phenomenal rhetorical gesture. The “occult” properties of bodies that these experiments 
(and this passing hypothesis, to Canton) suggest and manifest—that is, bodies’ 
conductivity, penetrability, attraction, repulsion, and nerve—are vital for the durability, 
effectiveness, and range of suasive motion. Correcting Nollet’s shock-expulsion 
hypothesis a second time, Priestley says, “In this case, the motion is communicated in a 
real succession, like a vibration, which must therefore take up time, and be 
measurable.”486 In the next section, I turn to Priestley’s use of the physiology of 
vibrations and Newtonian mechanics as general precepts to the communicative properties 
of rhetorical bodies. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 Ibid., 69. 
484 Joseph Priestley, Heads of Lectures on a Course of Experimental Philosophy, Particularly 
Including Chemistry, Delivered at the New College in Hackney (London: J. Johnson, 1794), 175.  
485 Schofield, The Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley, 234. From Priestley to Canton, 12 
November 1767. 
486 Priestley, History, 119. 
	   140	  
5  THE SIMPLE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER 
 
In Hartley’s theory of electrical transmission, bodies do not exert persuasive 
effect on other bodies; rather, electricity is conducted through sympathetic vibration 
across the ether according to the presence of essential properties of electrical conduction. 
For Hartley, if communication is electrical, than his empirical observations of electric 
transmission suggest that rhetoric is based on conquest rather than skilled persuasion: 
rather like the interaction between one person with a taser and one without. In his own 
edition of Hartley’s Theory, Priestley posits drops some of the physiology of vibrations, 
focusing rather on “association” as the mode of conduction and transmission. This, I 
argue, makes space for his incorporation of Newtonian mechanistic principles (covered in 
more depth in the next section). Priestley’s theory of electric communication derives 
from Hartley—Priestley is, of course, one of Hartley’s great champions—but he does not 
succumb to the temptation, when making his own rhetorical claims from the study of 
electricity, to view electrical communication as a form of deterministic control. Because 
Priestley has a highly differentiated notion of how sympathy works vis-à-vis electricity, 
he argues against the idea of innate bodily capacity, or the essential property of being 
more or less susceptible to persuasion.   
Hartley submits that Robert Hooke’s experiment wherein “the life of a dog was 
sustained by a continued stream of air through the lungs without any alternate respiratory 
motion)” proves “that one principal use of air, which is among the electric bodies per se, 
is to restore…the electric virtue” that circulates with blood.487 The body’s electric 
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property is for Hartley encompassed in its inner systems, reaching only so far as the 
aether hovering nearest the body is able to project. The vis inertiae is preserved. One can 
see how the like of Haukesbee’s experiment—the threads lean toward the fingers, but do 
not touch—might lead Hartley to contend that discrete bodies are buffered by this aether, 
which sensation can ford only through vibration. Thus he calls attention to fingertips (and 
other “extreme and pointed parts”) not for their tendency to conduct a shock, but for their 
“exquisite sensibility” due to “an ether of a greater density which, according to the 
Newtonian hypothesis, surrounds the extreme parts on all sides” and so “ought to be 
agitated by stronger vibrations.”488  
In his version of sympathy, Hartley does not contend that all bodies have equal 
access to feeling: rather, bodies are more or less conditioned for the sympathetic 
reception of particular electrical messages through the repetitive development of 
“clusters.” Clusters are the precipitate of all such actions to which a body has been 
exposed. It is an assemblage of “miniature vibrations”—“vestiges, types, and or images” 
that sensations left behind, which pattern “muscular exertions” from observation and 
imitation.489 The inciting gesture’s vibrations wriggle into place. The sympathizer’s 
response options are precisely one: “Any sensation A, or idea B, or muscular motion C, if 
associated for a sufficient number of times with any other sensation D, idea E, or 
muscular motion F, will at last excite the sensation D, the idea d, the very idea E, or the 
muscular motion F.” For “every action, or bodily motion, arises from previous 
circumstances, or bodily motions, already existing in the brain, i.e. from vibrations, 	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which are either the immediate effect of impressions then made, or the compound effect 
of former impressions, or both.”490 The observer “will find his mind so formed already by 
association” that he cannot brook his reaction. “Pure disinterested benevolence,” Hartley 
feels, proves that people are plugged in to one another’s actions—and the truth of the 
doctrine of vibrations. 
Hartley’s fomenting gesture has a melding effect: “Any vibrations A, B, C, etc., 
by being associated together a sufficient number of times get such a power over a, b, c, 
etc., the corresponding miniature vibrations, that any of the vibrations A, when excited 
alone, shall be able to excite b, c, etc.”491 Priestley’s rhetoric is deeply grounded in 
Hartley’s theories. But, for Priestley, Hartley’s deterministic association is belied by the 
medium he assumes for rhetorical transmission: there is always a communication 
potential between bodies that cannot be fixed by a particular utterance. Hartley’s medium 
for transmission is Newton’s aether, which Hartley takes to both suffuse the nervous 
system and to linger about the body’s outer periphery. The aether is necessary for Hartley 
because he views bodies as solid and impassible; sympathetic movement is 
communication’s only feature. Vibrations emerge by means of “the mutual actions 
interceding between these three: the objects, nerves, and aether.”492 The limbs of animals, 
Hartley says, are moved “by the power and actions of a certain very subtle spirit,” which 
references this description from Newton’s Principia493: 
And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle spirit 
which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies, by the force and action of 	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which spirit the particles of bodies attract one another at near distances, 
and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, 
as well repelling as attracting the neighboring corpuscles; and light is 
emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected and heats bodies; and all sensation 
is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the 
will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit.494 
Hartley applies this principle to muscle contraction in Various Conjectures on the 
Perception, Motion, and Generation of Ideas (1746). He reasons that “the phenomena of 
electricity and elasticity, each in its own manner and degree, seemingly argue that certain 
reciprocal motions have a share in other natural phenomena,” like association; “So in 
exactly the same way, the obvious attractions of gravitation, cohesion, electricity and 
magnetism” probably “obtain in descending orders of particles composing bodies.”495 In 
other words, “vibrations descend along the nerves, just as along so many royal roads, 
towards the muscular fibers” as “an electrical virtue along hempen strings.”496 These 
vibrations “put into action that attractive virtue, perhaps of the electrical kind, which lies 
concealed in the particles of the [muscular] fibers.”497 And much like the hearts of frogs, 
which go on beating once excised from their bodies via “heat, pressure, and punctures,” 
the muscle pulls, the observer acts, and a new association (between this precise foment 
and one’s reaction, or “occasions” and “expressions”) forms.498 
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It sounds deterministic. Indeed, “A man may speak, handle, love, fear, &c. 
entirely by mechanism.”499 To read Hartley requires a questioning of the “will” that 
Newton mentions at the end of Principia, and that Hartley flags increasingly by the time 
he publishes Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749). 
Newtonian “will” provides a wrinkle for Hartley, a wrinkle which provides the opening 
for Priestley’s important development on the relationship between association and 
communication. Hartley engages will at the close of Conjectures: “matter and motion, 
however subtly divided, or reasoned upon, yield nothing more than matter and motion 
still.”500 Matter, “if it could be endued with the most simple kinds of sensation, might 
also arrive at the highest peak of the human intellect,” thus toppling “all those arguments 
which are brought for the immateriality of the soul from the subtlety of the internal 
senses and of the rational faculty.”501 But as “the theory no-ways determines whether 
matter can be endued with sensation,” that conjecture is disposed as “foreign to the 
purpose.”502 Hartley follows Newton, who also hedges his aether similarly, noting that 
the “mobile spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies,” above, “cannot be 
explained in few words, nor are we furnished with that sufficiency of experiments” to 
determine “the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates.”503 Hartley via 
Newton does not so much refute the agency of rhetor and audience so much as he 
sidesteps the question.   
The heart of the question is what commutes impulse (“sensation A, or idea B, or 
muscular motion C,” above) to volition (“sensation D, the idea d, the very idea E, or the 	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muscular motion F”) in Hartley’s Newtonian paradigm: is agency in the rhetor or the 
rhetoric? Building on Hobbes’ materialism, Priestley’s answer is matter, itself. As he says 
in the introduction to Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the 
Association of Ideas (1775, same year as the second edition of his History and Present 
State of Electricity [1767]), “I am rather inclined to think that…man does not consist of 
two principles, so essentially different from one another as matter and spirit…by means 
of which they can affect or act upon each other; the one occupying space, and the other 
not…insomuch that…my mind is no more, in my body, than it is in the moon.”504 In other 
words, Priestley adopts Hartley’s notion of communication via the sympathetic transfer 
of electrical impulses, but for him, the bodily and affective (pre-cognitive) nature of 
much of this transmission does not preclude the role of conscious manipulation of 
transmission for particular rhetorical ends. The conditions of possibility for transmission 
are (in a Newtonian sense) physical, but these are also the conditions of possibility for 
agentic manipulation of transmission, and the agentic framing of received content.  
To make his claim for the transmittance and sediment of vibrations between 
bodies, Hartley relies on the aether—the “electric and elastic spirit” that suffuses space, 
including “interstices” between particles of matter—rather than the matter, itself. 
Priestley identifies this as the limit of the Hartleian body; he offers association rather than 
sympathy as the dominant mode of rhetorical transmission: “upon feeling motions and 
figures, and passing over distances, the differences of vibrations from pressure and 
muscular contraction, i.e. from the vis inertiae of our own bodies, or of foreign matter, 
suggest to us the words expressing these…by association.”505 Priestley later characterizes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Priestley, Hartley, 23. 
505 Ibid., 51. 
	   146	  
vis inertiae in terms of matter’s “supposed necessary property of solidity, inertness, or 
sluggishness.”506 Hartley uses inertia to demarcate what, in an affective transaction, is 
one’s “own”—resulting in a sympathetic understanding of communication that can be 
explained entirely through essential bodily properties. Priestley pokes fun at this position: 
for him, inertia suggests the opposite of material sluggishness.  Inertia instead is the 
physical law that allows excited and interactive communication between bodies, moving 
in association with one another.  Inertia is the rhetorical situational constraint inherent to 
physical law that, rather than pointing to the rock-like nature of all matter, is instead the 
reason why bodies can successfully act to move one another. 
This move to incorporate associationism is more than what Priestley’s 
biographers and editors make of it—a move strictly to bridge cognition with rhetoric 
(although it is that). Priestley’s associationism also provides means to capture the inter-
penetrability of physical and spiritual realms, notions of free will and mechanistic 
determinism, and of association and electricity—as Priestley, like Hartley, uses electricity 
“as a clue and guide” to “other reciprocal motions and vibrations…in the production of 
natural phenomena.”507 The question of the penetrability of matter is central to Priestley’s 
revision of Hartley.   
 
6  ELECTRIFICATION BY COMMUNICATION  
 
In the section of Oratory that addresses “the Tendency of Strong Emotions to 
Produce Belief, and the Transferring of Passions from One Object to Another,” the reader 
glimpses the “conduct” of appeal by way of sensation:  	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all strong passions and emotions are liable to be transferred to indifferent 
objects, either related to the proper object, or those whose ideas are 
actually present to the mind, at the time that it is under the influence of 
such emotion or passion…Brute creatures, and even inanimate things, are 
not exempted from being, in this indirect manner, the objects of such 
human passions…508 
In such “seeming irregular sallies of passion,” a sudden charge, a sortie leaps in effect 
from one referent to another, carrying with it expression, at times “in the same 
indiscriminate manner.”509 For this reason, it is strategic for the rhetor to afford as many 
sensational and associational pathways as possible, and simultaneously, when aiming to 
install belief, leaving as much to the vivid imagination as possible.  
Such forms as these are most natural in great agitation of the mind, when 
the succession of ideas is uncommonly rapid, and when, consequently, it 
may be expected that some thoughts should interfere with others, and 
occasion frequent breaks in sentences, and interruptions in a chain of 
reasoning.510 
Yet, at the same time, “When an orator expresses himself in such a manner as to make his 
hearers believe he could say more, and when his known situation makes it probable that 
he might have sufficient reason for pushing his argument no further than he doth…in this 
case, the imagination of the hearer will never suggest too little.”511 The listener fills in the 
gaps, meeting the rhetor with what charges and concerns she already brings. 	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“Interruptions,” and digressions in one’s “chain of reasoning” work to the advantage of 
both communicators.  
Belief is bound up with the body’s substance. Immaterialism is a mistake that 
Priestley finds hard to forgive in the philosopher (even Hartley supposed an “infinitesimal 
elementary body” as “something of an intermediate between the soul and the gross 
body”), but harder to forgive of a devine.512 Scottish theologian Andrew Baxter offers 
dreams and inattention as evidence that the soul can detach from the body in living time.  
The following from his Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (1733) describes the 
mechanics of that detachment: 
Resistance is fundamental in the nature of matter, and this itself is the 
power of the immaterial cause, indefinitely impressed upon, and exerted 
in, every possible part of matter. And since without this, these least parts 
could not cohere at all, or make a solid, making resistance, it appears that 
the power of this cause thus incessantly put forth, through all its possible 
parts, is that which constitutes the solidity and resistance of 
matter…Without this foreign influence to effect cohesion, and solidity in 
it, we could not conceive it to be at all a substance.513  
In Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), Priestley deems Baxter “ablest 
defender of the strict immaterial system.”514 Like the system’s many proponents, Baxter’s 
argument hinges on two closely related suppositions abut matter; one, its “solidity and 
resistance” and two, the “foreign influence” requisite to afford that resistance, as well as 	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to spirit matter about. Priestley can see how the former supposition comes to pass: “I 
press my hand against the table on which I am writing, and finding that I cannot penetrate 
it, and that I cannot push my hand into the place which it occupies, without first pushing 
it out of its place, I conclude that this table, and by analogy, all matter, is impenetrable to 
other matter.”515 But Priestley draws a different conclusion from this evidence of basic 
experience: he argues that “the cause of all resistance is repulsive power, and in no case 
whatever the thing that we have hitherto improperly termed solid, or impenetrable 
matter”516—a conclusion that Priestley posits is not only intuitive, but also mechanically 
necessary to all manner of bodies coming into apparent contact. Rhetorical transmission 
is not the sympathetic vibration of mutually impenetrable bodies enacting brief changes 
to the ether; rather, it is the associated and interconnected movement of bodies connected 
through the physical laws of attraction and repulsion.   
Baxter, Hartley, and others argue that the “foreign influence” thought to supplant 
the missing source of motion from bodies is ascribed to “the effect of the immediate 
action of God,” comprising “an immense spring which is in continual action.”517 Priestley 
probes the “fallacy” of this “doctrine of the contagion of matter” by bringing religious 
and philosophical tenets into line.518 His argument goes something like this: the “foreign 
property” of matter is “in reality absolutely essential to its very nature and being”; once 
endued with “proper moving powers,” matter is not “incapable of intelligence, thought, or 
action”; thus self-propelling matter comprises both the finite and infinite mind.519  The 
rhetoric itself has its own agency—its own potential for movement and effectivity, after it 	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has left the rhetor, just like electricity moving between bodies. At the point of impact of 
the charge on a body, the originating point of the charge no longer has it—but because 
electricity/rhetoric is a circuit, effective persuasion occurs when the connection remains 
and the charge moves through rhetor and audience. 
Sans foreign property, Priestley argues, there must be a mechanical power in 
matter without which, even granting this quality of resistance, “every particle would fall 
from each other, and be dispersed.”520 This holds for both atoms and composite bodies: 
“some power, internal or external,” brings about organization, lest “the parts of which 
they are composed would…be resolved into smaller parts, and consequently (the smallest 
parts being resolved in the same manner) the whole substance must absolutely disappear, 
nothing at all being left for the imagination to fix upon.”521  
It will readily be allowed, that every body, as solid and impenetrable, must 
necessarily have some particular form and shape; but it is no less obvious, 
that no such figured thing can exist, unless the parts of which it consists 
have a mutual attraction, so as either to keep contiguous to, or preserve a 
certain distance from each other. This power of attraction, therefore, must 
be essential to the actual existence of all matter; since no substance can 
retain any form without it.522 
This relationship between matter’s “mutual attraction” and form figures richly into both 
Priestley’s work on electricity and on elocution.  The latter I take up in more detail in the 
next section, but electrical experiment comes into play within Disquisitions, and bears 
relation to his notion of agency (or volition) amid “mutual action.” Priestley poses such 	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questions through electrical and light experiment because “chemistry and electricity are 
both conversant about the latent and less obvious”—elsewhere in The History and 
Present State of Electricity, With Original Experiments, he calls them “occult”—
“properties of bodies.”523  
In the preface to Principia, considering the motion of the planets, Newton 
observes that attraction can operate between bodies at great distance from one another: “I 
am induced by many reasons to suspect that [this and like phenomena] may all depend 
upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies…are either mutually impelled 
towards one another and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one 
another” (Newton MPNP 1947 xviii). Priestley sets up the relationship between attraction 
and form a little differently, here: 
For that matter is not that inert substance that it has supposed to be; that 
powers of attraction or repulsion are necessary to its very being, and that 
no part of it appears to be impenetrable to other parts. I, therefore, define 
it to be the substance possessed of the property of extension, and the 
powers of attraction or repulsion.524 
“I naturally imagine that the obstacle to its going through the table is the solid matter of 
which it consists,” but in fact “it generally requires a much greater power of pressure than 
I can exert to bring my fingers into actual contact with the table.”525 The hand and table 
are separated by powers of repulsion inherent in each. Finally, “Electrical appearances 
show,” Priestley says, “that a considerable weight is requisite to bring into contact, even 
links of a chain hanging freely in the air; they being kept asunder by a repulsive power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Priestley, History, 474. 
524 Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, 2. 
525 Ibid., 17. 
	   152	  
belonging to a very small surface, so that they do not actually touch, though they are 
supported by each other.”526 He means to debunk first, the phenomenal “place of contact” 
that would imply material impenetrability, and second, the inconstancy of “mutual action 
between two bodies taking place at any given distance from their surfaces.”527 He 
concludes that all matter “is possessed of powers of attraction and repulsion, and of 
several spheres of them, one within another.”528 This argument “equally affects the 
smallest atoms, as the largest bodies that are composed of them.”529 The principle of 
attraction grounds Priestley’s turn from bodies acting in particulate forms to applying 
Newtonian mechanics to peoples’ bodies interacting (see rhetoric) in political systems. 
Most recently, Priestley inherits this notion of the spheres through Hartley, who 
notes the “close connection” of the properties of bodies depends upon “mutual actions of 
the small parts,” and through Hartley’s citation of (another clergyman) Stephen Hales’ 
work. In Statistical Essays: Containing Vegetable Staticks (1727), Hales explores the 
transubstantiation of sap particles. Of particular use is Hales’ focus on particles that move 
between sap (“their fluid vehicle”) and air (“a fine elastic fluid, with particles of very 
different natures floating in it”530)—moreso, on the active quality of that air in the 
transmutation.”531 Hales takes his cue from Newton’s Optics (1706): “Dense bodies by 
fermentation rarefy into several sorts of air; and this air by fermentation, and sometimes 
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without it, returns into dense bodies.”532 But Hales, odd though his conclusion is, focuses 
on the agentic property of air: “If all the parts of matter were only endued with a strongly 
attracting power, whole nature would then immediately become one unactive cohering 
lump” but for air, “a due proportion of strongly repelling elastick particles, which might 
enliven the whole mass, by the incessant action between them and the attracting 
particles.”533 The insinuation that particles of air can permeate bodies, oscillate between 
spheres of attraction and repulsion, and (as in the case of evaporating sap), disrupt the 
form that the body itself takes again recalls Newton: “God in the beginning form’d matter 
in solid, massy, hard impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and in 
such proportion to space” such that “the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only 
in the various separations and new associations and motions of these permanent 
particles.”534  Rhetorical agency is to be found in what small capacity humans have for 
manipulating the conditions of the ongoing and often tiny and imperceptible series of 
changes that occur between mutually associated, attractive, and repulsive bodies. 
Priestley, by 1767, is a devoted Franklinian. Although Priestley suggests in the 
introduction to his The History and Present State of Electricity not to go beyond the 
visible in describing experiments and outcomes—that is, not to speculate on competing 
theories of invisible “how’s”—Priestley gives several chapters of The History to 
Franklin’s new experiments. (It is also well known that they were friends.) Of particular 
interest is an experiment that Franklin adapts from the work of his teacher, Albrecht van 
Haller. Haller observes, “Whosoever shall approach his finger to the body of the person 	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thus electrised will cause a spark to issue from the surface, accompanied with a crackling 
noise and a sudden pain of which both parties are but too sensible.” 535 In Franklin’s 
rendition, 1) two people (A and B) stand on wax, one “rubbing a tube,” and the other 
“drawing the fire”; C, standing on the floor, approaching either “will perceive a spark on 
approaching each of them with his knuckle.” 2) If A and B touch while rubbing and 
drawing, there is no spark. 3) If they touch afterward, “there will be a stronger spark 
between them than there was between either of them and the person on the floor.” 4) 
Post-spark, none of the people are charged.536 
What Franklin supposes is that C, “receives a spark upon approaching B, who has 
an over quantity, but gives one to A, who has an under quantity”; between A and B “the 
spark is stronger; because the difference between them is greater. After such touch, there 
is no spark…because the electrical fire in all is reduced to the original quality.”537 
Franklin reflects, “It is now discovered and demonstrated…that the electrical fire is 
a…species of matter, not created by the friction, but collected only.”538 For a spark to 
form, one body need have “an over quality” of this “matter.” This excess, “lies without 
upon the surface” of the body, “and forms what we call an electrical atmosphere.”539 
Atmosphere—would-be “halo of electrical matter-in-motion”—draws shape from the 
body enclosed, and, arbitrating attraction and repulsion, can be “drawn off.”540 Priestley’s 
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phrasing suggests both what he finds compelling about Franklin’s conclusion, and with 
what he takes issue:  
If a conductor…be brought within the atmosphere, that is, the sphere of 
action, of any electrified body, it acquires the electricity opposite to that of 
the electrified body; and the nearer it is brought, the stronger opposite 
electricity doth it acquire; till the one receive a spark from the other, and 
then the electricity of both will be discharged.541 
Priestley offers, as to the particular current of “electric fluid,” “According to Dr. 
Franklin, it goes from my hand to the charged wire.”542 Priestley agrees with this—this 
phenomenon undergirds his theory of communication by electrification. But 
“atmosphere” is Franklin’s term, and concept—“sphere of action” is Priestley’s subtle, 
but pointed disagreement. 
 
7  THE BODY OF THE FISH 
 
In Heads of Lectures on a Course of Experimental Philosophy (1794), Priestley 
describes a “voluntary power” of shock, which insinuates Henry Cavendish’s (1731-
1810) electric torpedo, which Priestley visited, and touched:  
At least two kinds of fishes, the torpedo and the electrical eel, have a 
voluntary power of giving so strong a shock to the water in which they 
swim, as to affect fishes and other animals which come near them; and by 
a conducting communication between different parts of these fishes, an 
electric shock may be given exactly like that of the Leyden phial, which 	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will be described hereafter; and if the communication be interrupted, a 
flash of electric light will be perceived.543 
Cavendish had constructed an artificial torpedo “based on the anatomy and electricity of 
the fish,” in order to answer critics who claimed that no animal was electric “enough” to 
administer a tangible electrical shock.544 The artificial torpedo comprised “shaped pieces 
of thick leather like the ‘soles of shoes’ to represent the body,” and “thin plates of pewter 
to each side to imitate the electric organs.”545 On discharging Leyden phials through the 
torpedo, and drawing his hand to it, Cavendish found the shock 
very slight in fingers. 
only in hands, there seemed to be something wrong. 
brisk in elbows. 
brackish in elbows. 
Under water it was 
  just sensible in hands. 
  stronger. 
  pretty strong Do.546 
Jungnickel and McCormach explain that Cavendish thought it likely “that the electric fish 
contained something ‘analogous’ to the Leyden-jar battery,” but “he also considered that 
there might be no such thing,” and in that possibility, “that the electric fluid is not stored 
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but gradually transferred by a small ‘force’ through the substance and all over the surface 
of the body of the fish.”547  
The authors credit Cavendish with “anticipating” the Voltaic battery and the 
associated concept of electromotive force548—the agent that impels electric current 
through a circuit. Cavendish marks the far reach of the era of static electricity. As 
Jungnickel and McCormach suggest, his methods belong to 18th-century practitioners: 
Cavendish came to his conclusion about the torpedo entirely from 
scientific reasoning…The question of the nature of the torpedo was 
tantamount to a series of related, fundamental questions: what is 
electricity, how is it produced, how is it stored, how is it conducted, how is 
it manifested, and how is it conceived, manipulated, and measured?549 
By the time of Heads, Priestley has backed away from his electrical work in favor of his 
famous chemical experiments on fixed air and religious and theological writing. Here, 
Priestley is able to reflect on the far reach of static electricity and the animal body—on 
Cavendish, as well as Luigi Galvani and Alessandro Volta. He concludes with more 
certainty than Hartley could that “the influence of the brain and nerves upon the muscles 
seems to be of an electric nature.”550 Priestley recounts the then-big picture for the 
electric gesture: Galvani’s discovery that an animal limb may be stimulated through 
electric shocks, and that electricity can restore life.”551  
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But in Heads, Priestley retains his focus on the motions that communicate with an 
electric charge (“No electric can be excited without producing electric appearances in the 
body with which it is excited”552), and the line between so-called voluntary and 
involuntary motions. Rhetors, like the torpedo—as well as the reaching hands—are both 
agitators and vessels for communication, with bodily resources and constraints on their 
ability to control the building flow of persuasion. As with Franklin’s conclusion in the 
shock experiments, communication is never figurative: “Nothing enters if nothing can 
leave; nothing leaves if nothing cannot enter.”553 It is a return to slippery notions of affect 
and effect, “those forms of address which are peculiarly adapted to gain assent.” 
Priestley’s electric theory of rhetoric centers gesture in persuasion through first, 
establishing that the interactive perception of gesture is a pre-requisite to effective 
persuasion—to gain assent—and second, that pre-cognitive passions and emotions are 
vital for the durability, effectiveness, and range of rhetorical persuasion, meaning third, 
rhetorical agency is the subtle and controlled manipulation both of gesture and the mode 
of perceiving gesture. 
Finally, I return Priestley’s discovery regarding the force between charges relative 
to the distance between them; to notions of motive and agency in communication—of 
appeal forged in complement with the “receiving” body. Rhetors do not “excite prey to 
self-motion” so much as provide incentive that prompts them to continue to move 
themselves554—i.e. do not awaken hidden electricity so much as release it. Priestley’s 
rhetorical gesture is more centrifugal than Bulwer’s or Sheridan’s. It hinges on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
electricity,” and recommends this treatment to a friend. Joseph Priestley to Rev. R. Robins 
(Birmingham: Birmingham Library, January 7 1781).   
552 Priestley, Heads, 170. 
553 Heilbron, Electricity 331. 
554 Ibid., 313. 
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persuasive potential latent in the conductive possibility between particular bodies.  
Rhetorical gesture at once creates conditions of possibility, recognizes their existence, 
and fosters/guides them into particular forms.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE RHETOR IN THE SPHERE: GESTURE AND CLIMATE IN GILBERT 
AUSTIN’S CHIRONOMIA 
 
 
1  THE LITTLE ICE AGE 
 
In The Art of Speaking (1768), James Burgh (1714-1775) points out a problem at 
the pulpit. Clergy, he says, complain of constituents “dozing,” or even falling into 
“profound sleep.”555 Burgh: “I happened lately to hear the tenth chapter of Joshua read in 
a church in the country,” he begins.556 It is a chapter wrought with miracles and conquest. 
“Particularly I shall never forget [the preacher’s] manner of expressing the twenty-second 
verse”: “‘Open the mouth of the cave, and bring out those five kings’” (the excitement 
begins) “which he uttered in the very manner, he would have expressed himself, as if he 
had said to his boy, ‘Open my chamber door, and bring me my slippers from under the 
bed.’”557 The constituency, as much as the preacher lately appears “wood or stone,” “cold 
and dead”—hands “pocketed up”; arms “hang by his sides as lank as if they were both 
withered”; head “fixed, as if the speaker had a perpetual crick in his neck”; eyes “cast 
down upon the ground, as if…receiving sentence of death.”558 Burgh attributes the 
sluggishness to “a total want of energy” in the delivery.559 Part of the culprit is the pulpit 
itself, big and stocky, which obscures the body, presenting something of a talking head, 
“as Milton describes the Sun upon the orient wave.”560 The bigger problem is the 
speaker’s temperament—less as it is seen than as it is felt—with “coolness and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Burgh, The Art of Speaking, 34. 
556 Ibid., 11. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid., 35, 44, 31.  
559 Ibid., 11. 
560 Ibid., 32. 
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indifference.”561 One Spectator writer captures this temperament, describing “speaking 
statues” that haunt churches: “Our preachers stand stock-still in the pulpit, and will not so 
much as move a finger…We can talk of life and death in cold blood, and keep our temper 
in a discourse, which turns upon everything that is dear to us.”562  
Parishioners are lulled on their velvet cushions by this “murder” of “elegant 
discourse”—which Burgh (like Sheridan and others) considers to be a particularly 
national interaction.563 Even Burgh does not assert that the pulpit is a place for gesture, 
per se, so much as for “appropriate attitude.”564 The notion that gesture does not befit 
British orators (most especially those at the pulpit) in part owes to assumptions about 
climate-born temperament, as described by Galen in terms of humoral mixture, and 
propagated by DuBos (1670-1742), Montesquieu (1689-1755) and others. I contend that 
in larger part, the temerity about gesture owes to dated notions of energy, and the means 
to preserve bodily heat.565 The ground for the assumptive relationship between climate 
and the appropriateness and effectiveness of physically animated oratory pre-dates 
thermometry, as Hasler, for example, in De Logistica Medica (1578) argues that body 
temperature accords with latitude, such that “Dwellers of the tropics were warm to the 4th 
degree while the Eskimos were cold to the 4th degree.”566 But even after thermometry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Ibid., 34. 
562 Anon., “Pronuntiatio est Vocis et Vultus et Gestus moderatio cum Venustate,” Spectator, ed. 
Steele, Joshua (18 August 1711). 
563 Burgh, The Art of Speaking, 33. 
564 Although Burgh does suggest that “the sagacious Roman Catholics” keep up their numbers as 
well as “please, entertain, and strike” through copious use of gesture (ibid., 46). 
565 The term “energy” not coined by Thomas Young until 1807 (one year after Chironomia’s 
publication).  
566 Ingo Müller, A History of Thermodynamics: The Doctrine of Energy and Empathy (New York: 
Springer Publishing, 2010), 2. As Müller notes, the development and intervention of the 
thermometer in this sort of assumption are well documented in W. E. Knowles Middleton’s A 
History of the Thermometer and Its Uses in Meteorology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). 
Müller keys in on the etymology for “temperature”—and thus, it seems, the operative principle 
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proves the contrary, DuBos maintains in Critical Reflections (1719) that “the character of 
our minds and inclinations depends very much on the quality of our blood,” while “the 
quality of our blood depends vastly on the air we breathe,” such that “people who dwell 
in different climates differ so much in sprit and inclinations.”567 According to this 
variance, “some countries have, generally speaking, a greater variation in their tone of 
voice, employ acuter and more frequent accents in their pronunciation, and are more 
active in their gesture than others.”568 The bias toward “temperate” climes and thus 
actions is perhaps plainest in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748): “The heat of 
the climate can be so excessive that the body there will be absolutely without strength. 
So, prostration will pass even to the spirit; no curiosity, no noble enterprise, no generous 
sentiment; inclinations will all be passive there.”569 
Fagan observes that “environmental determinism” is still a dirty word among 
historians—“You certainly cannot argue that climate drove history in a direct and 
causative way”—and that the stigma attached to such determinism keeps scholars from 
assessing aspects of human being and climate that in fact seem to respond to and shape 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for climatically-determined gestures—noting that “Temperature—also temperament” comes from 
“temperare—to mix. It was mostly used when liquids are mixed which cannot afterwards be 
separated, like wine and water. The passive voice is employed—the ‘—tur’ of the present tense, 
third person singular—which indicates that some liquid is being mixed with another one” (Müller, 
Thermodynamics 1). 
567 Abbé DuBos, Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music. With an Inquiry into the 
Rise and Progress of the Theatrical Entertainments of the Ancients Vol. 1, 1719, 5th ed. (London: 
John Nurse, 1768), 177-78.  
568 Abbé DuBos, Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music. With an Inquiry into the 
Rise and Progress of the Theatrical Entertainments of the Ancients Vol. 2, 1719, 5th ed. (London: 
John Nurse, 1768), 348. Following this logic, and the apparent chill in English blood, DuBos says 
“An Englishman, against whom sentence of death is pronounced, appears with less agitation than 
an Italian condemned to a small pecuniary fine” (ibid). 
569 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748, eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and 
Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 234. 
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one another.570 Fagan, rather, asserts that human relationships to the environment “have 
always been in a complex state of flux. To ignore them is to neglect one of the dynamic 
backdrops of the human experience.”571 In this spirit, I would like to return to the 
question of the British gesture at the turn of the nineteenth century, not as an in-born 
quality of blood but as purveyor of a different kind of rhetorical heat. As we have seen 
(Chapter 2), Hume moves away from the climatically-formed action by claiming that 
gestures infect “knots of companions” through proximity, not place—“sympathy or 
contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate.”572 Several Elocutionists 
follow suit. But the buy-in to temperature-derived action outlives its supposed scientific 
veracity through what Burgh and others call “custom.”573 Burgh, Walker, and many 
others advise that the decorous, phlegmatic gesture is enough for England—and not only 
effective enough, but also most appropriate for demure and rational British audiences 
“where there are so many so capable of judging.”574  
Against conventional wisdom on the imprudence of inflammatory public 
gesture—especially at the pulpit—Gilbert Austin (1753-1847), who is also a clergyman, 
makes an argument for gesture as means to energy transfer. Austin’s “acclimatizing” 
system of gesture is contingent on the dynamic inter-relationships of heat, motion, and 
bodies as reconceived in the late eighteenth-century, a model that posits a “kinetic” rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Brian Fagan, Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History, 1300 to 1850 (New York: Perseus 
Publishing, 2000), xiv. 
571 Ibid.,  xv. 
572 David Hume, “Of National Characters,” 1748, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects 
Vol. 1. (Basil: J. J. Tourneisen, 1793), 218, 220. Resonances of manner are imitation-based: “the 
human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often 
together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices 
as well as their virtues” (ibid., 218). 
573 Burgh, The Art of Speaking, 46.  
574 Ibid. 
	   164	  
than effluvial model of heat. I argue that examining this system not only re-captures the 
use of British rhetorical gesture in Austin’s time, but also provides occasion to consider 
the absence of talk of work, energy, and entropy in current models of gesture.  
Austin’s gesture is timely given its coincidence with the coldest period of the 
“Little Ice Age.”575 The Little Ice Age extended from roughly the sixteenth through 
nineteenth centuries, through what Fagan calls “a zigzag of climate shifts, few lasting 
more than a quarter century,” characterized by “cycles of intensely cold winters and 
easterly winds, then switched abruptly to years of heavy spring and early summer rains, 
mild winters, and frequent Atlantic storms.”576 1805 to 1820 marked the coldest years of 
the period for most Europeans, but the roughly the first half of the eighteenth century was 
a close second.577 This phase was particularly acute in Ireland, where Austin wrote and 
published Chironomia in 1806. 
 
2  THE RHETOR IN THE SPHERE 
 
Chironomia is perhaps best remembered for Austin’s Figure 18: the rhetor in the 
sphere (Figure 5). Stood on a couple of steps, right foot a little before the left, the rhetor’s 
right arm extends and fingers spread. His left arm hangs near his side at a forty-five 
degree angle from the straight of his waistcoat. Palms face us. The sphere is about twice 
the rhetor’s height and resembles a globe, boasting equator, two approximate tropics and 
several longitudinal lines. Austin even borrows for it topographic vocabulary, referring in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Fagan, The Little Ice Age, 170. The term “Little Ice Age” is coined by Francois Matthes in 
Transactions of the American Geophysical Union (1939); the date parameters are much disputed, 
but last roughly three to five centuries, characterized by cycles of intense cooling and heating due 
to “glacial advancing” (see “Climatic and Natural Events” figure in Fagan’s front matter for 
rough temperature fluctuations).  
576 Ibid., xiii. 
577 Ibid., 132, 170.  
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his chapter on arm positions to hemispheres, horizons, elevations, and latitude. “The 
human figure being supposed to be so placed within this sphere,” Austin explains, “that 
the centre of the breast shall coincide with its centre, and that the diameter of the 
horizontal circle perpendicular to a radius drawn to the projecting point, shall pass 
through the shoulders, the positions and motions of the arms are referred to, and 
determined by these circles and their intersections.”578 The rhetor seems sufficiently 
immured. One might suppose (as would become the popular criticism leveled at Austin) 
that he is being overly meticulous, and determining. One might also suspect Austin is 
nervous about something—that he has, in effect, put the rhetor in there for his own good. 
For all that Austin would stay the rhetor, he also means to unleash her. Like 
rhetoricians before him, Austin links gesture to the arousal of passion in audience, and 
the arousal of audience passion to belief. But rhetorical strategy, for Austin, becomes a 
matter of distributing rhetorical heat through gesture. The British rhetor and auditor are 
cool to the point of being disengaged. If Austin can heat them up, he thinks, he can rivet 
them (or precisely un-rivet them). But, as a preacher especially, he has to be careful. 
Passion unleashed is notoriously devious, and hard to call back. If a reasonable soul is “a 
calm sea, with sweet, pleasant, and rippling streams,” the passionate one is “the raging 
gulf, swelling with waves, surging by tempests, mining the stony rocks, and endeavoring 
to overthrow the mountains.”579 No one wants to lose a rhetor, or a parishioner, to the 
storm. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Gilbert Austin, Chironomia: Or, a Treatise for Rhetorical Delivery, 1806, eds. Mary Margaret 
Robb and Lester Thonssen (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1966), 310. 
579 Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde (London: Printed by Valentine Simmers for 
Walter Burre, 1601), 59. 
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Austin’s stated objectives for Chironomia are 1) to describe a system of delivery 
that ensures orderly, reasonable communication between subjects; and 2) in a world 
without video, to “capture” action in order to replicate it. Just under the surface, however, 
Chironomia gives us an extensive theoretical account of gesture’s weathering effect on 
bodies. For Austin, the effect is more than metaphor. His theory has much to do with 
Britain’s climate, and what by the late-seventeenth century was a national fascination not 
with its measurement and predictability—both possibilities made by the development and 
circulation of thermometers and barometers—but also with its ultimate uncontrollability, 
and the effects of its extremes as the Little Ice Age drew near its end. Below, I explore 
aspects of Austin’s rhetoric in relation to Britain’s then climate, and popular perceptions 
of it. The first segment looks at Austin’s depiction of a cold country with potential energy 
for eloquence. The second section takes up the relationship of gesture to energy, and the 
final section addresses Austin’s notational system as means to capture the warmth of 
motion, and to increase popular participation in that conservation effort. 
 
3  RHETORICAL CLIMATE 
 
The holy gesture is particularly taboo for reasons that John Henley (1692-1756) 
elaborates in An Essay Upon Pronunciation and Gesture (1750). This gesture betrays “a 
fantastical humour”—madness; labor; “fanatical superstition”; and impurity.580 Gesture 
opposed clergy declare “Action is unworthy of their Ministry…a scandalous Thing for 
those God hath honored with so serious and sublime a Function, to be studying, in the 
very Exercise of it, how to frame their Voice and move their Body, when they should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 John Henley, An Essay Upon Pronunciation and Gesture, Founded Upon the Best Rules and 
Authorities of the Ancients, Ecclesiastical and Civil, and Adorned With the Finest Rules of 
Elocution (London: C. Hitch, 1750): 10-11. 
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think of nothing but his Glory.”581 To win souls by gesture—“all the little Fopperies of 
Motion”—is “to sink Religion into Sense, and to make that which is spiritual depend 
upon carnal Worship, human Intervention, and external Fluorish.”582 Henley counters 
that good delivery reveals natural or supernatural grace: “God Almighty having made the 
Body of such a movable Mein, and of such Members as dispose it for Motion, that it ought 
to move sometimes, either as the Soul directs, or as the Body itself requires.”583 As such, 
gesture taps the auditor’s intellect: “when a man is hearing a sermon, he desires mightily 
to see the Face of the Preacher; and if his Pew deprives him of that Happiness, he goes 
Home with less Satisfaction.”584 It is also means by which to suffuse “passionate 
Rapture” across hearers.585  
But Henley’s own argument suggests another objection to the divine gesture: it 
promotes enthusiasm—a certain temperamental susceptibility. This susceptibility (or the 
fear, at large, of promoting irrationality through gesture) is evident not only in the many 
approbations to preachers to contain their gestures, but in descriptions of the 
contamination of imagination through heat. Such bodily contamination is evident in John 
Phelps’ (dates) The Human Barometer (1743), the subject of which “is the Influence of 
the Atmosphere upon the Human Frame, according to the Differences of its Gravity or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Ibid., 11. 
582 Ibid., 12. 
583 Ibid., 143. The argument for increasing gesture in the face of national temperament is little 
precedented before Austin. In Henley’s case, the call is not exceptionally well received given 
Henley’s reputation for Methodism, showmanship and spectacle; as Pope addressed him, “good 
old Stage Preacher at once and Zany of thy age.” Alexander Pope, “The Dunciad,” in The Poems 
of Alexander Pope, Vol. V.,  ed. James Sutherland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), 
175. 
584 Henley, Pronunciation and Gesture, 137.  
585 Ibid., 152. E.g. A famous preacher speaking on “the growing Vices  of his Parish…fell a-
weeping bitterly,” and called out “with a most feeling and pitiful Voice, And if thou forsake us, 
Good God! What will become of us?” which “brought all his Hearers to the same…Tenderness 
and Tears, if not also to a better Sense of their Duty; so mightily were they mov’d with the Tone 
and the Gesture that accompanied those languishing expressions.” 
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Lightness, heat or Cold, Dryness or Moisture, as these Effects are produced by various 
Seasons” or “the various Accidental Alterations that occur” by way of human 
interference. Phelps lands on another spectacular preacher to make his case for the 
propagation of too much heat with gesture:  
There mounted on his Tripod Whitfield stands, 
Silence and Awe canonick Garb commands, 
With Arms extended see he apes Saint Paul, 
And counts his own an Apostolick call, 
Gesture and Voice betray the heated Brain 
In Groans his Converts echo back again, 
And Souls impress’d with Thoughts of Grace, or Sin, 
Expectorate their Sense in solemn Din. 
These of enthusiastick Tranports boast, 
But are to Argument and Reason lost. 586 
Phelps lingers on the reverberation—and crescendo—of this heat-via-gesture between 
orator and auditor. “Enthusiastick transports” capitulate sense to frenzy. Even more 
revealing of this bodily susceptibility is Phelps’ footnote here, which qualifies “Solemn 
Din”: “whenever this notable Divine thinks fit to put a more than ordinary Emphasis 
upon a Sentence, or to express himself with a greater Degree of Warmth or Pathos than 
usual, one or other of the more Zealous Kind of Auditors, as a Sign of being uncommonly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
586 John Phelps, The Human Barometer: Or, Living Weather-Glass (London: M. Cooper, 1743), 
7. 
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affected, vents his inward Emotion in a deep hollow groaning Sound, which spreads itself 
immediately amongst the Crowd, and produces an universal Hum.”587 
Rhetorical heat is depicted as conflagrable “thing.” The Human Barometer 
illustrates some of the assumptions that Austin contravenes in favor of his theory and 
practice of rhetorical transmission and conservation via and in terms of heat, like the 
contiguity between air and blood: “Fermented Air too much our Blood exhales / Clogs 
Natures Wheels, its usual Vigour fails / Just in Proportion fares it with the Mind / 
Invention low, and Judgment weak we find.”588 Here we see the internal flame that was 
doused or fueled by that interaction; and the risk to the rhetor of engaging the body’s 
“senseless Matter”: “To kindle in the Veins a feverish Fire / Convulsive Nerves unhinge 
the inward Frame / Disturb the Judgment and the mind inflame / Capricious Fancy seizes 
Reason’s Throne / And holds the Province due to that alone.”589 Bodily inclinations, 
including gestures, are like a flame’s. Thomas Willis (1621-1675) describes these 
inclinations as “continually renewed almost every moment,” as certain parts “are 
consumed by burning, and fly away.”590 Hermann Boerhaave (1688-1738) calls fire the 
instrument of all motion, noting that if man were “entirely destitute of heat he would 
immediately freeze into a statue.”591 Fire is described in chemical terms: a heap of subtle 
contiguous particles, existing in a swift motion, with continued generation of some, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 Ibid., 21, emphasis added. I am tempted to add a footnote about academic conferences here. 
588 Ibid., 19. 
589 Ibid., 15, 19. On the soul being fiery in both act and substance, before Pierre Gassendi (1592-
1655), Democritus, Epicurus, Lucritius, Hippocrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and Galen 
“shook hands.” Thomas Willis, Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of Brutes, tr. Samuel 
Portage (London: JBT Dring, 1681), 45. 
590 Willis, Brutes, 29. Willis follows Gassendi in conceiving of heat as distinct, particulate matter.  
591 Hermann Boerhaave, The Elements of Chemistry, 1724, tr. Philip Miller for The Gardeners 
Dictionary (London: John and Francis Rivington, 1768).  
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renewed by the falling off of others. This fiery body continually seeks, incorporates, 
sloughs off, then again “inspires” nutrient.  
The consumptive aspect of this fire applied to rhetorical delivery is illustrated not 
only in cautionary tales like The Human Barometer, but also in elocution’s proponents, 
like Burgh, who says that true eloquence “ravishes” those “who are within its reach”: 
“The hearer finds himself as unable to resist, as to blow out a conflagration with the 
breath of his mouth, or to stop the stream of a river with his hand.”592 Austin represents a 
shift in the depiction of rhetorical heat from containable matter to heat as rhetorical 
process—one which might be practiced, cultivated, and interrupted. This shift introduces 
into theories of rhetorical delivery concepts like atmosphere, temperature, conservation, 
and work. I argue that Austin’s theory of gestural effect posits persuasion metaphorically 
and literally as a function of rhetorical climate. Austin depicted Britain as a cold country, 
in desperate need of infusing its oratory with heat. Like Priestley, Austin understands 
rhetorical persuasion to be an inertial process of influence transferred across and through 
bodies. I examine what Austin takes to be the logistics of the infusion of rhetorical effect 
between rhetors. If rhetoric is a process of energy transfer, then ethical and effective 
rhetorical practice should conserve heat.  
 
4  CONSERVATIVE PERSUASIONS 
 
“The paucity of orators in the fertile and magnificent field of religious discourses, 
particularly in Great Britain and Ireland,” Austin says owes to “the beaten path”—that is, 
“the custom of reading the sermons, which has obtained exclusively in the church of 
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England.”593 Preachers are still. “Fashion has bound up in chains of ice, the warmth and 
the eloquence of our country.”594 
Joseph Black’s (1728-1799) “discovery” of latent heat marks an important step 
away from the transmission of rhetorical fire described by Willis, Burgh, and others, 
which is consumptive and concrete. In Glasgow, a student of William Cullen’s, Black 
experiments on melting snow, describing Boerhaave’s “heat in matter” as “a demand 
which I cannot satisfy entirely.”595 For example, he says, “if we take 1000, or more, 
different kinds of matter, such as metals, stones, salts, woods, cork, feathers, wool, water 
and variety of other fluids, although they be all at first of different heats, let them be 
place together in the same room without a fire, and into which the sun does not shine, the 
heat will be communicated from the hotter of these bodies to the colder, during some 
hours perhaps…at the end of which time, if we apply a thermometer to them all in 
succession, it will point to exactly the same degree.”596 Similarly, Black observes that at 
the turn of spring, “the masses of ice or snow melt with a very slow progress, and require 
a long time.”597 The “vulgar opinion,” Black says, is that hot bodies “lose something” 
when communicating heat.598 But Black concludes that “the quantity of heat” and “its 
general strength or intensity” are different things. The latter is measurable by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 Austin, Chironomia, 232. Quoting Sheridan: “And this [total suppression of tones, looks, and 
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England...To be pleased, we must feel, and we are pleased with feeling. The Presbyterians are 
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temperature; the former he calls “latent” heat: “If, for example, we have one pound of 
water in one vessel, and two pounds in another, and these two quantities of water are 
equally hot…the two pounds must contain twice the quantity of heat that is contained in 
one pound.”599 Black holds that bodies in contact will reach the same heat intensity, and 
that heat is not “produced” and does not disappear in such interaction.  
Like Priestley, Austin views the rhetorical transfer of ideas and passions as a 
bodily process that yields in part to agentic control and manipulation. Austin, in a sense, 
sees gestures as “state changes.” The British will have to work hard to gesture, in part 
because subtle movements and keeping extremities near the body’s core conserves heat 
(one can imagine how that physiological necessity might quick morph into decorum), 
which would have been critical to everyday life in the Little Ice Age. Austin encourages 
the British to grow their gestures, in part, because the warmth the rhetor generates will 
come back to her, understood both as individual and representative of the body politic.  
While Austin’s warrant essentialists along familiar lines, it is less about rhetorical 
capacity as a determinative function of certain bodies, and much more about the 
relationship between rhetorical capacity and rhetorical constraints (to “weatherize” 
Bitzer) that inhere differently in different rhetorical climates. The British, Austin says, 
“require only attention to the single point of delivery to place their talents upon equal 
terms with all the excellence of antiquity. The want of this attention chills the ardour, and 
weakens the splendour of their compositions; whereas, the very purpose of animated 
delivery would warm and excite them.”600 At stake is the sphere of one’s influence, the 
loss of one’s listener (and her potential conviction) to the cold. Britain’s rhetor keeps her 	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gestures tighter and smaller, or leaves them off altogether, Austin suggests, his rhetoric 
suffers the same shorter reach. That is, a smaller sphere of effect and shallower 
impression on those touched. The British will “continue to be mere reasoners, or 
generally something less” if people do not commit to moving one another.601  
The connection that Austin makes between heat and gesture is vindicated in the 
experiments Count Graf Van Rumford (née Benjamin Thompson, 1753-1814), who 
makes the decisive break from the caloric (fluid) model of heat and is credited for the 
kinetic theory of heat that gains ground in the late eighteenth century.602 The bearing of 
this experiment on a theory of gestural heat will become quickly clear. Superintending 
“the boring of cannon” in Munich, Rumford notes “I was struck with the very 
considerable degree of heat which a bras gun acquires, in a short time, in being bored; 
and with the still more intense heat…of the metallic chips separated from it by the 
borer.”603 To explore this phenomenon, Rumford devised a contraption comprising a 
cannon, a boring cylinder, and “for the express purpose of generating heat by friction” a 
force of horses.604 When the horses moved, the borer was shoved against the cylinder. 
Rumford found that after 960 revolutions around its axis, the temperature of the cylinder 
had risen from 60°F (air temperature) to 130°F. He then amassed an audience, submerged 
the cylinder and bore in a massive tub of water, and as the horses walked their 
revolutions around the contraption, brought the water to a boil: “at 2 hours 30 minutes,” 	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Rumford writes in his report to the Royal Society, “it [the water] ACTUALLY BOILED! 
It would be difficult to describe the surprise and astonishment expressed in the 
countenances of the by-standers, on seeing so large a quantity of cold water heated, and 
actually made to boil, without any fire.”605 “What is heat?—Is there any such thing as an 
igneous fluid?”606 Rumford asks. “The source of the heat generated by friction, in these 
experiments, appeared evidently to be inexhaustible”: 
It is hardly necessary to add, that any thing which any insulated body, or 
system of bodies, can continue to furnish without limitation, cannot 
possibly be a material substance: and it appears to me to be extremely 
difficult, if not quite impossible, to form any distinct idea of any thing, 
capable of being excited, and communicated, in the manner the heat was 
excited and communicated, in these experiments, except it be 
MOTION.607  
Austin recommends the incorporation, or embodiment of appeals in such as way 
as to infuse them through motion. May there not be “some kind of gesture suited to the 
gravity of our manners, and the nature of our habits, that shall not shock by affectation, 
nor yet suffer admirable compositions”?608 He elaborates: “the cool, the solid, and the 
cultivated understanding of the British speaker, under the direction of rational principles, 
and roused into energy on great and interesting occasions, is capable, as well in action as 
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in composition, of all that is graceful and persuasive, and even on all the energetic and 
irresistible powers of delivery.”609  
A slight movement of the head, a look of the eye, a turn of the hand, a 
judicious pause or interruption of gesture, or a change of position in the 
feet often illuminates the meaning of a passage, and sends it full of light 
and warmth into the understanding…the whole powers of the man must be 
wrought up to their highest energy, or they become…frigid.610 
The sole answer “the reproach of frigid indifference which is charged against our 
public speakers,” Austin theorizes, is literally to heat up the local atmosphere through 
motion.611 
 
5  DEAD WATER AND THE RAGING SEA  
 
An English diarist in 1703 describes rain as “a soothing Anodyne to my 
perplexing vexations, and strikes unison to my constitution and falls in pat with my 
humour.”612 The diarist goes on to call it “weather as chiefly settles the fibres of the brain 
and ideas even.”613 This description is consonant with eighteenth century accounts that 
depict the climate and human body as existing in a kind of symbiosis.614 Rain is not only 
seen as a health benefit in terms of vapors and humors by physicians and others at the 
time, but it is also associated with fertilization and fecundity, with agricultural 
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productivity, and economic stability.615 With this connotation, Austin says that if rhetor’s 
delivery be “dry”—characterized by “mean gestures, constrained motions, rigidity of the 
joints, and stiffness of the body with short steps and doubtful or timid movements”—not 
only will his message probably fail to take hold, but he will come up bereft of subsequent 
inspiration, as well. “If his manner of speaking be confined to mere dry dissertation, he 
will proceed coldly and uniformly throughout; but if his argument be maintained by 
rhetorical ornament and illustration; and if he appeal to the passions of his audience, he 
will himself be excited, and the interest he feels, however rapidly he may proceed, will 
discover itself in each different period in the following order”616: eyes, then gesture, then 
utterance. The opposite of varied gesture, Austin says, and quick physical adaptation to 
context, is “barrenness.”617 Thus his is a very specific and localized charge to the 
inhabitants of the British islands: “Eloquence of the highest character ought, therefore, it 
should seem, to be the abundant produce of such a soil.”618 
Physical and mental health and the material environment through which the 
individual moved were taken at this time to be very much bound up. The same diarist 
speaks of rain discomposing him, the summer humidity that “made me feint and almost 
swoon and even wasted me to [failure of spirit],” and of rainy October giving him a 
melancholy genius. He goes on to say that the weather “chiefly settles the fibres of the 
brain and ideas even” and that the atmosphere quite literally descends into his soul. While 
Austin does not, of course, make the argument that one can by her gestures invoke 
weather patterns—like you shake a fist and the clouds change—he does seem to suggest 	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that you transform the air by how you move, and that rhetorical energy communicates 
between bodies through that transformation—not unlike Priestley’s theory of extra-
sympathetic transmission. As noted with Hawse, Austin takes rhetorical energy to change 
the constitution of bodies on both sides of a rhetorical exchange. Sentiments, he says, are 
conveyed “warm” from the rhetor’s body to the body of the listener, such that both the 
heat and engagement with subject at hand are preserved. But again, Austin emphasizes, 
the hand has to be positioned just so, the angle just right if one is to keep oneself and 
one’s auditor in the narrow between dead water and raging sea. That exigence—the 
body’s own barometer-like sensitivity to rhetorical climate—is shown in Phelps’ The 
Human Barometer. While “The pois’d Barometer will sink or rise / In Mode proportion’d 
to the changing Skies,” 
Th’ incumbent Air is Circulation’s Spring, 
And changes various as its Weight will bring; 
The Air serene, from Clouds and Vapours clear, 
Not burnt with Heat, nor chill’d with Cold severe; 
Adjusts the Motion of the circling Blood, 
The Pulse beats right, the Circulation’s good; 
Vapours and Storms aerial Weight abate, 
Our Blood runs low, and languid is our State, 
If Cold or Heat prevail to great Excess, 
More than we ought, we then perspire less, 
Our passive Body Alterations finds, 
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And with our Bodies sympathize our Minds.619 
Austin wants to help his reader navigate this narrow between dead water and the sea of 
“excess.”620 Bodies will respond to and condition rhetorical climes: “All the strong 
passions of the mind do indeed communicate themselves so suddenly and irresistibly to 
the body, that vehement gesticulations can hardly be avoided…Thus anger threatens, 
affright starts, joy laughs and dances.”621 Again, the language of infection: “And if a 
public speaker, conscious of his own deficiency, should be contented to relinquish the 
honour of aspiring to the name of an orator, he must carefully guard himself against 
manifesting any emotion of the mind, and limit his efforts to dry expositions and frigid 
reasonings” (138). Otherwise, Austin’s rhetorical gesture sweeps whole bodies—that is, 
it is not restricted to distant corners (as Bulwer’s sometimes is): “The parts of the human 
figure which are brought into action in gesture, cannot, in truth, be considered separate: 
for every muscle, every nerve, over which men can exercise voluntary action, contributes 
in some measure to the perfection of gesture. [The most distinguished parts of the body 
which effect the principal gestures] are: 1. The head. 2. The shoulders. 3. The trunk or 
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body. 4. The arms. 5. The hands and fingers. 6. The lower limbs and knees. 7. The 
feet.”622 
Austin advocates that heat is learnable—processual—pointing to plants that best 
climate-imposed limitations to growth as advertisement for British gesture. “There may 
possibly be nations whose livelier feeling incline them to more gesticulation than is 
common among us.”623 “There are also countries,” he says, “in which plants of excellent 
use to man grow spontaneously.”624 Gestures also grow: “these [plants that grow 
spontaneously in southern climes], by care and culture, are found to thrive also in colder 
countries.”625  
 
6  ATMOSPHERE 
 
Ludovicus Cresollius tells the story of Demosthenes’ gift of tears. The most 
celebrated orators, Cresollius says, and Austin recounts (he draws frequently on the 
ancients to elaborate his theory), “used formerly to shed tears in their pleadings.”626 But 
Demosthenes, “the light of Greece,” perfected it. He “made this such an established and 
regular custom, that he seemed by it alone to gain his causes, and to raise the trophies of 
his victorious eloquence in the theatre of Athens.”627 To explore how it is that emotion 
manifest, like tears, so readily moves between rhetor and audience—and so toward 
answering the larger question, as to how it is that energy can communicate between 
bodies during rhetorical exchange—Austin consults Pliny the Elder, who says eyes are 
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“savage, fierce, flaming,” and “burn.”628 “Whence is drawn that moisture, in grief so 
abundant, and so quickly furnished, or where at other times does it remain?” Then, “the 
eyes, like appropriate vessels, receive and transmit to [the mind] the visible particles.”629 
Austin extrapolates that eyes feel. That is, they seem to receive affectations outwardly 
and in-fold them:  “The whole person seems to be in some measure affected by this 
influence of another’s eyes,” Austin says, “but the eyes themselves feel it with the most 
lively sensibility.”630  
Austin suggests that eyes can affect co-directionally as speech acts progress—a 
kind of feedback loop between speaker and hearer that generates kinesis, in this example, 
at both ends (as opposed to a dissemination model, which would read more like the 
speaker projecting his or her sentiment, which the audience unilaterally absorbs). The 
notion of rhetorical climates thus circles back to the question of capacity explored in 
Chapters 1 and 3. What I argue should be thought of as a rhetorical microclimate is thus 
ultimately co-produced and circulated with the seer, rooted in the motions of both rather 
than solely the rhetor’s mind (Figure 6). “We seem to have the power, as it were,” Austin 
says, “of touching each other by the sense of sight.”631 Then, returning for a moment to 
the rhetor’s sphere of practice, “The line of the direction of the axis of the eye, however 
invisible and imaginary, seems as if in effect it could be seen, and that in every instance 
throughout a great assembly, crossing and radiating in a thousand directions from the 
centre of every orb of sight.”632  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 Ibid., 117. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid., 101. 
631 Ibid., 102. 
632 Ibid. 
	   181	  
 “Of the Countenance” chapter illustrates the susceptibility of the body to the 
motions of others. Here Austin addresses the face, and what the eyes, brow, lips and 
cheeks indelibly express. Quintilian he quotes on the matter: “upon the countenance the 
hearers depend, and into it they examine before the speaker opens his lips, the 
countenance is the object of approbation or dislike, it gives a deeper knowledge of the 
speaker’s sentiments than his words, and often says more than the language can 
express.”633 Austin piggybacks on this, drawing our attention to the importance of 
backing words with visible sentiment to ensure harmony of language and action (“ionic” 
vectors): “Hence it appears that the orator who would move others, must appear to be 
moved himself: that is, he must express his emotions in his countenance and by his 
manner, otherwise his language will be contradicted by his looks; and his audience will 
be more inclined to believe them, which are natural and sure indications of the inward 
mind, than his words, which may be easily feigned, and may differ much from his real 
sentiments.”634 Note first, that bodily action can actually trump language in terms of net 
rhetorical effect; second, that manner can be decisively “read”; and third, that even as 
Austin plugs this system for deliberately motivating sentiment, he can’t help but 
acknowledge the indomitable push of concurrent inclination (and that it will always shape 
motion to some extent).  
To explore the logistics of “reading” bodies, Austin turns to Darwin, who says 
that there are two ways by which this happens. “First by having observed the effects of 
[the passions], as of fear or anger on our own bodies, we know at sight when others are 
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under the influence of these affections.”635 Secondly, and importantly for Austin’s 
theorization of gesture’s warming effects: “When we put ourselves into the attitude that 
any passion naturally occasions, we soon in some degree acquire the passion; hence when 
those that scold indulge themselves in loud oaths and violent actions of the arms, they 
increase their anger by the mode of expressing themselves: and on the contrary, the 
counterfeited smile of pleasure in disagreeable company soon brings along with it a 
portion of the reality, as is well illustrated by Mr. Burke.”636 It is Burke in Essay on the 
Sublime and Beautiful who rounds out the case. He puts the body temporally before the 
mind in terms of the experience of passion—so “when the body is disposed by any means 
whatsoever, to such emotions as it would acquire by the means of a certain passion, it 
will of itself excite something very like that passion in the mind.”637 Here is the crux of 
Austin’s case, too—the bodily register of persuasion happens first. 
“In high passion,” Austin puts it, “the order is. 1. The eyes. 2. The countenance in 
general. 3. The gestures. 4. Language.”638 Note, predictably, that language is the last 
place into which the warmth suffuses, what is left from the first three having taken 
warmth to manifest expression. What of an impetus gets into the language is only the 
remainder, which is why Austin says the rhetor does well to capitalize on the first three, 
as well as why she well to be as convicted as possible. The more passion with which you 
start, and the more efficiently (by way of practice) you can embody that, the more heat 
makes it through to your word: “A public speaker sometimes delivers his sentiments from 
the impression of the moment; when these are ardent and generous, nothing further is to 	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be wished, than that he may have been well practiced and instructed beforehand in all the 
powers of language, as well as in all the external arts of eloquence. Words of fire will 
then be supplied, and lightnings will flash as splendid as irresistible; and voice, 
countenance, and gesture will be such as expression, force, and gracefulness demand.”639 
Austin suggests that you can train your body to acclimatize through motion. One 
“conserves heat” as the sentiment moves through the parts to language. It is this store that 
makes possible the “words of fire” and “lightnings” that will translate to sensation in your 
hearer.  
The storm language here is not accidental: “Even in the ‘tempest and whirlwind 
of his passion,’ he shall be still in possession of himself, and never abandon himself to 
undue extravagance. All that energy, brilliancy, or pathos can require, may, in the pulpit, 
in parliament, and at the bar be kept within such bounds, as shall better produce the 
intended effect, than the most licentious indulgence.”640 Austin is careful to present “high 
passion” as a cautionary tale—as storms worth preparing for, but not necessarily seeking 
out. Rhetorical agency is more atmospheric than individual. Heat conservation is a 
critical part of appeal.  
 
7  CALIBRATING RHETORICAL CONDITIONS 
 
The article beside Austin’s “A Method of Cutting Very Fine Screws, and Screws 
of Two or More Threads, & c.” in Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy in 1803 (one 
of his side avocations was philosophical chemistry) is the Reverend Arthur McGwire’s 
“Description of a Self-Registering Barometer.” The barometer he describes consists of 	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mainly household items like a piece of paper “upon which are hours and minutes marked 
by perpendicular lines,”641 a fixed scale, a pencil, “a circular piece of light wood, 
cemented to the tube of the barometer, of a size sufficient to make the barometer float at 
its proper height,”642 and a wooden cover (you would also need a certain amount of 
mercury, and a reservoir for it). The article comprises a kind of “do-it-yourself” 
description of how to make a portable barometer, beginning with, “The paper AAAA 
moves horizontally and presses against the pencil D. The pencil would trace an horizontal 
line upon the paper if the mercury remained stationary; but suppose the mercury descends 
in the cylinder of the barometer one inch, it will rise in the tube of the reservoir one inch 
from N to O.”643 The height of the mercury, he explains, would be ticked on the paper by 
the pencil about every hour and one minute. 
The “personal barometer” emphasizes the extent to which meteorological 
instruments seem to have been popularized in the course of the eighteenth century—and 
with the instruments, of course, weather monitoring and prediction. Along this line, 
Golinski shares in British Weather the story of how in the 1720s, James Jurin—secretary 
of the Royal Society—began an effort to coordinate weather recording in Britain and in 
many of its colonies: “Dozens of weather recorders were inspired,” he reports, “with a 
sense of public-spiritedness to contribute to this project. Journals were received from 
many places in Britain, continental Europe, and North America.”644 Most of those then 
just laid about in the Society archive. But by 1774—about twenty years before Austin 
publishes Chironomia—the Society “was beginning to compile and publish its own 	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642 Austin, Chironomia, 142. 
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weather record, using instruments kept at its London premises. The next decade saw the 
publication of journals from Bristol, Edinburgh, Somerset, Montreal, the Coast of 
Coromandel in India, and the Coast of Labrador in North America.”645  
Austin was known among his contemporaries for developing a system for the 
written transcription of gesture as a part of language, a system that allowed, for example, 
a speech transcriber to indicate precisely the gestures accompanying the verbal 
arguments. This notational system is often held up by his contemporaries (as well as later 
historians of rhetoric) as an example of Austin’s own chilliness—of his desire to, 
following the sense of the time, contain the energetic unruliness of gesture. Hawhee and I 
engage Austin’s notational system as a means not to minimize, but rather to capture the 
warmth of argument. It is also means to increase popular participation, in parallel to a 
contemporary popular uptake of meteorological research, in that conservation effort. As 
the Royal Society enlists transcribers of weather, Austin means to put the recording 
instrument in the hands of the people, both as means to garner data, and for divining 
trends to inform elocutionary practice:  
Every man has to begin for himself; and hence few are willing to venture 
upon the labor of contriving a system, and choose rather to trust to the 
gesture suggested by the moment, than hazard the more dangerous 
exhibition of gestures imperfectly conceived, and which will consequently 
be imperfectly executed. Each public speaker therefore falls into a manner 
of his own, as it is called, which is pardoned as being his way, and which 
is in general most unimpressive and most ungraceful. If these gestures 
contribute in the warmer parts of an oration to give any force to the 	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expression, nothing more can arise from them; they deduct from it amply 
by their wearisome sameness and iterated monotony. Some speakers, 
aware of this, do not venture upon any gesture of the limbs at all, but nod 
with their head, and labour with their body through the whole 
discourse.”646 
Like the eager weather diarists’ motivation for participating in the national effort to track 
patterns in weather—spurned to record “by a sense of participating in a collective 
enterprise that was building up a picture of the climate of Britain and its overseas 
territories”647—Austin also wants his system to tap inclinations for national identity. 
Austin likens the notations to music. The system in practice happens a bit like 
music too, in the sense that there are “notes” on a line across the tops of words, which 
require an intimate familiarity with the system (routine practice) to read (“see”) and 
reenact (“feel”). The idea is twofold: first, it will allow students to be able to enact the 
delivery of speeches in a highly specific and repeatable way. Second, in an era where 
recording equipment was yet a long way off, it allowed—if you could write fast 
enough—gesture accompanying a speech to be preserved for posterity. Austin renders 
notations in incredible detail through explication in chapters and a series of tables and 
charts, which break minutiae of gestures into “bite-sized pieces” to ease translation, and 
later, notation. For example, regarding the “letters written above the line on which the 
gesture is noted, relating to the hands, the fingers, and arms,” we have the first lower case 
letter, which denotes the manner of the palm, which may be: (p.) prone, (s.) supine, (n.) 
inwards or natural, (o.) outwards, (f.) forwards, (b.) backwards, or (v.) vertical; as well as 	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the position of the fingers, which may be (c.) clinched, (g.) grasping, (x.) extended, (h.) 
holding, (m.) thumb, (l.) collected, or (w.) hollow.648 
Following in the line comes the second lower case letter, denoting “elevation of 
the arms”; the third small letter, “position of the arms in the transverse direction”; the 
fourth and fifth small letters, “for motions of the hands and arms, and force of gesture,”; 
capitals to be placed at the sentence’s end, “head and eyes”; and last, letters below the 
line for feet (see (a.) advance, (r.) retire, (tr.) traverse, (c.) cross, (st.) start, (sp.) stamp, 
and (sk.) shock).649 In the final column of the table, and rendered last in his system of 
charts, we find a nod to “significant gestures and expressions of countenance which may 
be noted in the margin, after the manner of Mr. Sheridan,” which seems of particular 
interest for this investigation.650 Here, on the periphery of the tightly cinched notational 
clusters, in the white between staffs where you might scribble conductor’s notes on a 
score, is a place for that mischievous vector that permutes and swells as a course of the 
affective circuit, and throughout the rhetorical exchange. But these signatures are limited 
because Austin wants to keep them out of the limelight (as attending to less “effables” in 
too nuanced a way could underscore seepages in his system). To the margin, he relegates: 
(Ap.) appealing, (At.) attention, (Vn.) veneration, (Ls.) listening, (Lm.) lamentation, 
(Dp.) deprecation, (Pr.) pride, (Sh.) shame, (Av.) aversion, (Cm.) commanding, (Ad.) 
admiration, (Hr.) horror, (Gr.) grief, (Fr.) fear, and (En.) encouraging, “and many others 
at pleasure.” 
This exactingness belies Austin’s apprehension about more entropic aspects of 
delivery, the variables that fall outside the boxes of his master table, or which he cannot 	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calculate. But it is no accident that room exists within the system to try to capture the 
entropic combinations that work—rousing an audience to physical effect. He wants to 
catch patterns for posterity, but moreso to calibrate the gesture. 
 
8  SPHERE OF PRACTICE 
 
Austin depicts the compass of gesture with scientific precision. Looking closely at 
Austin’s Figure 18, one can make out small letters around the periphery. Two other 
figures on Plate 2 include such markings, one capturing the frontal view, and one the 
aerial view: “Let a sphere be described according to the stereographic projection, 
consisting of the primitive circle (Z h R h), the right circle (A R), and two oblique circles 
(Z q R and Z C R), in an angle of 45 degrees at each side…All these circles are 
intersected by three others.”651 These letters partition the sphere into latitudes and 
longitudes, by which Austin plots the coordinates of the rhetor’s body: “The circles [in 
Austin’s Figure 18] which are strongly marked, relate to the right hand, the faint circles 
to the left. The right circle and the oblique circles at each side of it serve for both 
hands…That marked (q) for the right becomes (c) for the left, and the contrary.”652 The 
trajectory of gesture is then charted as one might a road trip, by map.   
Chapter 7, “Of Positions, Motions, and Elevations of the Arms” best captures 
Austin’s topography of the body. It is clear from these descriptions and figures that 
Austin means for his gestural system to work, mechanically, just like his air pump—
which bears similar markings in Austin’s diagram, and is similarly described in terms of 
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work and energy produced by each component (Figure 7).653  Austin enumerates 
rhetorical gestures like fixtures on his apparatus. Combining 3 vertical with 5 transverse 
positions yields 15 “fundamental” arm positions, which can happen at one of three 
elevations (downwards, horizontal, elevated across), and can be performed by right, left 
or both hands, yielding 135 permutations of arm gesture. Austin then relates 
permutation—degree of arm position—to 
the degree of energy proceeding from the sentiment of desire or aversion 
with which a passage is delivered [which] influences much the character 
of the gesture, in the same manner as it does the tones and expression of 
the voice…It will be observed that the hand is always directed accurately 
to the proper point, and that the variation arising from the force or energy 
of the action relates to the arm principally.654 
But like weather, the compass of rhetorical gesture is difficult to apprehend, often 
exceeding record, prediction, and control.655 Austin acknowledges that there are probably 
“infinite” rather than 135 arm gestures; and “in speaking of angles and elevations 
determined by degrees, mathematical precision is not intended, and is not necessary.”656 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  653	  Gilbert Austin, “On a New Construction of a Condenser and Air-Pump,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 103 (1813): 138-145.	  
654 Austin, Chironomia, 314-15. 
655 The inclemency of the system’s early stages is rehearsed in the following anecdote, excerpted 
from Mary Margaret Robb and Lester Thonssen’s introduction to the 1966 edition: “Dr. Jonathan 
Barber’s Practical Treatise on Gesture, 1831, gave full credit to Austin, stating at the beginning 
that it was chiefly abstracted from Chironomia and designed for the students at Harvard College. 
Dr. Barber, English physician turned elocutionist, served as Dr. Edward T. Channing’s assistant 
from 1829 to 1835. Channing, a very successful teacher of rhetoric, asked for an assistant who 
would work with individual students to polish their delivery for declamations, and to give some 
lectures. Evidently Barber was not wholly successful. One morning he found his bamboo sphere 
on the top of a barber’s pole (the sphere was undoubtedly used in teaching Austin’s system). 
Soon Barber resigned. The students found his teaching too mechanistic and demanding” (ibid., 
xvii-xviii). 
656 Austin 316, 310. 
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In the rhetorical sphere, a body is always moved to stance, which forms, melts, and 
reforms across occasions and practice. 
Just as Priestley’s theories of rhetorical transmission were, in a sense, extensions 
of recent insights into the chemical and physical properties of matter, Austin’s call for a 
gestural rhetorical practice of heat conservation is grounded in contemporary 
meteorological scholarship. Rather than what would much later be called the “rhetorical 
situation,” Austin offers, I argue, a way to think about the context of persuasive utterance 
in terms of rhetorical energy: a model that is more useful for thinking through the 
relationships between rhetor, exigence, and audience in material terms.  
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EPILOGUE:  
SOLICITATIONS 
 
Gesture’s work, Austin suggests, lies as much in its entropy as energy. Gesture 
“may be varied almost to infinity.”657 It is at once shaping us, penetrating other bodies, 
wily as errant thoughts, and as convincing. Elocutionist accounts amply describe the 
rhetorical gesture’s provocation, and ability to exceed the individual will. Austin, for 
example, mentions a preacher whose delivery pulls parishioners off their pews.658 Bulwer 
notices gestures that pull the rhetor off-topic. On graver notes, Sheridan and Priestley are 
both run out of town by riots, described in various accounts as having been touched off 
by “party gestures.” The gesture’s thread of cause and effect is well expressed through 
Liebniz’ (1646-1716) potential energy: “I call the infinitely small efforts or conatus, by 
which the body is so to speak solicited or invited to motion, solicitations.”659 The 
solicitations are to the motion “as a point to a line.”660 In this way, the rhetorical gesture 
becomes difficult to parse. It becomes part of what Burke calls in The Philosophy of 
Literary Form  “the unending conversation” of history. Although Burke does not speak to 
the body per se in this much-quoted passion, the body and its gesture are implicit 
resources for the situated symbolic action he describes: 
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others 
have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a 
discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is 	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Writings, tr. Mary Morris (New York: Dutton, 1965), 136. 
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about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them 
got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps 
that had gone on before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you 
have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone 
answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns 
himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your 
opponent, depending on the quality of your ally’s assistance. However, the 
discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you 
do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.661 
The power of gesture looms large in the dismissal of the elocutionary period in 
prominent rhetorical histories. Wilbur Samuel Howell says in Eighteenth-Century British 
Logic and Rhetoric that “The elocutionists made rhetoric appear to be the art of 
declaiming a speech by rote, without regard to whether the thought uttered were trivial or 
false or dangerous; and under auspices like these, rhetoric became anathema to the 
scholarly community, and sacred only to the anti-intellectuals within and outside the 
academic system.”662 The elocutionists are rejected—in a manner for which Austin is a 
particularly good example—for being at once too dangerous and excessive, and too 
hidebound to the famously conservative mores of the British national culture in and 
through which they lived and worked. A synthesis of Bizzell and Herzberg’s treatment of 
“Elocution” in The Rhetorical Tradition, and Thomas Conley’s of seventeenth century 
rhetoric and the subsequent elocutionary period in Rhetoric and the European Tradition 	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in Symbolic Action, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 110-11. 
662 Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (New York: Russell & 
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suggests a rhetorical practice and pedagogy that is excessive and anti-rational—“appeal 
by drug”—precisely in its overly determined attention to rote physical form over and 
against creative and informed invention.663 In “The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and the 
Rhetoric of the Closed Fist,” Edward P. J. Corbett says “muscular rhetoric”: “The older 
rhetoricians, who devoted most of their attention in the classroom and in their texts to 
instruction in the strategies of the logical appeal, would be appalled at this development 
in contemporary rhetoric.”664 
Common to all of these dismissals is the re-affirmation of gesture’s significance: 
the Elocutionists cannot be simply consigned to a marginal canonical moment obsessed 
with comportment, because their charts, notations, and manuals traffic in rhetorical form 
that is at once central to reasoned delivery and excessive of it. The fire and pull of 
Priestley’s rhetorical transmission is implicit even in Austin’s chilly notations. As Paul 
Carter observes about Linnaeus’s taxonomy of dance choreography, “In this process [of 
capture], it [the dance form] loses all power to signify beyond itself, to suggest lines of 
development or the subtler influences of climate, ground and aspect. In short, its ecology, 
its existence in a given, living space is lost in the moment of scientific discovery.”665 
It is an important time to return to the elocutionists, and to consider especially the 
warrant for their claim to centralize delivery in rhetorical training: energy moves bodies 
outside of meaning. Contemporary theorists of material rhetoric have begun to return to 
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gesture as central to an adequate understanding of political discourse. Their studies beg a 
question to which I respond in this dissertation: given the affective excess of gesture in 
speech, what is the role of gesture in rhetorical invention and educational practice? Is a 
material rhetoric even rhetorical, or is it something before and beyond? Jenny Rice 
argues, “[George W.] Bush’s rhetoric…creates an intensity that can move others. Bush’s 
ineptness contains something affective that turns out to be more than its symbolic or 
meaningful form. In other words, before we can talk about gridded position (ings) either 
for or against Bush, something intensive occurs in the interstices between our various 
bodies.”666 Drew Westin, in The Political Brain uses Howard Dean’s “scream” during the 
2004 Democratic primaries as an “interesting example” of tectonic ethos shifts by 
gesture.667 In Toward a Civil Discourse (2006) Sharon Crowley calls the political left, but 
also our discipline more generally to pay better attention to the body in rhetorical 
exchange. 
In short, I argue with Crowley, rhetorical theory, practice, and criticism should be 
approached from the assumption of the physicality of invention—“you put in your oar,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 Rice, “Executive Overspill,” 1, 3.  
667 Drew Westin, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 298. Along this line, Paul Ekman, and Wallace V. Friesen, co-
authors of Masking the Face (Cambridge, MA: Malor Books, 2003) compiled what they called 
the Facial Action Coding System, or FACS, a 500-page compendium on the subject. And Ekman 
has done all kinds of interesting things with his knowledge, like help President Clinton iron out 
an eyeroll that Ekman claims suggested ‘I’m a bad boy’ [See interview account in Malcolm 
Gladwell’s Blink (New York: Back Bay Books, 2005), 206]. Ekman connects realizes, after days 
of practicing faces and the like with Friesen, that in his words, “‘Say you do A.U. one, raising the 
inner eyebrows, and six, raising the cheeks, and fifteen, the lowering of the corner of the lips,’ 
Ekman said, and then did all three. ‘What we discovered is that that expression alone is sufficient 
to create marked changes in the autonomic nervous system. When this first occurred, we were 
stunned. We weren’t expecting this at all. And it happened to both of us. We felt terrible. What 
we were generating were sadness, anguish. And when I lower my brows, which is four, and raise 
the upper eyelid, which is five, and narrow the eyelids, which is seven, and press the lips together, 
which is twenty-four, I’m generating anger. My heartbeat will go up ten to twelve beats. My 
hands will get hot. As I do it, I can’t disconnect from the system. It’s very unpleasant, very 
unpleasant” (Gladwell, Blink, 207). 
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as Burke says. G. H. Mead describes the collective, affinitive nature of cognition “as a 
result of the interaction of three elements: actions or gestures, resulting interpretations of 
gestures; and responses of the self and others to gestures.”668 In The Body in Pain, Elaine 
Scarry describes the write-ability of the dynamic human form: “Not only is there no form 
of sentience specific to ‘imagining,’ but it does not, unlike other forms of sensation, even 
seem to be anchored in a specific part of the body…it is almost as easy to make an 
imagined blue flower arise in the interior of the calf of the leg as it is to make it arise in 
the head; just as the picture of a foot race can occur along the interior path on the 
forearm, with its starting point at the elbow and its finishing point at the wrist.”669 The 
bodies at Burke’s party, likewise, are pliant, absorbing then refashioning components of 
the conversation in ways that are slightly different each time. Speaking of “poetic 
gestures,” Burke observes that “The body is an actor; as an actor, it participates in the 
movements of the mind, posturing correspondingly; in styles of thought and expression 
we embody those correlations—and the recognition of this is, as you prefer, either 
‘scientific’ or ‘poetic.’”670 In The Life of S.T. Coleridge, Lawrence Hanson recounts the 
following lines of William Hazlitt’s concerning Coleridge: 
I observed that he continually crossed me on the way by shifting from one 
side of the foot-path to the other. This struck me as an odd movement; but 
I did not at that time connect it with any instability of purpose or 
involuntary change of principle, as I have done since… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668 Karen Burke LeFevre, Invention as a Social Act (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1987), 50. 
669 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
670 Burke, Philosophy, 130. 
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There is a chaunt in the recitation both of Coleridge and 
Wordsworth, which acts as a spell upon the hearer, and disarms the 
judgment. Perhaps they have deceived themselves by making habitual use 
of this ambiguous accompaniment. Coleridge’s manner is more full, 
animated, and varied; Wordsworth’s more equable, sustained, and internal. 
The one might be termed more dramatic, the other more lyrical. Coleridge 
has told me that he himself liked to compose walking over uneven ground, 
or breaking through the straggling branches of a copse-wood; whereas 
Wordsworth always wrote (if he could) walking up and down a straight 
gravel-walk, or in some spot where the continuity of his verse met with no 
collateral interruption.671 
Burke uses this example to illustrate the attitudinizing of the poem, by which the whole 
body enacts idea—“dances a corresponding state of mind, reordering the glandular and 
neural behavior of the organism in obedience to mind-body correspondences, quite as the 
formal dancer reorders his externally observable gesturing to match his attitude.”672 To 
omit the body from accounts of invention is to ignore our solicitations—other bodies, the 
road we walk. Like Merleau-Ponty’s identification, forming rhetorical stance (like 
opposition, assent, or embarrassment, above) “can only happen if my hand, which is felt 
from within, is also accessible from without, itself intangible, for my other hand, for 
example, if it takes place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens 
finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part.”673 Although the body and its 	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673 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, tr. Alphonso Lingus (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press), 133. 
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gestures (/non-alphabetic vocabularies and concepts) have been largely omitted from 
accounts of rhetorical invention, gesture is inevitably improvisational: “its own 
movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate.”674 
This project especially commends gesture to inventional activity for its entropic, 
irrational possibility. Brian Massumi in Parables for the Virtual shares a scientific study 
to advance his claim on sensible bodies. He tells us that there were patients implanted 
with cortical electrodes (“for medical purposes”). Mild electric shocks were administered 
onto patients’ skin. The pulse at each place was perceived only if it lasted more than 0.5 
seconds. “The researcher speculated that sensation involves a ‘backward referral in 
time’—in other words, that sensation is organized recursively before being linearized, 
before it is redirected outwardly to take its part in a conscious chain of actions and 
reactions. Brain and skin form a resonating vessel. Stimulation turns inward, is folded 
into the body, except that there is no inside for it to be in, because the body is radically 
open, absorbing impulses quicker than they can be perceived, and because the entire 
vibratory event is unconscious, out of mind.”675 The body, Massumi says, “infolds 
volitions and cognitions that are nothing if not situated”—he recommends “using 
inattention as a writing tool. You have to let yourself get so caught up in the flow of your 
writing that it ceases at moments to be recognizable as your own.”676 With Prior, I 
address the unreasonable separation of “gesture” from “writing” in composition studies. 
“Writing” is continually defined and prescribed in a traditional, pen-to-paper, artifact- 
and text-centric way. Writing is, of course, an embodied practice. As Haas and Witte 	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argue, it is “intimately linked with technologies and with knowledge,” that are “enacted 
in part through bodily and sensory means.”677 Prior and I argue not only that gesture 
influences writing (which was not lost on Quintilian, for instance, who noted certain 
gestures could keep writing “warm”) but that gestures write, and writing gestures. 
Finally, this project is a call to reconsider what gesture is and does for rhetorical 
and writing studies, as well as what rhetorical and writing studies can do for studies of 
gesture. This capacity of the hands (and body as a whole) to express concepts 
independent of or alongside—and even to assist—spoken language has been a central 
tenet of the recent resurgence of interest in studies of gesture.678 For example, Goldin-
Meadow, in Hearing Gesture: How Our Hands Help Us Think suggests that the body 
aids in carrying or holding cognitive effort during speaking: “gesturing may not only 
reflect a speaker’s cognitive state but may, by reducing cognitive load, also play a role in 
shaping that state.”679 This capacity is central to Kendon’s encapsulation of what gesture 
is: “a label for actions that have the features of manifest deliberate expressiveness.”680 
While this definition has operated as a popular definition for gesture within Gesture 
Studies for some time, it restricts the qualification of gestures to those “being done for the 
purpose of expression rather than in the service of some practical claim.”681 “Capacity,” 
as such, is also a central feature gesture research—which, tending toward psychological 
and anthropological studies, tends to focus either on how individual gestures happen 
(inner physiology), or what gestures mean (taxonomically, semantically). Rhetorical and 	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writing studies underscore the importance of thinking about how gestures communicate, 
attitudinize, forge pathways to mutual acknowledgment and identification. Rather than 
limiting “gesture” to  “manifest, deliberate expressiveness,” I wonder about expanding 
that qualification to “manifest, accidental practicality,” and even, as Leibniz might assert, 
to the “non-manifest, accidental practicality” of solicitations.682  
Kendon identifies questions central to the emerging, interdisciplinary field of 
gesture studies, and which I would call, in one way or another, exigencies for thinking 
about developing the relationship between gesture and writing studies: a) on the nature of 
interrelationship between speech and gesture: “these two activities are so intimately 
connected that they appear to be governed by a single process,” he says, “although…the 
way in which gesture and speech serve as modes of expression is quite different”683; b) 
that of the extent to which “visible bodily action, including gesture, can play a crucial 
role in the processes of interaction and communication”684; c) the tension between 
gestures seeming both natural and/or universal and “shown to be regulated and subject to 
social convention”685; and d) “the question of the evolutionary origins of language,” 
much debated in the eighteenth century, in which gesture is implicated.686 Rhetorical and 
writing studies suggest both answers and additional questions for Kendon’s rubric. With 
Sheridan, I wonder about extending the root of the gesture to bodies-in-proximity. With 	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has never finished tracing a line until one has finished tracing a shorter one, despite the fact that 
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Austin, I wonder about conceiving gesture in terms of a less-grammatical unit, like work, 
or heat. With Priestley, I wonder about those moments of hard-to-pin-down agency 
present in our human manipulations of the physical movement of energy throughout our 
environment.  
Here is what I hope the elocutionists bring to us: not dated projects of revitalizing 
and standardizing English oratory, but rather a demand to consider argument, in theory, 
criticism, practice, and pedagogy, as physical form from physical form, galvanized 
through infinitesimal conatus. 
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FIGURE 1: GESTUS 23 (Chirologia…Chironomia, 188). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: CANON 8 (Chirologia…Chironomia, 218). 
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FIGURE 3: FINGER CANON 29 (Bulwer, Chirologia…Chironomia, 223). 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Tone Chart (Walker, Elements, 137). 
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FIGURE 5: Figure 18 (Austin, Chironomia, 12). 
 
FIGURE 6: Figure 39 (Austin, Chironomia, 15). 
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FIGURE 7: Air Pump FIGURE 3 (Austin, “On a New Construction,” 144). 
 
 
 
